September 27, 2008
Ares PDR Was Not As Smooth As NASA Says It Was
Editor's 27 Sep note: Mike Griffin has given Dave King 30 days to fix this problem. King has assigned people to fix or remove problems/people ASAP. Heads have already rolled. The phrase "clean house" has been used again and again over the last two days. Meanwhile, X-33 genius and Ares manager Steve Cook mysteriously remains in his current position.
Editor's 24 Sep update: NASA sources report that there are some red faces in Huntsville and that there is the obligatory witch hunt under way at MSFC to find guilty parties and to try and figure out how this information got outside of NASA. Suffice it to say that the way this post-PDR "survey" was done is laughable - and that this witch hunt will simply cause even more embarrassing information to surface. So Steve, instead of searching out the people who spoke the truth to you and wanted the world to hear it as well, perhaps you should take their comments to heart and fix a process that is most certainly dysfunctional.
Editor's 23 Sep note: NASA recently concluded a PDR (Preliminary Design Review) for its new Ares 1 rocket at NASA Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama (charts). Despite glowing comments about the success of the review and the smoothness with which it operated, many of the participants seem to have a different point of view.
"Too many people involved in the planning phase, meetings were too large"; "The integrated vechicle review did not present the element design issues (RIDs) so it was difficult to know if the parts added up to a rocket that will fly"; "The review occurred to close to the element PDRs, This did not allow for some of the element level rids to addressed or predeclared in documents"; "Much of the documentation presented for PDR was not mature enough for PDR. This limited an effective of these documents and left the impression that the PDR was rushed."; "The RID screening rules and procedures seemed to change from day to day, like we were making it up as we went along."; "Insufficient time was allotted to review the documents."; "Not allowing RIDs to be written against the SRD and declaring it a finished document prior to the PDR was just arrogant and wrong. This was further evidenced and confused by the introduction of two version of the SRD, showing that it was in fact being changed behind the scenes." etc.
Below are verbatim commments provided to an online review website by the actual PDR recipients. The deadline for adding comments was today (23 September 2008).
Ideas: What did we intend to do, and did we do it?
1. Execute an effective PDR for all phases
2. We intended to deliver a well planned and execution of the PDR Kick Off and DDP, with all technical issues worked behind the scenes, invisible to the customer.
3. To train the participants so that they would be able to function effectively. I thihnk we earned a 7 out of 10 on did we do it
4. The intent was to make sure all DDP participants knew what was expected from them with respect to presetation content, time allowed and presentation format. I would term this partially successful
5. The PDR followed the NASA PDR criteria but the presentation of the design documentation made it difficult to evalaute the Preliminary Design.
6. I thought it went very well.
7. The best was to address this is how effective we are in addressing and resoving the issues raised during the PDR by CDR.
8. 1. Training was a joke. we had 40 people in a conference room that held 20 + about 13 in the hall way.
9. 2.Who was the customer? NASA HQ, ARES PO, the elements. Invisiable from who????
10. The PDR team did not execute the plan that they somewhat trained the participants in. Their failure to adequately inform the participants of the changes in the plan damaged the adequacy and credibility of the review.
11. We intended to judge the preliminary design against the requirements. We ended up doing a reqts review for the most part.
12. The focus on most of the above comments seems to be on process rather than purpose. This also seemed to be the mindset of the PDR planning goup: Rid Training, RID processing, Kick off logistics, design presentations, team processes, etc. etc. The real purpose, evaluating the preliminary design against requirements, seems to have been lost in the minutiae of RID processing without a comprehensive evaluation of design against requirements.
13. What should have been doing is correcting design and concept defects; instead we worked very hard to kill RIDs. I guess it's not a defect if the RID is rejected for missing or incomplete "from/to" language.
14. Because of the short review time for RID review and dispostion, RIDs were rejected based on technicalities and the underlying issue described in the RID was not addressed.
15. The process was well thought-out, however, this design review as in others is made up of participants that are not familiar with the process at all. I recommend two things to preceed any training: 1. Clear definition of roles (a list of all the roles, what does each role entail), and 2. A list of the steps from pre-RID to RID to closure. My document was effectively reviewed; just not efficiently.
16. From a Board perspective, the review went well. The Exec overview during the kickoff served is purpose. The board meeting was reasonably crisp and offered ample airing of the issues that surfaced. However, as was presented, and as shows in the comments, there were several disruptions and missteps along the way. These took extra-ordinary effort to deal with. So, from my perspective, it would be very important to review these lessons learned and incorporate corrective action in future similar reviews.
17. We intended to confirm that the design process had matured sufficiently in addressing the requirements commensurate with the Preliminary Design Review criteria. We only confirmed where we are in the design process and captured the shortcomings through stoplight metrics and actions.
Ideas: What worked well, and why?
1. Kickoff worked well, because the Project Office had staff that was experienced in conducting the kickoffs
2. The DDP worked well, because the Project Office had staff that was experienced in conducting kickoffs, and this was very similar to the kickoff.
3. Things went well because the Project office AND Engineering worked together as a team!!
4. Many of the team tabletop activities went well. The most successful ones were the ones who had a plan of how to conduct their team meetings and a schedule for getting through their activity, and also had the better facilities in building 4205.
5. The wiki site was a great source of information
6. The wiki sit helped me find the information quickly.
7. In my opinion, that is the only way the PDR could be successful.
8. The invidividual reviews were performed in a very efficient and organized manner.
9. The teams performed well, especially given the timetable and changes of course during the review.
10. Free coffee. Many thanks to the occupants of 4205 for their generosity
11. The Ares1 Project Coordinators saved the day despite the verbal abuse, neglect (the RID coordinator generally could not be found), constant change and near 100% lack of direction from the two people tasked to lead the work. If not for the professionalism of these Project Coordinators, the PDR review would have been a disaster. It would be a welcome change if they could be rewarded/acknowledged for the herculean efforts to make this review a success despite the actions of the two people tasked with organizing and running it.
12. The Kickoff was great. A large auditorium with actual space between seats and a well organized presentation. The agenda was followed. Gray Research is nice for smaller events, but could not handle the PDR
13. The commuications with the board went very well. The Wiki, the exec overview, and the board meeting communications through e-mail all met their purpose and made serving easy
14. Opportunities for stakeholders to have insight and input in the process is important and we did a good job of making those opportunities available to all.
Ideas: Based on what went well, identify what we should keep doing. Please prioritize your list. (Be sure to include which Phase and Area of that Phase you are referring to when you enter your responses)
1. Wiki
2. Face to Face Tabletops
3. Sequestering teams away from their normal work sites
4. RID Tool "Reporting"
5. 1. Face - to Face meetings
6. 1. Face-toface meetings2. WIki Page
7. sequestering, face to face meetings
8. Continue the open face to face forums, and pursue better meeting space on site.
Ideas: What didn't work well and why?
