Forgetting (Or Not Knowing) What NASA Has Done

My own opinion, from only a high-level look (I may be wrong), is that the same research or very similar stuff has been duplicated in the space stations over and over since the 70s, with SkyLab, Saliout, Mir, and now the ISS.

They always talk about zero-g fluid dynamics, reproduction of whatever insect, molecular chemistry, or bone loss to humans. It doesn't seem to me that this has provided any significant insight into physics or biology.

So I'm not suprised that somebody reinvents the wheel every 15 years...

Wo.

Astrogenetix is a step beyond doing research, at least according to their info. The other work you mention was research to help in the development of therapeutics. Astrogenetix is using the cultures to develop an actual commercial product rather than a journal article.

Editor's note: dear anonymous poster. Let me suggest that you do a little but more than just a drive-by assessment of earlier work. You will see that there was MUCH more being done that writing journal articles and that developing therapeutics was on many many minds - and within project plans.

Guys, can we all just get along. What is the point of arguing about this since we are abandoning the Space Shuttle for a capsule that can barely launch 4 astronauts. If it weren't for the planned, yet to be proven, return capability of the Dragon capsule we wouldn't be able to get anything returned from the ISS either. Great planning NASA.

ESA recently submitted an ambitious plan for the “European Life and Physical Sciences in Space” (ELIPS). ELIPS integrates ESA, Japanese and industry requirements. Facilities include both ground and ISS facilities; ESA Columbus Lab and Japanese JEM lab. However, as pointed out by dbooker above the ISS has limited capabilities.

Keith Cowing's comments stating that NASA previously had a viable academic and industry program on SpaceLab and the Shuttle is correct.

I was actively involved. The following are more details. Allow for some memory slip since that was many years ago.

Starting in the 1960s NASA HQ and MSFC developed and managed a Materials Processing in Space Program (MPS) with experiments carried on Apollo, Skylab and Space Lab. This research and development program included NASA funded Principle Investigators from NASA and universities. During this time NASA MSFC hosted several Post Doctoral workers from Europe, principally from Germany. These scientists returned to their countries and essentially duplicated the program. Thus MPS became an international initiative.

The MPS program included an integrated approach for progressive R&D steps using ground based platforms such as laboratories, aircraft, drop tubes and, drop towers and space based facilities such as Skylab, Spacelab and later ISS.

On or about 1976/1977 NASA HQ decided to expand MPS to include investigators and projects from US commercial concerns; Commercial Materials Processing in Space (CMPS). In this regard, Dr. John Caruthers, Bell Labs, was hired to lead this initiative. MSFC Program Development Directorate (PD) was assigned to support Dr. Caruthers. I was assigned as a Business Development person for this effort.

A major element was the inclusion of investigators and flight hardware provided by commercial firms. An innovative set of Industrial Guest Investigator (IGI), Technical Exchange Agreements (TEA)and Joint Endeavor Agreements (JEAs) were developed with quid-pro-quo terms and conditions in which industry would build the hardware and NASA would launch and operate the experiments in ground based facilities and space based facilities without charge to industry. That is we avoided FAR. In turn, NASA was allowed the use of this equipment for research on NASA selected materials. Thus reducing the need for NASA funded processing hardware.

§ A team was formed that included NASA scientists and program development subject matter exerts. Specific industries with significant R&D budgets were matched with results from NASA funded projects. The team selected as an entry point the Vice Presidents for R&D at these companies. For example, the results from early NASA funded processing of alloys was used as an example in discussions with John Deere. Similar semiconductor R&D was used to solicit the interest of 3M. Dr. Charles Bugg, The University of Alabama in Birmingham Medical School then took the lead for processing of pharmaceutical. Dr. DeLuca succeeded Bugg.

§ Working arrangements and formal IGI, TEA and JEA were signed with 3M, DuPont, Dow, AMOCO, ALCOA, John Deere, MRA and several Pharmaceutical companies in partnership with UAB.

§ The aforementioned companies gave positive testimony in congress regarding the benefits of the program.

§ In addition, studies were funded with the Harvard Business School to assess CMPS benefits and impediments from a business case. One of the students was David Thompson of Orbital. Another student Russell Ramsland, Jr, was a co-founder of Microgravity Research Associates (MRA).

§ The program was reduced in funding and content after the Challenger accident. At that time 3M had budgeted for more flights on the Shuttle.

The MPS and CMPS program supported the establishing of the NASA Administrator’s Space Station Commercial Advocacy Group (CAG) with representatives from all NASA centers. The CAG developed and presented a wide variety of commercial options for review by NASA; CMPS, launch systems, commercial astronaut corps, etc. These early studies helped lead to establishing of the Office of Commercial Programs (Code C) at NASA HQ Code C was active in a wide variety of initiatives. For example, a industrial advisory group of over 50 industrial representatives was established. This groups developed and published 5 (five) volumes of possible industrial projects for NASA consideration; CMPS, launch systems, satellites, technology developments and services (e.g., a US based airline to operate the Shuttle).

