Here we go with the Safety Discussion again.
Oh my goodness.

The report is likely excellent and being the one and only Life Science, Safety mission assurance report that ESMD may choose to read while they still exist.

In theory reading and understanding the report may lead to ESMD remaining in existance

Happy Holidays

The Columbia loss was caused by a lack of systems engineering.
The External Tank was designed as if it flew by itself.
No requirement existed regarding damage to the Orbiter caused by E.T.foam.The purpose of the foam was to minimize ground boil-off.
All E.T. structures had posive margins during ascent, without foam, except for an area on the oxygen tank ogive.
This area had factors of safety greater than 1.0 considering foam loss. At the E.T.CDR a RID was written to develop an NDE method of verifying foam adhesion.This RID was never satisfied.Foam adhesion was checked by pulling several small core samples which constituted less than 1% of the foam area.
Although, intutively, low density foam (2LB/CU.FT)may have been ruled out as a threat, intuition can not be relied on.
The Columbia failure was designed into the Shuttle.

WOW...I just read this report...It's pretty graphic if you understand what they are saying...What a horrible way to go...I hope our new Spacecraft will be much more safe and not get rushed so fast that go fever comes up again...pray no one ever has to go through this again...

One recommendation in this report (already put into effect) is that Shuttle crews be trained to activate personal breathing systems and close visors at the first sign of a problem.

OK, I'm not an engineer, but I'm missing something here. Why are crews not required to have their ACES suits fully pressurized, visors down and sealed, using an independent air supply, during every reentry?

If it is because the personal air supply O2 tanks are too small to keep astronauts supplied through the whole of the reentry procedure, then why was the system designed that way? It's only a little over 30 minutes from entry interface to landing, and less than that to 30,000 feet where the crew can use the Inflight Crew Escape System.

The NASA press release says, "Trade study on supplemental portable O2 found a potential candidate that would offer more O2 than the existing system, which would greatly increase survivability for multiple Shuttle emergency launch pad and post landing emergency scenarios. Detailed feasibility assessments are being finalized to determine final SSP implementation plan."
Why the heck was this not a requirement when they were designing the Shuttle in the first place, or at least after Challenger when they put the ACES suits and the ICES in? Why was there not, say, a 60-minute O2 bottle attached to each seat, used during normal reentry, with the PEAP supply a reserve for emergencies?

Granted, the CAIB found that pressurized suits would not have saved the Columbia crew given the altitude and velocity of the Shuttle's breakup, but there are certainly scenarios where they would.

Matt Bille
Freelance space writer/historian

When the visor is lowered on the ACES suit, pure O2 comes into the suit at a higher quantity than a crew member actually uses. The surplus oxygen is vented into the cabin. This oxygen comes from the orbiter main oxygen supply while the suit is connected and from a "bail out bottle" after the crewman leaves the seat. The problem with leaking O2 is that the critical design limit for O2 concentration is reached fairly rapidly, in much less time than the full re-entry timeline. With high O2 concentration there is a great potential for a fire.

The new suits for Orion are being designed with a recirculation system that avoids this problem and allows the crew to be fully suited for the entire duration of launch or entry.

These new suits are in development and are not available for current shuttle use. The ACES suit is derived from military aircraft where O2 leakage is not a problem.

It was pointed out to me (and it's my fault for not being more thorough) that the report says:

"The suit protects the crew in many scenarios; however, there are several areas where integration difficulties diminish the capability of the suit to protect the crew. Integration issues include: the crew cannot keep their visors down throughout entry because doing so results in high oxygen concentrations in the cabin; gloves can inhibit the performance of nominal tasks; and the cabin stow/deorbit preparation timeframe is so busy that sometimes crew members do not have enough time to complete suit-related steps prior to atmospheric entry."

Granted that the engineering changes for reentry wearing pressurized suits will not be attempted now, with the shuttle scheduled for retirement, but it strikes me all these could have been overcome. The oxygen level problem could be fixed by a tweak to the software running the environmental control system (making it, essentially, run slightly less efficiently during the last hour of flight), the timeline adjusted a few minutes to permit the additional suit-related steps, and the gloves of the ACES suit, like all pilot/astronaut pressure suits, are designed to permit use of the stick and other critical controls while pressurized. The crew's actions would be less efficient, but not prohibited.

I'm well aware the folks who did this report and the Challenger and CAIB ones are infinitely more qualified than I am, but I remain puzzled. One possible accident is a less severe Columbia scenario (one where the depressurization occurs later on and the vehicle holds together until it reaches escape-system altitude), and this modification would have addressed that.

Matt Bille
Freeelance space/science writer
http://mattbille.blogspot.com
(I should add that all posts by me are strictly the personal opinions of the author as a private citizen.)

^^^ The report deatils some of the reasons why visors were not down. One crew memeber was not fully strapped in, and multiple members did not have gloves on or locked. With the visors down and locked there can be increased O2 pockets in the cabin causing a flamability issue. Lessons learned from Apollo 1? :) Challanger? There is always a trade off. The last crew member who was not fully stapped in was expected in the timeline of events, as that person has some of the final itmes to perform on the entry checklists which was being wrapped up around EI.

Thanks very much to Wayne Hale for posting a response.