1. Need more than one person that understands the ENTIRE process and can help with answering questions, emails, phone calls, etc.
2. Too many people involved in the planning phase, meetings were too large
3. Internal communication was not integrated
4. Internal communication was not integrated
5. The RID tool access was too limited to allow everyone who needed access to the system. Many cases only a few people were able to enter rids for an entire branch.
6. Too many people involved in the planning phase, meetings were too large
7. Need more than one person that understands the ENTIRE process and can help with answering questions, emails, phone calls, etc.
8. RID tool was cumbersome and still is as we try to address the RIDs.
9. The presenation of the design was not well laid out. A Product Breakdown Structure (PBS) may help.
10. The integrated vechicle review did not present the element design issues (RIDs) so it was difficult to know if the parts added up to a rocket that will fly
11. The review occurred to close to the element PDRs, This did not allow for some of the element level rids to addressed or predeclared in documents.
12. The table tops seemed to have no agenda and were always full of people who seemed to just be observing the meeting, making it impossible for people with technical issues to attend.
13. Time was limited for the book-mangers to work RIDs with the initiators
14. Comments made by the "screening" team, when returned to the review team, were more often than not confusing to a point that the question was often raised as to the background of the screening team and did they understand the issue being discussed on the RID. This may have been a problem with the way the RID tool was being used/implemented.
15. People assigned to perform document reviews were also assigned to the screening team, leaving no time to actually review the documentation.
16. The text fields in the MSFC RIDS tool only allow 2 or three lines of text in a narrow window to be shown. This made it difficult to review RIDs in the screening team with a projector. The RIDS tool should be modifed to allow showing all the text in any field, not just a small slice of text.
17. Building 4205 was a very inconvienent place to hold the RID screening tabletop meetings. The Gallery room in 4205 is an echo chamber and it is impossible to conduct an effective meeting there. Parking around 4205 is limited, and the Marshall cops were giving parking tickets to people for parking on the grass or on the roadways. Most people had to park at the 4200 complex and walk over to 4205. The people normally resident in 4205 were resentful of the PDR visitors and got upset when we used the copiers, coffee machines, vending machines, etc. The building has limited restroom facilities. For a major review such as the Ares I PDR, the project needs to find a better venue in Huntsville that provides adequate parking, excellent wireless access, multiple meeting rooms, well-stocked vending machines, and access to restaraunts. The Von Braun Center downtown or the Jacobs Conference Center are possibilities.
18. Building 4205 was a very inconvienent place to hold the RID screening tabletop meetings. The Gallery room in 4205 is an echo chamber and it is impossible to conduct an effective meeting there. Parking around 4205 is limited, and the Marshall cops were giving parking tickets to people for parking on the grass or on the roadways. Most people had to park at the 4200 complex and walk over to 4205. The people normally resident in 4205 were resentful of the PDR visitors and got upset when we used the copiers, coffee machines, vending machines, etc. The building has limited restroom facilities. For a major review such as the Ares I PDR, the project needs to find a better venue in Huntsville that provides adequate parking, excellent wireless access, multiple meeting rooms, well-stocked vending machines, and access to restaraunts. The Von Braun Center downtown or the Jacobs Conference Center are possibilities.
19. Much of the documentation presented for PDR was not mature enough for PDR. This limited an effective of these documents and left the impression that the PDR was rushed.
20. The RID screening rules and procedures seemed to change from day to day, like we were making it up as we went along.
21. The CSRT detailed design presentations were missing major content such as graphs and tables, probably because they were generated on a Macintosh computer and the PowerPoint files were incompatible with the Windows versions. All presenters should have used Windows versions of Powerpoint to produce their slides.
22. The RID tool does NOT have a capability to retrive RIDs lost for nay reason.
23. RID training was conducted in an incompetent fashion. We had 40+ people in a room designed to hold 15-20. We had 10-15 people sitting in the hallway outside listening in.
24. The RID tool can not recover issues lost for any reason. A daily backup would be of great benefit. One full day of work entering RIDs (by multiple people) was lost and had to be repeated.
25. Insufficient time was allotted to review the documents.
26. Bldg 4205 was a very bad choice. That building was not designed to handle such an event/meetings. The selection and use of 4205 reduced the effectiveness of the review. People who made this selection did not understand what was expected or needed by the review teams.
27. Single point failures in communication and planning impacted the effectiveness of the PDR.
28. Several presenters did not know what was in there charts or had not seen them prior to presenting
29. Definition of "Editorial Issues" not consistent between teams.
30. Developer of wiki page was not given credit for his work (see source code of actual developers name). Credit was given to someone else. Not ethical.
31. Meeting room facility needs and request ignored.
32. Request to have room cleaned ignored.
33. Planning and notices of "overbooking" of kick-off and detailed design review had effect of discouraging people to participate in PDR.
34. Informal notice that people who might be admitted to kick off could be asked to leave to make room for VIPs discouraged attendance.
35. RID tool passwords and usernames shared with others (beyond RID tool account holder) by RID coordinator. RID tool usernames/passwords not secure.
36. RID tool passwords and usernames shared with others (beyond RID tool account holder) by RID coordinator. RID tool usernames/passwords not secure.
37. ABUSIVE STAFF LEADERS
38. NO ONE WOLD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GETTING THINGS SETUP AND PROBLEMS WORKED. CRITICAL NEEDS IGNORED.
39. MANY OTHERS DID PDR PLANNING WORK ADN SUPPORT, BUT CERDIT FOR WORK COMPLETED WAS TAKEN BY SOMEONE ELSE.
40. STAFF OVERWORKED, NO DIRECTION, SOME EMAIL FROM rid CONDINATOR VERY ABUSIVE TO TEAM MEMBERS
41. Restrictive invitations to PDR presentation and RID participation greatly reduced the capability of potential participants to provide a review of the vehicle design.
42. Not allowing RIDs to be written against the SRD and declaring it a finished document prior to the PDR was just arrogant and wrong. This was further evidenced and confused by the introduction of two version of the SRD, showing that it was in fact being changed behind the scenes.
43. This one goes to both this team and those above them. It is impossible to have adequate review of parts or the integrated vehicle if the schedules for other Elements does not allow for participation.
44. Allow adequate time for issues raised in Element or sub-system reviews to be addressed and brought forward. If we are actually building an integrated vehicle, then we need to pay attention to all the parts. We were directly told in training that the results of the US and Avionics reviews didn't matter to this review.
45. Not enough actual design documentation was available for review, many of the products were in poor shape for a pdr. Not enough actual design documentation was available for review, many of the products were in poor shape for a pdr.
46. Facility was inadequate/noisy. No place to sit quietly and review documents.
47. Documents were printed out for reviewers use but were not clearly marked-took a long time to find what you wanted and this could have been alleviated easily by labeling the notebooks with doc names.
