Since we don't know what you both talked about, this is difficult to make oneself an opinion.

Editor's note: it is also hard to fully understand the opinion of someone who does not use their full name ...

Keith,

Is there a transcript available?

Okay, Keith...

What did Abbey say that you agreed with?

Editor's note: That NASA Needed more money in order to do what Bush told it to do i.e. go back to the moon.

That NASA Needed more money in order to do what Bush told it to do i.e. go back to the moon.

Interesting -- that's probably the one thing I don't agree with.

The VSE did not direct NASA to craft a program that requires more money. The Vision was really a question to the agency: you get ~$17B per year; can you do anything with it? If given a strategic direction and permission to 1) retire the Shuttle; and 2) complete ISS, existing money could be diverted to developing a new system that would allow humans to go beyond low Earth orbit.

The challenge is to craft a program that gets us there eventually. I think this means lunar return with small, incremental, and (most importantly) cumulative steps. As an example, we could have a large presence on the Moon with robots and teleoperated machines within the next ten years; these robots would emplace the infrastructure needed for a lunar outpost. The dates given in the VSE speech and documents were guidelines, not deadlines. Time was to be the free variable, as opposed to money during the Apollo era.

Any agency can always use up more money (and not always wisely). The one thing the VSE did not say was to develop an unsustainable architecture and then whine about not having the money necessary to do it.

Congrats on the invite, I wish I'd seen this in time to listen! I agree with George Abbey too, LOL... and interestingly, the front of their website now has a poll about: "Do you think we will actually get back to the moon and eventually travel to Mars?"

Interesting -- that's probably the one thing I don't agree with.

I agree with Paul. NASA didn't need more money to get to the moon -- they needed to spend what they had smarter.

Probably both Keith/George and Paul and Rand are right on this, even though your disagree! NASA could do VSE in budget, but the constraints on the agency have been such that it's been impossible to save the money one place to direct it into Cx. Constraints, btw, also include some of the earlier engineering decisions, with solutions coming before the requirements horse.

Dr. Spudis,

I had the pleasure of attending the Moon 101 classes at JSC in 2008, especially the session on relating the science objectives to the engineering goals.

So, in light of your post on this subject today, where do you think Constellation needs to change to be sustainable and accomplish the Vision?

Justin,

The biggest problem with the current architecture is that it simply costs too much, at least $4-5 B per lunar mission. (In cost, I include both development and recurring costs.) Moreover, in choosing LOR and sortie missions, a huge investment in equipment is simply abandoned after each flight. This is fine if your goal is to do lunar "touch-and-go" and "on to Mars" (which seems to be the mindset of the agency) but it does not lead to a build-up of reusable, permanent infrastructure on the Moon, permitting us to recoup our investment through resource extraction and the creation of a cislunar spaceflight systems.

I prefer: 1) an architecture that uses a variety of existing (e.g., EELV or new commercial) or straightforward STS-derived (e.g., Shuttle C) launch assets; 2) an engineering R&D program to master key skills (e.g., resource extraction, zero-g refueling in space, cryogenic liquids management) and to create the key assets (e.g., comm and nav systems - extend GPS to cislunar space) required to develop a true reusable, extensible and flexible spacefaring system; 3) An Lagrange point-based flight architecture that allows easy export of lunar surface-produced propellant for use and sale in cislunar space; 4) throughout all of the above, the innovative and aggressive use of private sector assets to stimulate new aerospace industry and revive the high-tech manufacturing capabilities we have lost since the end of the Cold War.

For more thoughts on this, please see a couple of my meeting presentations here and here.

These are not simply my fantasies, but rather, the carefully thought out recommendations of the President's Commission, published in the summer of 2004 and consigned to the dustbin thereafter. C'est la guerre!