Its Up To The White House Now

What is interesting is one of the statements that Augustine made toward the end of the press conference concerning the inability of the NASA administrator to actually administrate when there are 525 prince and princess up on Capitol Hill protecting their fiefdoms. He said that if things were unfunded that the overhead in personnel should be cut. I believe he referred to the downturn in the defense industry in the early '90s when the various defense contractors cut 640,000 jobs as part of the "peace dividend" after the fall of the Soviet Union.

That goes along with an early post of mine with regard to the manned space program. If they do terminate the Shuttle program in early FY 11 then the astronaut corp should go from the current 88 down to maybe 18. The 88 makes sense when you are flying 7 per shuttle flight 3 times per year and having 2-4 ISS expedition crew members per year. But when the number of astronauts goes down to 2-4 ISS per year, all you need is 18-20. Also cut 75% of trainers, 75% of other support etc. But of course NASA would never be allowed to do that which is what Augustine is getting at. So what we have is a grounded bureaucracy, not a space agency.

Can't wait for the public healthcare, huh?

Detest Fox as much as any Dem, but wonder if this is a factor:

Mum's the Word for NASA's Secret Space Plane X-37B

"You would think that an unpiloted space plane built to rocket spaceward from Florida atop an Atlas booster...NASA has a long history of involvement with the X-37 program. We continue to monitor and share information on technology developments," said Gary Wentz, chief engineer Science and Missions Systems Office at the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. "We are looking forward to a successful first flight and to receiving data from some advanced technologies of interest to us, such as thermal protection systems, guidance, navigation and control, and materials for autonomous re-entry and landing."

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,569143,00.html

In reference to your article on spaceref.com statement :

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These sort of committees appear with some regularity. Each time they produce a pretty report with lofty suggestions, options, recommendations, etc. Yet with almost equal regularity they soon get ignored until such time as the process needs to repeat it self.

At some point one of these reports has got to "stick" and make the transition from suggestion to reality. Will this one "stick"? We'll see. Its up to the White House now.
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Do you believe that congress will choose the status quote?

There are a lot of relevant and honest statements in the conclusions of the report. These conclusions should not be overlooked.

Have these type of statements been made in the past and still overlooked?

I can't figure out why the Augustine commission report distorted the capabilities of the SD-HLV???

They said it would require three SD-HLV launches for a single manned lunar mission when NASA argues that it would require only two: one Orion SD-HLV launch to lunar orbit and one Altair SD-HLV launch (up to 48 tonnes) to lunar orbit for a manned lunar mission. And John Shannon actually showed the commission a video illustration of the SD-HLV concept that showed exactly two launches!

A very odd and significantly distorted conclusion on the SD-HLV concept by the commission, IMO!

Marcel F. Williams

I'm not 100% sure, Marcel, but I think that the Commission's archetecture assessments were based on the assumption of a crew only/cargo only launch paradigm. Thus, an extra launch is required to launch the Orion to rendezvous with the LSAM and EDS. This handicap was also applied to the in-line SDLVs (with DIRECT given as a good example of the class).

This is, of course, a non-optimal archetecture for the D-SDLVs. The SD-HLLV is optimised for a two-launch TOR or LOR profile, whilst DIRECT uses a two-launch EOR with one launch for the EDS and the other for the Orion and LSAM. This initially made me think that the Commission were trying to skew the figures in favour of Ares-V-Lite, whose higher launch-to-LEO payload means it can launch the LSAM and EDS and a second #using the 'Ares-IV' hybrid with the Ares-I upper stage# to launch the Orion. However, on reflection, I think that this just shows the limited scope of the Commission's reviews given its very tight timescale. They didn't even have the time to assess alternate mission strategies so had to try to shoehorn everything into the PoR strategy of cargo only and crew only launches.

The problem is that the politicians are unlikely to understand these purely technical arguments (unless they are particularly well briefed by the advocates of the various alternatives), so the consequence of the report is that any final deicision will be based on misleadingly-applied data. I do not suspect malfeasance, just lack of time.

It's not just your opinion. The thumbs are heavily on the scales.

The actual goals of the report:

1.) Stop the ongoing Ares debacle without overtly embarrassing NASA.

2.) Keep ISS, Earth science and basic launch capabilities intact.

(which leads directly to)

3.) Telling NASA to refrain from
stomping on commercial space
flight, especially commercial
crewed space flight.

4.) Give NASA something vaguely constructive to do that will keep them out of Obama's hair for the duration of his presidency.

(which leads directly to)

5.) An HLV project that will save
face for NASA but that will
will quietly morph into
something saner than Ares...
but not as effective as the
actual Direct architecture.

6.) Give Obama material for a stirring speech about the future in space.

7.) Obama then tells NASA not to bother him again. Period.

The actual relevant architectures and their factual basis were... irrelevant.

I've been saying this for some time, ever since the deliberately muddled "options" were first trotted out... but people just would not listen.

