Back To The Drawing Board Again

Having read the Sentinel article, I remain a bit puzzled about the kerolox option. I had assumed that they were talking about the ULA Atlas-V Phase 2 (5.5m core) or Phase 3 (8.4m core), especially as they mention that it would use a Russian engine, presumably the RD-180. However, their artist's impression looked like a new runner.

Whilst I'm a kerolox enthusiast for core stages, I have to question whether the costs involved in developing an entire new core would give any budgetary advantage over adapting the current shuttle hydrolox infrastructure already in place. Additionally, a kerolox core would also seem to break the commonality with Ares-I, so this would also require a new ISS-only CLV. FWIW, my dream scenario at the time of ESAS would have been Atlas-V Phase 2 as CLV and Phase 3 as CaLV.

That said, it is interesting that Mr. Block reports that both versions of Ares-V-Lite under consideration will use the 8.4m EDS upper stage. Can anyone confirm that this is the case?

Another study? Yeah, that's real leadership. The politicians will never be happy until a study comes along that confirms their perceptions.

The phrase Analysis Paralysis comes to mind.

Does anybody know what that silhouette is next to the modern version of Saturn V? It looks like the inline one on the left but has shorter solid boosters. Mistake maybe?

I agree dbooker. I love how the article says that having one rocket to use for both crew and cargo now will be cheaper. Sure if you're going outside of orbit every mission. What about ISS crew missions? Are they assuming that's is for private companies now? Also, using liquid kerosene for first stage is cheapest? I thought the solids were cheapest.

"The study team is focused on designs that can be developed quickly and cheaply"

What are the choices again?

I don't understand the ridicule and/or the reticence toward another study. Either by design or by economy, Ares is most likely doomed; therefore another approach is needed. How is that other approach to be found? By pointing while blind folded? By a poll of blog comments? By objective analysis and trade studies? It seems to me that if we're to get anywhere, the third option is the way to go. It's pretty obvious that there are no other paths to follow. The architecture decision aside, it seems to me the options left to supporters of manned space exploration have only a few options left themselves:
1. Continue whining.
2. Continue the snide and/or jaded ankle biting.
3. Contribute somthing tangible to the process or give support.
4. Get out of the way so that others can try to get something done.

I've seen more than enough of no's 1 and 2 in blog comments. If some of the comments read represent the objective know-how of scientist and engineers today, our objectivity seems terminally crippled.

"Does anybody know what that silhouette is next to the modern version of Saturn V? It looks like the inline one on the left but has shorter solid boosters. Mistake maybe?"

That silhouette is the actual size of the 'modern Saturn-V' in comparison with the other options. So, we perceive that it is a 8.4m diameter core spacecraft (maybe with the Ares-V upper stage) with liquid fuel outriggers, maybe Atlas-V CCBs.

Here here. Everyone's an armchair rocket designer. The same folks will be criticizing whatever vehicle NASA ends up pursuing, whether it's Ares 5 lite, side mount, Direct, commercial, etc.

I wonder if the shuttle or Saturn would have been built if the blogosphere and armchair rocket designers had been around back then?

The current plan is unsustainable. And thanks to Mike Griffin's misguided leadership, we are 4 years and $8 billion in the hole with nothing to show for it. A truly Shuttle-derived vehicle is the only way to go. How can you justify doubling or tripling development costs for claims of operational savings when the flight rate does not support a ROI.

Anyway, the architecture is irrelevant. NASA will fail regardless of the architecture if we don't fundamentally restructure management. Constellation (and Engineering at the Code M centers) is being run by ops people who have no clue about design. Until that problem is fixed, we are doomed to failure. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be fixed. I fear for our future, or lack thereof.

This is, in part, the study that should have been conducted four and a half years ago, instead of blindly going with the Griffin plan. The Griffin plan was based on using STS derived hardware which would be simple, safe, and soon. Griffin's architecture did not work out. The original booster concepts could not carry what was required based on the rest of the Griffin architecture which included an over-sized Orion, and so simple, safe and soon became became technologically complex, not so soon, and we can debate the safety or reliability of a new and untried system.

Hopefully this current study is recognition that they need affordable heavy lift, but is not necessarily accepting the architecture (Orion and Apollo redux).

Whether to keep Orion, and whether we are doing Apollo style lunar sorties as the next step, are two other studies.

I'd suggest:
(1) affordable Shuttle-based heavy lift
(2) least expensive but reliable LEO access possible, likely a rocket plane and maybe something based on X-37 riding on the Shuttle based heavy lift
(3) Modified ISS elements and systems for deep space long duration missions.
(4) Unmanned lunar polar landers that look at water harvesting and ISRU

Those ought to be the next steps and should be planned for a five year development/implementation schedule.

In about 3-4 years, start working the Phase A studies that scope the follow-on steps.

Managerially, divide into manageable chunks. Place STS experienced-people in charge of the STS-derived booster program.
Place X-37 people together with human spacecraft design people in charge of the new LEO vehicle program.
Place unmanned probe people together with ISRU people in charge of the the unmanned mission program.

Re-establish a series of engineering and science institutional organizations that provide the systems management/hardware development support. Don't duplicate the systems engineering responsibilities in the programs.

Each program should be responsible for program management.

Looking at the right-most picture of the completely liquid fueled vehicle: this monstrosity is basically twice as tall (according to the picture) as the Ares V. I thought the Ares I-V combination was pushing the height limit of the current VAB. Does this option mean a new VAB?