48. I don't care who at NASA the RID coordinator is/was sleeping with personal abuse of team members is wrong!
49. My overriding concern with the PDR is the lack of ethics displayed by the contractor RID coordinator and two NASA managers. The contractor RID coordinator was given tasks by NASA and did not do them, when timing was critical she passed the work onto others, then had the finished work sent back to her. She then uploaded the products as her own taking full credit work she did not do. This was known by the NASA PDR lead. Nothing was done due to the sexual relationship between the RID coordinator and a Sr. NASA manager. The lack of ethics and standards, the dishonesty and overt favoritism is damaging this project and will if left unchecked endanger the Ares 1 program (as it will spread) and one day Astronauts. We need to get back to building rockets, not hiring girlfriends. 1.
50. Need to define exactly what should be done/completed prior to tabletop meetings during PDR. Book managers needed to already have worked issues/comments/editorials with reviewers prior to attending PDR tabletop with the sequestered team. They needed to already have worked whether they accepted/rejected their comments before entering. They needed to check the RID tool themselves for their documents to see if any RIDs had been entered against their document. The tabletop meetings were not meant to work issues, unless a sequestered participant had a question/comment about a RID.
51. I do not believe the sequestering of the review teams worked well for non-local people supporting other projects. Complaints were voiced about lack of Orion support of the Ares PDR, imagine the outcry if Orion would have requested 3 contiguous weeks of sequestered Ares support a month or two before the Ares PDR. It was just not realistic.
52. The option to print a full RID report in the RID tool should only be available to certain users and not everyone registered to use the tool.
Ideas: Based on what did not go well, identify what we should do differently. Please prioritize your list. (Be sure to include which Phase and Area of the Phase you are referring to when you enter your responses.)
1. Individual review period was not long enough for those review team members who had to prepare charts then rework them ad naseum for the DDP
2. Not enough time was provided for a complete review of the technical design
3. Logistics and requirements should be well defined for the Review's needs
4. There are many good leaders in this group, but one person needs to be empowered with assigning/delegating the tasks needed for successful execution...this person should be assigned my NASA management, and given the authority to act as a supervisor during this process
5. Need to define exactly what should be done/completed prior to tabletop meetings during PDR. Book managers needed to already have worked issues/comments/editorials with reviewers prior to attending PDR tabletop with the sequestered team. They needed to already have worked whether they accepted/rejected their comments before entering. They needed to check the RID tool themselves for their documents to see if any RIDs had been entered against their document. The tabletop meetings were not meant to work issues, unless a sequestered participant had a question/comment about a RID.
6. 1. Present the Integrated (all the Element) RID Story so that it is easy to follow and so that it can be referenced while reviewing VI products
7. Rework the RID tool so that it supports the RID process used (instead of driving the process). Also improve the reports.
8. Have a drawing Layout Room for CDR. There will be more drawiongs and we will need to see them.
9. Obviously the location for the RID review was undersized for the number of reviewers. Network capacity was a problem and should have been anticipated. Room location for some put review teams into areas that were not supportive of the review. Consider a larger location next time with the appropriate network capacity.
10. Since a lot of the PDR documentation was not mature enough to be considered for PDR, limiting the value of a review of these documents, the PDR entry critieria should be reconsidered. Possibly restricting documentation addressed in the PDR to 60% maturity with no TBDs or TBRs.
11. Consider using the large auditorium at the Davidson Center not just for the kickoff presentations but also for the Detailed Design Presentations. Provide good wireless network access in the Davidson Center and breakout rooms for splinter meetings.
12. The conduct of this review begs a question: was it designed to review technical content or just pass a program milestone?
13. PEOPLE RUNNING THE PDR HAD NEVER CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF THIS TYPE (OR ANY OTHER ACTUALY). NO EXPERIENCE WAS EVIDNET. PDR LEFT TO RUN IT'S SELF AS BEST TEAM MEMBERS COULD SET UP.
14. Plan and execute and open PDR of the design, not just the delivered documentation. Make every facet of the design RIDable and accept that you have invited the discipline experts to CRITICALLY review your design.
15. Plan for days or hours of fully training participants or participant leaders in the review processes and tools. One 30 minutes session and a pointer to the locations was essentially a hand-wave at what was really needed.
16. Product readiness needs to be addressed/assessed. In general, this program changes direction so much that we spend all of our time reacting instead of working on a quality product. this review was no different. Groundrules were changed during the review-i.e., how we were to handle editorials. in that case, book managers would contact a reviewer and tell them how they were going to handle their editorial comment and by mid week that was no longer true. changing the review plan during the review is just inexcusable and shows poor planning-and my example was one of the least destructive changes.
17. (Type here to submit an idea.)
18. Organizing the review teams by WBS prevented any team from obtaining a system level overview of what was going on. The result was a completely stovepiped review. The prime purpose of the review was to demonstrate that the preliminary design met requirements. In order to properly demonstate this, a review team should be given the requirements for some subset of the total design and the preliminary design soulution against these requirements. The team should be tasked to examine the adequacy of the design subset through manufacturing, assembly, test, ground operations, launch and flight. This is the only way to completely validate the preliminary design against requirments.
19. The PDR was essentially a bean counting activity driven by RIDs, the RID tool, and RID tool problems. Instead of being the focus of the review, RIDs should only be used as input problem flags to an SE&I/Operations Research activity that determines root causes and identifies and documents the larger real issues. Focus on finding the problems rather than closing RIDS.
20. The answer is obvious -- Pass a MIlestone with minimum damage
21. 19. is the answer to 11.
22. Regularly scheduled Data Drops and Basic Metric by the RID Coordination Team available for all who where participating in the review might have cut down on the number of times people where performing the system stalling Data Extracts from the RID Tool
23. A clearly defined, user friendly and consistently implemented Reclama Process to insure that Issues brought up by Initiators where addressed through out the review process. Initiaors informed when their RIDs were dispositioned at all phases of the review process and given the opportunity to Reclama.
24. To accomodate participants that are not familiar with the process at all, I recommend two things to preceed any training: 1. Clear definition of roles (a list of ALL the roles, what does EACH role entail), and 2. A list of the STEPS from pre-RID to RID to closure.
Posted by kcowing at September 27, 2008 12:40 AMHuh, it just occurred to me: the IG at MSFC must be bought off too. With the depth of Ares BS, where is the IG in all of this?
Posted by: Antares at September 23, 2008 9:31 PMIts amusing that the Ares logo on the PDR is virtually identical to the InterOrbital Systems logo which was designed in the late 90s.
Posted by: Brian Bernhard at September 23, 2008 10:32 PMWith all of the above there is no possible way that the PDR could have been successful except by management fiat.