Its quite simple. It has to do with religion. When the report maligns someone else's religion its justifiable since its obvious. But when the report "distorts" your religion, I mean your concept, then its obvious that they don't know what they are doing. For instance when the report distorts Constellation schedule and presents its own unsubstantiated "recommendation" that ARES won't fly till 2017, you and others don't blink an eye and accept it as gospel truth. Even though the commission has not substantiated how they arrived at that conclusion. But when in IYHO the report distorts the SD-HLV then its odd. TRUTH is in the EYE of the beholder. Especially for wanna be engineers.

Sorry, Eagle Eye but you're wrong again. Whom would you rather believe, the Aerospace Corp. or self-serving Constellation program managers? And just to set the record straight, the members of the Augustine panel-including Augustine himself-have many years of engineering experience.

Maybe Orion/Ares was simply a $10 billion cover for the X-37b program and the real intent was always to morph X-37b into the Shuttle follow on ? X-37 may very well be the vehicle that is closest to replacing Shuttle capabilities.

Eagle Eye, as many have pointed out, including in the Augustine report, when the Constellation ESAS program started in 2004, just about 5 years ago, the initial Orion Ares launch date was 2012. Now, 5 years later, even the Orion/Ares managers said they were hard pressed to make 2015. They've been slipping the launch date about a year, every year they've been working on it. Does anyone really think that their dates, like much else in their program, is believable ?

The Shuttle Derived issue is interesting. On p. 89, while discussing the Ares V Lite, the Report specifically says that they do not feel that the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report does not preclude launching humans with cargo when it is sensible to do so.

However, while Ares V Lite is clearly intended to be human rated, in the descriptions of mission profiles for moon first on p. 38 and flexible path on p. 42, the shuttle derived missions include an extra commercial crew launch step, which is not part of the Ares V Lite profile. On the page:

http://www.nasa.gov/offices/hsf/related_documents/index.html

the "Integrated Options" and "Affordability Analysis" PowerPoints from August 12 also indicate that crew launch would be commercial, with the Shuttle Derived vehicles used for cargo only. There would have to be on-orbit transfer from the commercial vehicle to Orion.

On the same page, for June 17 there are PDFs for Sidemount and DIRECT. I looked through the Sidemount one because it's a smaller download, and it's not clear why the Augustine Report pushes availability back to the 2020s, and why they would require three launches in addition to commercial crew for the moon. I didn't see anything in the Report of the PowerPoints I referenced that explains the Committee's rationale, other than the lower capacity of Shuttle Derived options compared to Ares V Lite. It might be buried somewhere in these or other documents.

It would have been helpful to have more detail to explain why the Shuttle Derived vehicles are handled the way they are in the Report. There isn't enough detail about possible mission profiles, or about why they wouldn't be human rated. Page 67 says sidemount is "an inherently less safe arrangement if crew are to be carried," which might explain why they don't human rate sidemount, but that says nothing about DIRECT.

Basically, we need more information. There aren't enough details to really be able to critique the report.

@ Eagle_Eye

Differing views on development time lines is one thing but arguing that a particular architecture requires three launches for a manned lunar mission instead of just two is simply an outrageous distortion of the facts.

Fortunately, I think Bolden will pay a lot more attention to what John Shannon will have to say on the SD-HLV launch architecture than the Augustine Commission.

Marcel F. Williams

Well hopefully it is not just up to the White House now. Why would the White House know what direction in which to turn ?

General Bolden needs to get some of his visionary strategic thinkers together to identify some recommendations.

What can NASA and complementary sources like Space-X/Dragon, deliver, and at what kind of costs ? There ought to be a roadmap; one for current anticipated spending levels; another for a $3 billion increase; another that prices the program of record. Along with costs there need to be some rudimentary schedules. What does the Flex option spacecraft look like ? Is it 2 nose-to-nose Orions, and its thrown away after every mission to ever increasing distances, or is it an ISS derived, Vasimr powered planetary clipper ?

Who are those visionary, strategic thinkers. No doubt they are assigned to the Strategic Visionary Thinking Department.

What will really be interesting will be the upcoming test launch of the SpaceX Falcon 9. This will include LIVE first and second stage and at least a structural test article Dragon capsule. It may fail, we have to see. But the fact that they went from NOTHING to a totally new rocket, engine and capsule design and for BILLIONS less than any government option should make everyone stop and think.

As opposed to dummy, dummy, dummy dummy ARES 1X. And don't take this totally as ARES bashing. I just don't understand why, if they could fire off a 5 segment rocket back in August they couldn't have the ARES 1X at least be a flight test of a 5 segment booster. A nice addition would have been to have a flight test model of the Orion and to be able to test the launch abort system with that since the second stage is a dummy. Unfortunately the ARES 1X just seems to be a publicity stunt with some, but limited engineering testing.

Frank, I do not dispute the commissions extensive engineering experience. While journalists may be awed by the commission members engineering credentials as you seem to be, I am not. Keep your EYE on the ball. Rely on facts. Please prove me wrong and point to the technical facts the commission based their claim that ARES won't launch till 2017. All I've seen is hand waving, well why not release the data since it is at the crux of most of their analysis. And to answer your question, in this specific case I will take Constellation’s word over Aerospace until I see evidence to prove them wrong.