Not to worry, all this banter of replacing Constellation, will be all for naught. The AP is reporting that agencies will have to freeze spending and in some cases reduce their budget for 2011. If this occurs, it doesn't matter what a bunch of armchair wanna be engineers and space cadets want all you'll have is a bunch of powerpoint studies to justify some nonsensical destination path to L1 or better yet Mars orbit. http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Obama-wants-domestic-spending-apf-691348121.html?x=0&sec=topStories&pos=3&asset=&ccode=

NASA sort of reminds me of the zombie movies,where they have capable functioning bodies with no soul or intellect to give them direction.
But there may be hope yet, JSC is taking the initiative and pulling out all the stops in developing a feasible end run around Constellation to land a robot on the moon and retu.....uhhhh.. oh...uhhhhh No word yet on whether it will be returned safely back to earth. Stay tuned I suppose.

Constellation is expensive, but it was headed to create a series of capabilities today that no one else has. We get a lot for the money.

Believing we can get around the cost problem by juggling rocket components means believing that government will have learned a lesson about becoming more efficient and mission oriented...

I'm more apt to believe we'll be paying several hundred million more to launch similar sized rockets to what SpaceX will have been flying next door for years by the time NASA is ready.
How do we insure our redesigned rocket avoids becoming an embarrassment?

Private industry will not have a "similar sized rocket" as the HLV's that NASA will have to develop, not in our lifetimes anyway. There is no commercial market for 125-ton payloads. I wish SpaceX the best, but they are duplicating an existing capability. I hope that their cost model works out because that is their only advantage. I'm afraid they will find out that launching rockets is more expensive in reality than it is on paper. The trick will be to not become too bloated with employees and facilities.

I'm all for reconsidering the launch system. However, the article states that "the study team is focused on designs that can be developed quickly and cheaply, using existing engines and motors."

It seems to me that our current conundrum is in part because current launch systems cost too much to assemble and operate. Focusing on the cheapest and fastest units from the perspective of development cost and schedule, rather than on the operating costs, is how we stay in the conundrum.

Better think again. If there is one lesson that we should learn from ESAS and the Augustine Commission, it's that space exploration beyond LEO has an *affordablity* issue. If we don't take the time to get it right now, when will we have to time to make the corrections later?

While I wouldn't use his exact words, Possum is right: By asking for teams to quickly evaluate large launcher options, Charlie's action appears to imply that 'the problem' is 'the design'. I disagree that the designs - per se - are the problem. Our organization, our bureaucracy, our various - competing - and old, cultures, along with managers at many levels of many Centers not being what one might describe as 'strong' and "innovative" is much more of our problem. Several weeks of quickie viewgraph- level exercises, with some of the subteams having very clear agendas, is deja vous all over again. That's exactly how the space station design got changed - at an added cost of tens of billions of dollars. How an Ares I gets created; and how a simple Ares-iX low-fidelity flight costs NASA the same amount as NASA is giving to two companies to help build two entirely new launch vehicles in the COTS program (i.e, $400+).

Possum is also right, though, on another score: if we are absolutely insistent that a single very large booster is mandatory, that is not something the commercial industry can, would, or should build. As Elon Musk pointed out earlier this year, an ELV that flies only a couple of flights a year is something that can never be economical or affordable. Thus if we must have one. it has to be done by government. And such a vehicle would be very, very expensive to build; very expensive to operate; and would have such a low frequency it would be 'worse' than the shuttle, in that it would never be a truly operational vehicle. Two launches a year is experimental - not operational.

So, the issues of jobs in Alabama and Florida aside, do we have an absolute, compelling need for a very large, extremely expensive to build and own, booster?

And if we do - should the current NASA bureaucracy be the one to build it?

"Anyway, the architecture is irrelevant. NASA will fail regardless of the architecture if we don't fundamentally restructure management. Constellation (and Engineering at the Code M centers) is being run by ops people who have no clue about design. Until that problem is fixed, we are doomed to failure. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be fixed. I fear for our future, or lack thereof."

Of course, it would be funny if it were not so tragic, but Constellation and JSC management said, at the Augustine meetings, 'now that they are beyond PDR they have learned how to manage. They are now organized.'

On a 'typical' development project of say, about 5 years, PDR is usually about the first year. It is usually the fun part of turning concepts into strategy and requirements. Constellation management failed miserably on that part so far. But it is after PDR that the tough activity, that requires real engineering management, has to get started - actually gearing up to do the design, development and then systems integration.

If the 1 year, $2 billion concept phase extended to more than 4 years and $10 billion, how long and how many dollars will the 4 year, development effort that is currently projected at about $100 billion take ?

Exploration and Constellation management need a realignment.

"On a 'typical' development project of say, about 5 years, PDR is usually about the first year."

What?? I'm not sure how many DoD or space projects you've worked on, but by the time you get to PDR, several years will have been invested towards solidifying the design.

"It is usually the fun part of turning concepts into strategy and requirements. "

Incorrect. By PDR, things like primary structure will have been analyzed, which is way beyond just fine-tuning requirements. And as a general rule of thumb, by CDR, which is usually 12 to 36 months later (depending on the project), about 90% of the detail and assembly drawings should be complete. That'd be a tall order if all you've done by PDR is define requirements.

Why does every high-level study has to be finished in time for so and so, so that it only lasts one or two months?

I can't understand how anybody can seriously believe it's ok to spend a few weeks of actual work considering how you're going to spend the next 10 years...

In -real- space projects, i.e. missions with actual goals (comms or EO), the feasibility phases (phase 0 and A) take at least a year each, and they usually come on the back of several studies looking at the scientific or commercial case and the critical technological points.

I am puzzled, unless this is another study whose conclusion is foregone.

A.