I love the juxtiposition of these two statements:
3. Things went well because the Project office AND Engineering worked together as a team!!
________________________
48. I don't care who at NASA the RID coordinator is/was sleeping with personal abuse of team members is wrong!
________________________
Von Braun is spinning in his grave at just how far the competence level has fallen at MSFC and at Headquarters.
Posted by: Concerned Citizen at September 23, 2008 10:44 PMThe whole PDR was is wash. This is just the tip of a much larger iceberg.
A month before the PDR there was a dry-run where the Astronaut Corps, Safety & Mission Assurance and Life Sciences all refused to sign-off. S&MA was bullied into line by HQ, LS folded without a fight and the management of the Corps was persuaded to ignore the rest of the astronauts grievances (many of which were held over since SRR, because they were told Preliminary Design was the time to bring them up, not System Requirements) in return for a promise they would be heard at CDR. It had nothing to do with the pressure from HQ management who told them their management careers were on the line depending on which way they swung and improving ones management career seems to be far more important than actually making sure something's going to work.
And lets not forget the fact that the "Yellow-red" [sic] category has never existed in a major program before. Everything has always been 3 color traffic light. For Ares-I PDR though, we added two new 'intermediary' colors "Green-Yellow" and "Yellow-Red". Our management was then persuaded to dump all 11 of our "Red" problems in the next category down, purely because we can't pass PDR if anything remains in the "Red" and Ares-I's schedule would be screwed if PDR was delayed at all. Just forget about the fact that it doesn't meet the criteria, we need to press on anyways and we're expected to just fix it all later.
I'm convinced now, more than ever, that this beast is headed for the trash bin of all trash-bins. This is already worse than X-33 ever was. I'm getting out before the program dies and takes everyone with it. I figure there are still good jobs throughout industry to go to right now. I feel sorry for everyone I leave behind who waits too long.
--Fred.
Posted by: Informant-1X at September 24, 2008 12:13 AMDoes any of the NASA administration read NASA Watch? If so, then i'm writing to you: PLEASE do something about this mess. These problems aren't specific to Ares...they've been happening across the Constellation Program for 2 years. I had hoped that they were getting better, that those were growing pains we were learning from.
It is now evident that this is not the case. We have the wrong people in critical decision-making positions. And they are driving this wonderful organization into the ground with every push to ignore major concerns in order to make budget and schedule.
With blogs, emails, this website, it's now possible to take a sample of how the troops are feeling. Take advantage of this insight now, and make some changes. Specifically, focus on building spacecraft, not on meeting impossible deadlines. Accept that those deadlines cannot be met, and instead let's try to get quality vehicles built so that we do have a human space program in the near future. Ambitious deadlines are important, but you've got to have the budget and personnel to support them. We don't have those luxuries right now. So, let's do the best we can, without endangering the whole program.
The troops are getting restless.
Posted by: Hugh Stonian at September 24, 2008 9:37 AM"Neither Thrust Oscillation mitigation designs, or adequacy of resources or schedule, were considered in the pre-board recommendation."
SO LETS GET THIS RIGHT, GIVEN A BLANK CHECK AND ALL THE TIME IN THE WORLD HOW DO THINGS LOOK? WOULD THIS PASS,AS A "PRELIMINARY" DESIGN, THE DESIGN THATS NEEDED? I suppose that's a YES!
As usual Operability is an afterthought...notice that the charts say "verifiable requirements"...as in "2. The flow down of verifiable requirements is complete and proper or, if not, an adequate plan exists for timely resolution
of open items. Requirements are traceable to mission goals and objectives."
But is not affordability and safety a goal and objective, thus needing requirements, thus being verifiable or needing to be?
Posted by: A NASA Engineer at September 24, 2008 10:00 AMIt is becoming all too apparent that Constellation is failing. It looks like NASA is sharing management with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The lack of competence is appalling all across the board. Wishing severe problems didn't exist by creating a yellow red category is incredible.
NASA should not be developing vehicles. They don't know how. The White House and Congress have no idea what they are overseeing on anything complicated. Bring in a Burt Rutan with dictatorial authority over the whole program and start from scratch. We need a Werner von Braun type running the show.
Posted by: Eric Hedman at September 24, 2008 10:07 AM"Green-Yellow" and "Yellow-Red" RID categories?
Is NASA trying to put lipstick on a pig? This one, highly-visible decision on how to report status says more than enough. It is a political gimmick if ever we have seen one. And being an election year, I guess it is de rigeur. How terribly sad.
Posted by: Ray at September 24, 2008 10:32 AMGlad I'm not working in the NASA "dog and pony-show" anymore. 18 years of beating one's head against a wall begins to flatten one's perspective on life.
Constellation is turning into another Space Station Freedom!!!
Posted by an ex-Constellation Contractor
Posted by: unknown at September 24, 2008 4:03 PMI think NASA should get rid of the red catagory all together, because if anything gets put in that catagory, it doesn't look good. They might want to get rid of orange also, because that's too close to red. Here is how I think the catagories should be aranged.
GREEN
GREEN/GREEN
GREEN/LIGHT GREEN
GREEN/TEAL
GREEN/EMERALD
Now, don't these colors make you feel good?
This is the inevitable result when a project becomes the Chief Executive's (or, in this case, the Chief Administrator's) pet. As nothing can be said against it except at the cost of a career, problems become 'opportunities for future development', faults become 'cost-cutting features' and a failure to meet the basic design requirements is dealt with by changing the design requirements.
What is really horrible is to contemplate the likely events if Dr. Griffin is replaced next year. Everyone who, right now, is pro-Ares will switch to the new orthodoxy with a whiplash-inducing "snap". It should be fun to watch Ares-I being decried by those who are currently its partisans, claiming that a 'biased media' previously 'mis-represented' their statements or 'reported my remarks out-of-context'. :-p
Posted by: Ben the Space Brit at September 25, 2008 8:42 AMI am going to make a prediction:
WHEN SpaceX has shown that:
1 - It can design TWO NEW rocket engines in less than 4 years & fly them
2 - Build TWO new launch vehicles ( one with engine out capability ) and fly them both
3 - Build a manned capable spacecraft & Dock it with the ISS
4 - Do all of the above in less than 5 years, starting FROM SCRATCH, for less than $100 million.\
THEN CONGRESS will come to it's senses & Cancel the ARES program & give the money to Spacex THEN DONT LET NASA BUILD HARDWARE when there are commercial businesses doing more for less money.
Isnt there actually a LAW that states that NASA must contract out work that can be done by a commercial company?
Curious.
Posted by: Stu at September 25, 2008 12:18 PMNASA can always design a spec that is just a little out of reach. Much as they did with the CEV and Delta IV Heavy. Then the commercial competitor doesn't have the capabilities that NASA "needs".
Sounds like more of the head in the sand management that we have gotten use to hearing about over the last 2 terms.
Reality doesn't change because you don't like the answer.
It's against the very purpose of a PDR to minimize and defer critical problems.