It would seem to me that the fact that the reinforced crew modules broke free in both Challenger and Columbia accidents point to a high desireability of providing an escape mechanism that would (a) stabilize the crew module using a drogue chute, (b) slow the module, and (c) deploy main chute(s) at an altitude that would either permit the astronauts to bail out of the module, or would lower them safely to the ground. Yes, there would be a weight penalty, and it is obviously too late to incorporate such a feature in the current shuttle, but this should be a warning to future designers to use a large enough booster to overcome such penalties.

This is NOT a trivial task! Encapsulized crew modules have been incorporated in high performance aircraft, and have proven less than 100 percent reliable (see the XB-70, X-2, and the original downward ejection seat in the F-104 that killed Ivan Kincheloe. Kincheloe's death on takeoff resulted in incorporation of the RAPEC rocket assisted upward seat, but it was too late for him.

Additionally, suits must be designed to insure survivability to a greater extent than the current ACES, and procedures need to be modified to close and pressurize the suits prior to entry interface.

Sadly, it is almost always easier to do something over after people have died. If we learn something from their deaths, and do something about it for the future, then it won't have been in vain!

Ad LEO! Ad Luna! Ad Ares! Ad Astra!

I've just read the report - it's thorough, and sobering.

It's a bit late in the day to do much about the physical things like the ACES design, or even the lack of head protection within the helmets, but surely a hard look could be taken even now at the crew procedures which allowed astronauts not to be properly strapped in (let alone gloveless).

Bob Shaw

I might get flamed for saying this, but from the perspective of a layman, outside of the space and aeronautical industry, I cannot shake the horrible feeling that some of the safety issues identified originate in a delusion that the Shuttle system was safer than it actually was. In essence, real, dangerous faults were simply not addressed seriously enough because various senior figures said "the Shuttle is safe" and, ergo, these faults cannot be that serious and do not require the funds and time required to research and mitigate.

As I say, this is just a gut feeling. However, it is one that I also get from reading the background to the Challenger disaster too.

The environmental control system is not run by software.

A well thought out and written report.

Sometimes it helps to remember where the buck stops. From the STS-107 Certificate of Flight Readiness.
I understand improvements to the process have been made since then.

... The Space Shuttle Program is ready to proceed with the conduct of this mission

L. J. Ham – Manager Space Shuttle Program Integration/Launch Integration
R. D. Dittemore – Manager Space Shuttle Program

I concur that the Space Shuttle Program and the International Space Station Program (for ISS Missions) are ready to proceed with this mission

M.C. Kostelnik – Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space Shuttle Programs

As a member of the FRR Board, I concur that, pending completion of planned work, the Space Shuttle Program and International Space Station Program (for ISS Missions) are ready to execute the mission.

J.D Howell – Director, Johnson Space Center
R.D Bridges – Director, Kennedy Space Center
A.G. Stephenson – Director, Marshall Space Flight Center
W.W. Parsons – Director, Stennis Space Center

As a member of the FRR Board, I concur that, pending completion of planned work, the Prime Mission is ready to execute this mission (for no-ISS missions)
M.E. Kicza – Associate Administrator for Prime Mission

NASA S&MA has reviewed the status of preparations for this mission and has performed an independent assessment of the Readiness of the Space Shuttle Program for the conduct of this mission, and the readiness of the International Space Station for launch and on-orbit operations (for ISS missions). We are in concurrence with proceeding with this mission.

B.D. O’ Conner – Associate Administrator, Safety and Mission Assurance

APPROVAL

.... I have concluded, with the concurrence of the FRR Board, that pending completion of planned work, the Space Shuttle Programs is ready to execute this mission ...

W. Readdy – Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight

Excellent Thinking:
In essence, real, dangerous faults were simply not addressed seriously enough because various senior figures said "the Shuttle is safe" and, ergo, these faults cannot be that serious and do not require the funds and time required to research and mitigate.

Safety and Risk are forever linked. The notion "the Shuttle is safe" is highly subjective.

It is like stating ARES 1 is safe.
Willing to assume Risk:
these faults cannot be that serious and do not require the funds and time required to research and mitigate.

Bingo
Fly it like it is.
when the craft is destroyed, then one can write a report post accident or not.
"the Shuttle is safe", I think the statement was, we need to get building the space station, why discuss this issue.

This is why there is so much love for ESMD. The same exact thinking is taking place.

Perhaps it is a good thing that nearly six years have elapsed since that tragic morning.

Early reports mentioned that astronauts were not wearing gloves, faceshields not down, etc., and it seemed as if blame was somehow being cast when it didn't take a rocket scientist to see that even if they'd been wearing asbestos, they wouldn't have survived.

But there was a precedent...anyone remember the Edmund Fitzgerald? The investigation blamed the crewmen for having improperly "dogged" the hatch covers. This set off howls of indignation amongst family members and Great Lakes mariners who knew the crew well. It wasn't until technology allowed detailed simulations of what happened that it was proved that the forces encountered by the Fitz were able to easily dislocate the hatch covers.

But the damage, and the ill will created, was done.

It wasn't their fault.
How were they even supposed to know?
All things can be healed with time.

The above is from the version of "Knockin on Heaven's Door" as performed by Guns n' Roses and played on WDVE.

No requirement existed regarding damage to the Orbiter caused by E.T.foam.The purpose of the foam was to minimize ground boil-off.

One wonders if the deletion of the paint from the External tank after the first couple of orbiters flew would have made any difference. There is always a difference between the designers and the operational guys and maybe the crack in the system opened long ago, for this particular problem.