Moonman, how convenient to only look at the facts that make your argument. ESAS planned one thing with a corresponding budget true. however, that budget never materialized and so naturally they had to slip. They are not even provided a reserve. how can a program of this size manage without a reserve? see figure 4.3.2-1. ( I assume you know how to read a dimensional chart)

Constellation claimed ownership for virtually all aspects of future human and some non-human spaceflight, with major initiatives begun in LEO (Orion and Ares 1 supporting ISS, on the moon (Altair, Electric Rover, new spacesuits, Ares 5) and for other future missions.

They needed to focus on the job at hand and do things in order. Early successes and demonstrable progress might have led to later expanded support. That might have been a supportable strategy.

The idea that they should have blindly accepted the ESAS plan especially when the budget ESAS "anticipated" see figure 4.3.2-1, was never there, only meant there were sure to be big problems.

The first focus needed to be on creating a LEO vehicle to take over some of the Shuttle capabilities since that was the immediate concern.
That was needed in 2011 or 2012.

Other than some in-house conceptual work, expending serious dollars on systems that were decades away was a waste.

An Orion LEO like capability could have been done smaller and lighter which would have then opened less expensive options as far as launchers. Going with configurations and new development efforts that were going to cost significantly more and require considerably more time when there were less expensive, faster options available were mistakes.

All of these things should have been balanced rather than blindly assuming ESAS was the only answer.

Augustine's report really has few new concepts or surprises. It was generated in only a couple of months. All he has done is laid out other options, many of which should have been under consideration from the start.

Augustine's prime finding, that NASA was on an unsustainable trajectory, was something that NASA and program management should have recognized, identified, admitted, and begun making alternate plans years ago.

There were many alternatives other than slipping to a schedule which then rendered the hardware Constellation was developing of little value.

ISS started out with an H-frame design, solar dynamic power system, satellite servicing and planetary port mission, in the first year to the configuration pretty close to the one flying today.

Shuttle started out as a flyback liquid booster, straight winged orbiter and evolved to the current configuration within months.

ISS and Shuttle changes were directly the result of inadequate budgets.

Apollo started as a direct architecture with a Nova booster and moved to LOR with a Saturn V and LM within a year.

Apollo changes were the result of being unable to meet the set schedule.

All of these required heated arguments, and leadership making drastic changes in architecture, direction, configuration and contracts.

That is what Program Management is about.

Barsoom, I would take the time and address each of your points, but I am not a help desk. You are seriously ill informed about how things work. I will only say that ESAS was NASA led at the direction of the Administrator and its product was not an option but the direction NASA was to take because of how "spiraled" out of control things had gotten. Before I confuse you further, I offer this prescription, you should take some basic civics courses to understand how the branches of government operate. Follow that up with some recent history and you'll hopefully be enlightened. That should give you a foundation on how the executive and legislative branch work, thankfully the judicial doesn't have a major role in any of this. Then you should investigate the relationship between the administrator and the programs. I hope I'm not boring you with facts and details. Follow that with an aspirin and respond in the morning. Eagle_eye OUT.

I think you are saying that ESAS was a dictate from Dr. Griffin, and no one felt they could challenge him.

You probably need to read Diane Vaughn's Challenger Launch Decision and how the same cultural and managerial failures continued with Columbia.

Personnel could not speak openly.

What I see in Constellation reflects the same failures of NASA culture and management.

The program management board should have been composed of personnel representing their own organizations and established in order to instigate adversarial discussions specifically to bring forward inconsistencies and issues, and in order to force management to make difficult decisions.

Instead, the management was established as a group of peers working on the basis of group consensus, many originally from the same home organization, and all answering to the same hierarchy for their funding and support. Many were placed in their leadership positions specifically as a result of their allegiance to the program manager and other senior managers in prior working relationships.

We have repeatedly heard from multiple sources that people would go away from the Constellation management boards shaking their heads over technically unsupportable decisions, but which they have said no one felt they could speak about openly for fear of their jobs, their positions or funding.

If NASA and Constellation management had been doing their job, they could have and should have recognized the non-supportability of ESAS years ago, and defined required changes.

Instead they waited for Mr. Augustine to render his judgement.

Constellation reflects the latest failure of the NASA HSF management culture.

Eagle Eye, the Aerospace Corp.'s track record on launch vehicle analysis-going back to Titan IIIC-and also the Moorman Report which have birth to the EELV is without peer. Why? Because NASA itself relies on their analysis tools. Why is their analyses acceptable when it agrees with the status quo and not when it suggests change? Seems to me you can't have it both ways.

And/or maybe the US HSF "Gap" is/was manufactured for a reason.....

Is the RLV industry emerging from hibernation?

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1497/1

barsoom's analysis of NASA CxP management is spot on!