This Turkey Baster shaped rocket is almost certainly going to end up in the 'Paper-rocket' dustbin no later than early 2009.
Posted by: Steve at September 25, 2008 3:21 PMThat's a chilling thought Karl.
Posted by: Saber at September 25, 2008 5:31 PMStu,
I certainly hope the best for SpaceX, but right now Elon is 0 for 3. He is a long way from proving his rocket's reliability to the point of being able to scrap everything else NASA is doing. If anything, NASA should purchase Atlas V's for access to LEO. It's existing and capable and has demonstrated reliability. It also most likely meets the requirements of the modified Human Rating document which was rewritten (downgraded) for Constellation.
Karl,
You are absolutely correct. I believe that is exactly what they did for ESAS, but NASA has now down-sized the Orion to make up for the lack of performance of Ares I. They have also changed every aspect of Ares I that made it the rocket of choice in ESAS. It would be interesting to know how the current Orion matches up against the capabilities of the Atlas V and Delta IV Heavy. Although I admit, I don't think the Delta IV is a viable option at this point because it doesn't have the flight history and still has some issues.
Steve,
You're right on the money for PDR. This is nothing but a dog-and-pony show. These folks are just checking a box. The Ares I will be cancelled next year. It looks like a "corn dog" to me.
As always in these situations, a leak revealing disatisfaction in the ranks about a project does not lead to changes in the project but, rather, a witch-hunt to find the source of the leak. As always, it seems beyond senior management's ability to grasp that the problem isn't disloyal staff, it is horror that they are being required to wave through a flawed design as satisfactory.
NASA, please consider this: If all was well with the Ares-1 project, would there be such leaks? Listen to the concerns of professionals, do not punish them for speaking out.
Posted by: Ben the Space Brit at September 27, 2008 7:55 AMI must not have paying attention at the time.
What is meant by "X-33 genius"?
Posted by: stckinva at September 27, 2008 8:37 AMDon't forget it was Steve Cook who also brought us RBC3 and the announcement that the "Revolutionary air-breathing engine rockets past key milestone ahead of schedule,"
http://www.msfc.nasa.gov/news/news/releases/2002/02-168.html
before even the closure date for RID submittal by those of us performing the review.
stckinva -
I'm not sure, but I think what is being said is that Mr. Cook was the project leader or something on the X-33 'VentureStar' shuttle replacement project. The project was supposed to deliver a revolutionary new STS within five years but instead did nothing but suck up money and die a horrible, public and embarrassing death after it was found to be hideously overweight.
A pity really as I really /liked/ the look of that machine. Ah well...
Anyway, the implication seems to be that Mr. Cook has already steered one high-profile (and possibly critical) project onto a sandbank. What is the probability of him doing it again with Constellation? Worse, with things so obviously going bad, why has he not either been replaced or at least put on a tighter leash?
Posted by: Ben the Space Brit at September 27, 2008 11:18 AMNASA Dictionary
un-natural selection - the process by which NASA chooses managers who have failed repeatedly to lead the next program and/or promotion
Posted by: Kevin at September 27, 2008 11:56 AMGriffin likes to portray himself as a smart guy, and certainly has the "book learnin" to back it up. However, he lacks basic engineering sense and an ability to manage people. He continues to keep brown-nosers at the helm even as Rome burns in the background.
Posted by: sc220 at September 27, 2008 1:10 PMFrom 06.12.06 - NASA New release #06-079:
The release is no longer available on nasa.gov, but thankfully Google still caches it here:
http://74.125.45.104/search?q=cache:EgmMqY__Aw4J:www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/news/releases/2006/06-079.html+X-33+Steve+Cook&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=firefox-a
"From 1995 to 1997, Cook was deputy manager of the X-33 Flight Vehicle Program, an effort to develop the reusable, single-stage-to-orbit X-33 experimental technology demonstrator. From 1998 to 2004, he was deputy manager of the Advanced Space Transportation Program and Next Generation Launch Technology Program. Cook was deputy manager of Marshall's Space Transportation Programs and Projects Office from 2004 to 2005. He also served during that time as a deputy lead for NASA's Exploration Systems Architecture Study, which laid out NASA's future plans for implementing the Vision for Space Exploration."
These managers running Ares (and NASA) right now are exactly the same fools who are previously responsible for every one of NASA's previous major program failures/cancellations over the last 25 years. Go research it for yourselves exactly what projects Steve Cook, Doug Cooke, Jeff Hanley, Mike Griffin etc. have worked on previously. The list is long and distinguished only by the number of failures.
Ares is in proven safe & reliable hands.
Not.
Fred
Posted by: Informant-X-1 at September 27, 2008 2:25 PMAh. Thank you.
Must be one of those people who works for the government because he/she/it (gotta cover all three) would never make it in the rest of the country.
Posted by: stckinva at September 27, 2008 2:43 PMI'm not involved with NASA at all, but even I can tell from the language of these PDR Reports that something smells bad in the program. Griffin should go to prison because fraud is a crime.
Unsafe, unsimple, unsoon!
I think we need to go back to the moon, but the route we are taking there leaves much to be desired.
Posted by: Joe Kerr at September 27, 2008 3:26 PMDie ARES-1, die. With the current focus on the failure of our financial institutions to obey sound practices, there should be floodlights turned on NASA for doing the same in the realm of aerospace engineering. I fail to see how my tax money is being used in ANY sort of responsible way at this federal agency. So when will the "NASA bailout" be put before the overtaxed taxpayer?
Posted by: Ray at September 27, 2008 5:01 PMC'mon. The fault is more Griffin's fault than S.Cook's. Ares is a POS. S.Cook is just doing what he's told.
Posted by: Antares at September 27, 2008 5:51 PMI was a member of the audience at the Huntsville Library when Steve Cook was giving an early presentation of the Ares 1-x mission. There were a lot old timers there in the audience as well. When the question and answer session started, Steve's thesis advisor from UT Tullahoma asked why they were building what in his judgement looked to be a fundamentally unstable rocket that he would have failed if it had been turned into him as a design assignment.
Steve responded about the design and that there were 3,000 sensors on the bird to tell them everything that was happening. Another old time piped up "is that all? Hell when we did the Saturn 1 first launch it had over 10,000 sensor channels" Steve mumbled something about the limitations of the Atlas V computer that they were using.
Another questioner in the audience asked if NASA had a plan B if the Ares 1-X mission failed. The reply was no.
Let's see any of you do it any better given the circumstances and limitations.
There will always be complainers and critics - it is human nature to ignore the positive but jump at the chance to criticize.
Posted by: anonymous at September 27, 2008 9:46 PMThe telemetry boxes are NOT from Atlas. Besides, they work fine on a vehicle that's not shaking itself to death.
Posted by: Antares at September 27, 2008 11:55 PMThe type of comments to the PDR and even again number of comments here is a phenomenon that perhaps should be of more interest here than the new vehicle design and it's adequacy against what's wanted.
Consider for a moment carrying out a large new civil space initiative in the age of the internet. NASA has done multi-hundreds of millions dollar projects but this will be the first multi-tens-of-billions dollar project in the age of the internet. The Space Station was developed just before the internet could provide such free flow of information.
So, how does NASA carry out a large new human space transportation system development when:
1-The cost picture is no longer unfathomable given the information flow (leaks?) that present such information in so many ways? Everyone passionate on the subject gets to dissect such cost information, measure it against today’s Shuttle, add it up, see how it fits within the NASA budget, see what it means for future budgets and so on. This is new not in it's being possible but in it's pervasiveness to spread and have multitudes of "peering" heads add views to what they see.
2-The troops can use anonymity to advertise discontent, whereas in previous programs the best that could be done was some sharing of gripes at the water-cooler? Critical mass of negative knowledge might never accumulate in the old days. So a large program like Shuttle could proceed, or Station, obliviously. Consequences arose after the system was operational and the inability to meet promises was more evident as was the ability of run-away operational costs to cause other agency areas to suffer for that subsequent generation.
The saying in advertising today is "a happy customer tells 3 others, an unhappy customer tells a thousand others".
So...is the spread of knowledge ultimately going to standstill an agency like NASA when it starts a large human spaceflight program and forgets that the internet exists, that negative information will spread "virally"? Or will it make NASA stronger once this is realized? Once the agency throughout from top to bottom realizes that costs can not be hidden? No real improvement in crew safety can not be hidden? Delusional optimism about future budgets can not be hidden?
Posted by: A NASA Engineer at September 28, 2008 9:37 AMOK anonymous, please provide some examples of "the positive".
Posted by: ChrisG at September 28, 2008 11:09 AMOn top of the problems with this PDR, the overall problems associated with Constellation are enormous. Here are a few:
1. Because there are so many projects within the Program that are over budget and behind schedule, we should expect at least another 2 to 3 year slip and a more than doubling the cost.
2. The Program has a huge identity crisis. They have spent a tremendous amount of time and energy claiming that this will be nothing like Shuttle. So much, in fact, that the engineers and requirements developers, who mostly come from a Shuttle background, are writing requirements that have no foundation in practicality or sensibility. The primary goal is to "do something different than Shuttle" no matter how stupid that something might be. There is absolutely no interest in any lessons learned from Shuttle.
They claim that they intend to return to the roots of NASA by doing things the "Apollo way." Sounds good. They have even brought in many grey-beards to help with the corporate memory. The problem is that when these specialists-in-history point out the "Apollo way," the Constellation budgetary folks step in and stop things claiming it is "out of scope."
3. There is no longer any experience in NASA on developing the programmatic, operational, or design requirements for a large-scale production-line type of space program. There has been no effort to address these issues.
4. There are no clear-cut, established, and documented roles and responsibilities. Unlike the Apollo and Shuttle programs, which had/have well documented roles and responsibilities, along with well-established flow-down of authority, the Constellation program is devoid of well documented programmatic structure, roles, responsibilities, board structure, authority delegation, etc.
5. There is no program-level systems integration (SI) organization. In a program as large and complex as this, it is imperative that a strong SI organization be established. This organization, and Shuttle has a very good example, is responsible for controlling and establishing the performance and environment requirements and the interface requirements between elements. Additionally, because there are so many element design parameters that influence and affect deep into the performance and capabilities of other elements, the SI organization should have over-sight responsibility within elements to monitor all design requirement affects on others. Obviously, the elements object to having a strong SI organization. They don't want the strong oversight. They claim that they can integrate themselves. While it sounds good, it never works in the real world.
Posted by: apple at September 28, 2008 12:52 PMRegarding operating in a new internet environment, I would like to make the observation that so many supposed "wiki' sites being touted in this Review and many other activities are not wikis at all. They do not change or evolve based on inputs from participants, they are not enriched by the knowledge of the people who use them, but are just static portals to Windchill or other such 'file cabinets', whose content is dictated and very tightly controlled by their owners.
If you want to know what a true wiki is, read the September 15 issue of Government Executive magazine, "Government in a Wiki World" by J. Davidson Frame. What we are seeing implemented as so-called wikis for the most part have nothing in common with this definition. It is just a fashionable term to use these days, that makes the owners feel like they are keeping up with the latest style. It is pretense.
re Fred:
"The list is long.
Dirac Angestun Gesept."
- Eric Frank Russell
And here we have it... the Chinese launch 3 men into orbit, perform a spacewalk, and return safely to Earth. At the same time, SpaceX is the first private company to make it to Earth orbit. Meanwhile, we have nothing but sex, scandal, nepotism, and incompotence in charge at MSFC. When will someone wake up and clean house? There is still a mountain of talent within NASA wanting to do the job right...Mike, please do something!!!
Posted by: Joe at September 28, 2008 8:07 PMMeanwhile, we have nothing but sex, scandal, nepotism, and incompotence in charge at MSFC. When will someone wake up and clean house? There is still a mountain of talent within NASA wanting to do the job right...Mike, please do something!!!
I agree. Please clear house at MSFC, or better yet, consider handing the asset over to the Army. Redstone Arsenal is desperate for engineering and management talent, and this would help Huntsville in the long run. I know that the Republican side would like to consider downsizing the NASA center infrastructure, and taking MSFC off of the rolls would help in a big way.
Huntsville has benefited greatly from the BRAC consolidation. I think they can afford to take a hit from the NASA side. In the long run, it would be best to consolidate human spaceflight development at JSC and KSC.
Posted by: sc220 at September 28, 2008 9:12 PMDon't count on Mike to fix any of this, it is mostly his fault.
1) He gives project management TOTAL authority over engineering in all matters. Therefore technical problems are glossed over or ignored.
2) He insists on this monstrosity called Ares I for which he is solely responsible for selecting. It is fundamentally flawed and does not pass the giggle test.
3) He allows Centers to assign idiots to important positions and approves them anyway. Steve Cook has a long history of failed programs on his resume and Jeff Hanley has never managed a project in his life, much less a $100 billion program.
We couldn't get rid of him fast enough. He's just as bad as Goldin in my opinion.
Actually Joe, Orbital Sciences was the first private entity to make orbit. And they did it with a lot less public money.
Posted by: Chris at September 29, 2008 4:18 AMChris,
You are right. In 1990, before Orbital became a publicly-traded compnay, they were the first to privately-develop a successful space launch vehicle, the Pegasus. Although it was an air-launched vehicle, it was the first.
Thanks for the correction.
Posted by: Joe at September 29, 2008 8:00 AMPossum said: "Karl, You are absolutely correct. I believe that is exactly what they did for ESAS, but NASA has now down-sized the Orion to make up for the lack of performance of Ares I."
Possum, you are absolutely wrong. Ares I has the performance plus margin that were specified in its requirements. Orion has a ways to go to get down to it's specified weight.
Concerned citizen said: "Steve's thesis advisor from UT Tullahoma asked why they were building what in his judgement looked to be a fundamentally unstable rocket".
This is proof that some people (many of whom blather things they know nothing about on NASAWatch) need to stay in academics. Essentially every rocket that has flown since the V2 is "fundamentally unstable", meaning that without active control (usually thrust vectoring) it will tumble. So what? Either a launch vehicle has sufficient control authority and flight control system performance or it doesn't. NASA says Ares I does. Does anyone here have data that says it does not?
Some people freak as an instinctual (but incorrect) response because the fuselage increases in diameter higher up on the launch vehicle. I invite you to contemplate the Titan IV or Delta III post-booster seperation. They make the Ares I look positively sleek.
Posted by: GeezerGas at September 29, 2008 9:01 AMSC220 -
My experience with KSC is tht they have no development capability...they certainly know how to process hardware and launch rockets, but that is fundamentally an O&M responsbility.
Historically, NASA has maintained strong SI and program oversight capabilities grounded in the promotion of development engineers who were moved into program management. Yes, there were always "operators", personnlel who came from an operations engineering background, that were promoted based upon exceptional leadership and political skills, but prior to the Gene Krantz era at JSC, the majority of leaders/PMs had strong development engineering experience. Clearly, Doug Cooke has a strong development background...please identify for me those senior NASA managers with exquivalent experience (~35 years) with a primary focus on development. My neighbors in commercial engineering tell me that over 40% of new development projects experience a failure during development, but at NASA, that number is just not accpetable. I support not sending more astrnuats out to die, but I also wish that the nay sayers would step back and see the big picture here.
Clearly, Doug Cooke has a strong development background...
Oh yeah? Really believe that? Start listing the accomplishments
Posted by: opinion at September 29, 2008 3:28 PMI also wish that the nay sayers would step back and see the big picture here.
Ok, here is the big picture.
The Ares I uses an SRB as sole first stage. This is an entirely new concept that has ZERO legacy in history or experience.
Clearly anyone who still continues to promote this incredibly naive and illucid scheme (SRB as first stage) as a next generation launcher, after it has already demonstrated itself to be a FAILED CONCEPT, simply isn't seeing the big picture.
Anytime any of you Ares I and Michael Griffin supporters want to return to the reality based world that the rest of us live in, I can guarantee you we will welcome you with open arms.
You remain in your own little fantasy world at your own peril.
Posted by: Engineering Lead at September 29, 2008 4:33 PMTo GeezerGas:
Here's the data on CLV performance as published.
ESAS CLV:
Lunar mission – 59,898 lbm to a 30 X 160 nm orbit at 28.5 deg inclination
ISS mission – 56,089 lbm to a 30 X 160 nm orbit at 51.6 deg inclination
Ares 1 CLV (A103 configuration):
Lunar – 56,253 lbm to a -11 X 110 nm orbit at 28.5 deg inclination
ISS – 42,540 lbm to a -11 X 110 nm orbit at 51.6 deg inclination
Note the suborbital "orbit" for the current CLV. It relies on the payload to put itself into orbit. No wonder it is overweight. I personally don't understand the small difference in Lunar and ISS missions for ESAS, just another indication the data was probably bogus.
Posted by: possum at September 29, 2008 5:47 PM"Engineering Lead"
You better your facts...
Orbital Science's Taurus, which is a 4-stage launch vehicle, uses an SRB as its sole first stage. It has successfuly launched several military and commercial satellites into orbit. The Taurus first stage has heritage in the Peacekeeper first stage from which it evolved. Mike Griffin used to work for OSC, so he should be familiar with such a launch platform. So why not extend the concept to man-rated vehicle if you can solve the problems with vibration? While it may not be the best techical design, it does have heritage.
"if you can solve the problems with vibration?"
Anyone who has actually built a payload to fly on a solid rocket can tell you that it is a far rougher ride than on a liquid fueled rocket. Little silicon chips and large pieces of metal survive this environment with a lot of extra engineering and testing. There are many stories in the business of payloads coming apart on the vibration test stands while being qualified for flight. Meat payloads (i.e humans) have a much more difficult time with these vibrations and it is much more difficult to test them under worst case loads as the catastrophic failure modes are permanent and the cost of training a replacement is high.
In addition, anyone who makes the statement that there is any heritage between an SRB designed as a booster for the Shuttle and as a human rated launch vehicle needs to be returned to aerospace engineering school. The general rule of thumb in the business is if 35% of the vehicle or more is replaced, then it is a new vehicle and must be treated as such.
As for those senior leaders at NASA with development experience, they were all forced out in the buyouts at MSFC in the 1990's. Those that are still around and who have attempted to participate in helping the younger generation of engineers have found a hostile environment, mostly originating from NASA headquarters and the upper management of Marshall toward their advice. In January of this year at the 50th anniversary of the Explorer 1 launch a great deal of the coffee break discussions were about this subject.
One old NASA MSFC hand put a picture up during his presentation of several Von Braun team members and stated that the people at that table had the competence to make the hard design decisions or knew who to call to get the advice needed. This person said that this does not exist at NASA today. Many of the old timers desperately want the new lunar effort to succeed but many of them are convinced that with the atmosphere that now exists, that it will be impossible to do so.
There are good engineers at MSFC but with blind leadership at the center as well as at the top at headquarters, success is not an option.
Ok, I'll concede that small point.
So Mr. Griffin is extrapolating from a small four stage all solid unmanned launcher to a shuttle SRB topped with a large crogenic liquid upper stage? Let's call it a leap of faith.
Now Mr. Griffin continues to push the delusion that this will work, when it already is a demonstrable failure? It can't lift the payload, it has intractable vibration problems, it has utterly failed fiscally, and we can no longer afford it.
Pound for pound, solid launch vehicles are the most expensive vehicles on the market. Look at the flight rate of Taurus.
And you people continue to swallow this load of crap.
Posted by: Engineering Lead at September 29, 2008 8:13 PMPossum: You know not of which you speak.
Soon after ESAS when more detailed analysis of the architecture was possible, it was learned that moving the Orion/Aers I staging point earlier had benefits for upper stage disposal (you WANT to be suborbital) and for Orion ascent heating. If you work out the performance differences in your two quotes, you will see there is a net INCREASE in sytem performance.
The differences between missions for ISS and lunar are not "bogus". In one case Orion goes to an ISS orbit with little need for additional onboard propellant. In the other case, it goes to a rendezvous orbit with the EDS/Altair and must have significant onboard propellant for the TEI burn.
Describing something you do not understand as "bogus" does nothing but show your prejudices.
Posted by: GeezerGas at September 29, 2008 9:34 PMEngineering Lead wrote: "Clearly anyone who still continues to promote this incredibly naive and illucid scheme (SRB as first stage) as a next generation launcher, after it has already demonstrated itself to be a FAILED CONCEPT, simply isn't seeing the big picture".
Exactly how has Ares I demonstrated itself to be anything, success or failure? It has not flown yet. Stating something in a blog in capital letters does not make it true. Accumulating bogged opinions and concluding they must be correct does not make it so. What "big picture" am I not seeing? Please respond in specifics, and no shouting is necessary.
Are you also demanding that Taurus, Pegusus, Athena II, the Peasekeeper missle, etc. stop flying because a solid booster as a first stage is "naive"?
Posted by: GeezerGas at September 29, 2008 9:50 PMSix stages of Aries 1
1.Wild Enthusiasm
2. Complete Disillusionment
3.Total Panic
4. The search for the guilty
5. The punishment or the innocent
6. The praise and accolades for the non-participants
Engineering Lead wrote: The Ares I uses an SRB as sole first stage. This is an entirely new concept that has ZERO legacy in history or experience.
I hope you mean as a manned launch vehicle solution. In that case you would be correct. But Joe asks "why not extend the concept to man-rated vehicle if you can solve the problems with vibration?" Man-rated vehicle design decisions usually relate to the failure modes of specific solutions, and how quickly they can be detected and mitigated. One of the primary failure modes of SRBs is catastrophic failure (explosion) due to case overpressurization. This happens quickly, and so it can be hard to detect in enough time to react to save lives on the vehicle. Moreover, the inherent design of an SRB prevents it from being "throttled back" like a liquid rocket. So mitigation options are limited to blowing the nozzle off and reducing thrust that way.
IMHO the use of an SRB as first stage for a human rated vehicle was a bad decision to begin with, and the thrust oscillation just reinforces why it is a bad decision. I am not sure how the Hazard Risk Index (HRI) process scored this solution as better (safer) than a liquid motor.
Posted by: Ray at September 30, 2008 9:22 AMExactly how has Ares I demonstrated itself to be anything, success or failure? It has not flown yet.
You answered your own question.
Posted by: Engineering Lead at September 30, 2008 1:34 PMEngineering Lead wrote: "IMHO the use of an SRB as first stage for a human rated vehicle was a bad decision to begin with, and the thrust oscillation just reinforces why it is a bad decision. I am not sure how the Hazard Risk Index (HRI) process scored this solution as better (safer) than a liquid motor".
It was scored as much better because:
1) The RSRM has had nearly two hundred successful flights (two per shuttle mission). No other stages/motors are even close.
2) Every one of these motors have been recovered and inspected. This is extremely valuable as you know how close to your margins you are actually operating. No other stage/motor has this advantage.
Now, you must understand if how you are using the motor in a different configuration affects this heritage - thrust oscillation being a good example(if it does indeed prove to be an issue - no one knows for sure since it has not yet flown this way). This does not obviate the excellent heritage that the RSRM has.
Posted by: GeezerGas at September 30, 2008 1:46 PMEngineering Lead wrote: "IMHO ...
Actually, no, I didn't say that.
What you said was :
The RSRM has had nearly two hundred successful flights (two per shuttle mission). No other stages/motors are even close.
I guess you must have missed those SSMEs. That's so weird how SSMEs fly to orbit, whereas SRBs do not. Given a choice, I would go with the SSMEs any day.
This does not obviate the excellent heritage that the RSRM has.
As a shake your brains out, run up enormous operational costs shipping them half way across the country to be refueled alternative to competence in launch vehicle design. In that regard, they're great. Most of us have moved on.
Posted by: Engineering Lead at September 30, 2008 10:13 PMGeezerGas wrote: Exactly how has Ares I demonstrated itself to be anything, success or failure? It has not flown yet.
Lead Engineer wrote: You answered your own question.
I guess oh-so-clever one-liners are a substitute for meaningful discourse? I won't play that game, but I will try to understand what you are saying since you really did not answer my question.
It now seems you have a development time limit after which a project is declared a failure? Please share what that is and why?
BTW, sorry for misquoting you in previous response.
Posted by: GeezerGas at October 1, 2008 8:05 AMGeezerGas wrote:
1) The RSRM has had nearly two hundred successful flights (two per shuttle mission). No other stages/motors are even close.
2) Every one of these motors have been recovered and inspected. This is extremely valuable as you know how close to your margins you are actually operating. No other stage/motor has this advantage."
This is a perfect example of bait and switch. Your arguments are no longer applicable
1. This is no longer applicable. The 5 segment SRB can not consider the 4 segment shuttle SRB as part of its legacy. There are too many changes, among them propellant shape. The only thing in common are the casings.
2. And neither will the Ares booster. They are considering to delete the recovery capability to increase performance.
Also Taurus does not use an SRB (that is a shuttle term), it uses an SRM and it is unmanned and the payloads are more ruggedized compared to other ELV's or they use heavy isolators
Me wrote:
Also Taurus does not use an SRB (that is a shuttle term), it uses an SRM and it is unmanned and the payloads are more ruggedized compared to other ELV's or they use heavy isolators
The terms SRB and SRM are interchangeable. Although they refer to different things in the colloquialism of the NASA vernacular, neither one is specific to any launch platform.
That said, one could argue that SRB refers to the overall stage/system, while SRM refers to the motor alone. The two are not so easily distiguishable in a solid stage. Either way, there is nothing inaccurate or misleading in saying the the Taurus uses an SRB as its first stage.
The liquid analogy, is a bit more clear, where the Liquid Rocket Booster (LRB) includes the Liquid Rocket Engine (LRE), tanks, feedsystem, controls, etc., The LRE, or LRM if you will, is clearly distinct from the rest of the stage.
Posted by: Einstein at October 1, 2008 2:13 PMOn the prior observations about the Shuttle solid rocket boosters having a very extensive track record, one that is assisted by post-flight analysis of the hardware, how would one count the record of other Shuttle parts such as Orbiters, Tanks and Orbiter main and orbital engines and propulsion systems? The orbiters have 3 engines. So if we count 200 boosters as history, 2 per flight over about a hundred flights, should we not count the engines as having had 300 flights, 3 per flight over about a hundred flights? Yes, the tank, a part of the propulsion system, is discarded, but would that just "discount" the liquid propulsion systems down to about the same 200 as the SRB's?
Point being, which type system has more promise for one day having routine flights to space, such as Grandma visiting the kids over at Station 42?
Posted by: A NASA Engineer at October 2, 2008 9:58 AMExcuse me, but after reading all this, I'm going to have a good stiff drink to the memory of Wernher von Braun.
Perhaps I should learn to speak Hindustani.
Roci
Posted by: Roci at October 22, 2008 2:51 AM