Mark Uhran Assistant Associate Administrator
for International Space Station has led this effort in recent years. Dr Mike Wargo, Exploration Science Division, NASA HQ, was engaged in these early efforts as a graduate student at MIT.

@Harry,

Thanks for that. That certainly looks quite a lot of activity. Reading about it, I realise (and it does make sense of course) that ESA and NASA have put up a large research infrastructure on this topic. It is certainly underpublicised by both organisations in all their PR about astronaut flights.

What is interesting is that you mention a lot of the "who" and "how" it was done, but the "what" or the "what for". If a layperson asked me, even as a fairly bright-eyed space cadet I wouldn't know what to quote as an actual technical result.

I'm not even talking about products or spin-offs here, simply a view as to what experimental results were obtained and what conclusions they provided into physical and life sciences. As an apparently knowledgeable person yourself, would you know where I can find that?

Cheers,

A.

(I've tried for two days to get an ID, so I can make a comment. There is something messed up with the sign-up process. So, forgive the weird name, it was the only way I could make a comment.)

I joined MDAC's CFES/EOS team just before we geared up for production, not just research. CFES (the middeck unit shown with Charlie) had shown the promise of refining drugs in space. Our then-secret target drug, erythropoetin or epo, was difficult to produce in quantity, and difficult to refine on Earth.

Our partner, Ortho, believed that the value of the refined drug offset the expense of space flight. At that time (mid 1980s), some people in the space commercialization community considered us the first and best example of the potential for commercial manufacturing in space. AvWeek wrote articles about us.

EOS, the production prototype, was eventually manifested to fly on STS-51L. We weren't ready to fly, and withdrew from that ill-fated mission. But that's how close to space manufacturing we got.

In the years it took to get the Shuttle flying again, our project staff (funded by internal r&d) dwindled and Ortho came up with ways to refine epo on Earth. Epo is now marketed as Procrit. If they had not discovered ways to refine epo on Earth, the commercial success of Procrit would seem to indicate that space-borne drug refinement was a commercially viable approach.

So drug manufacturing in space wasn't just on people's minds, it was months away in January of 1986.

One clarification, before some obscure historian uses my post to write a book (yeah, right). My memory was fuzzy about whether or not 51L was the reason J&J left. (It certainly was the reason CFES and EOS were mothballed.)

By October of 1985 (before 51L), J&J (Ortho) had pulled out of their agreement with MDAC, saying they could get a product to market sooner with ground processing. Some of their advancements in production came from investment in the space venture, so in a way their success was partly a result of that investment.

MDAC was pressing ahead with the flight of EOS-1, and looking for new partners in the venture. By 10/85, the payload had been moved to a mission in mid-1986. That mission would have been the first for Robert Wood, the second MDAC astronaut. (Robert was killed by a speeding driver a few months ago, details can be found in the NASAWatch archives).

Here is an article from the 12 October 1985 Flight International that helped refresh my memory.

Wouarnud: Dr. Carruthers often said we were perfoming these R&D project to determine the Yes, No and Maybe So of low gravity processing. As for applications the previous data regarding the MCDAC EOS experiments showed that sometimes preparing to process in low g resulted in a redesign and improvements of ground based equipment. That source and DeLuca et al at University of Alabama can add their R&D reasons. John Deere never intended to process cast iron in space but looked at this as an opportunity to add another data point for product improvements. Deere told us they processed cast iron also in a centrifuge. Their objectives was to produce low grade steel that had the same machining capabilities as cast iron. We presented to AMOCO the results from foam experiments that showed an even distribution of spherical cavities of equal size. AMOCO was interested because of their research on Zeolite crystals used in filtering processes. A prediction of the filtering capabilities is dependent on being able to predict the surface area of voids inside the crystal.

Finally, most of the industrial particiants viewed this as a governement and industry partnership to improve ground based products. Also, I recall an official of EXXON saying he would seriously consider participating in the program for three reasons; to learn something about the effects of low gravity processing, to learn something about NASA and most importantly for NASA to learn something about EXXON.

I hope NASA will return to using our assets in a partnership with US industry. It appears this is the case for ESA and Japan.

At the risk of being repetitive, EOS-1 would have moved beyond r&d. EOS sat in the payload bay, and was being sent up as a prototype for production. The observation that J&J improved ground-based production is an artifact, it was not the primary intent of the program.

Back in the 1980s, the sentiment was that space manufacturing was around the corner, not a distant dream. One benefit of working in space was bringing a finished product (captured solar energy, pharmaceuticals, strategic materials) to Earth, not just doing research that made a terrestrial product better.

After David Sander and Co get money to produce Man Conquers Space, they should follow it up with one that chronicles what might have been if we'd pursued the 1980s dreams (well documented by The Space Studies Institute and their 14 conferences on space manufacturing.

We might have constructed orbiting microgravity production facilities, mass drivers to move Lunar material into space, giant solar energy satellites, et al. Not quite the romance of MCS, but it would have been a cool timeline.

@Harry @ ,

Thanks for that. Don't misunderstand me, I would have loved to see space manufacturing, and I am somewhat aware of history, so I know it was big in the 80s. I am in fact trying to understand why it didn't happen!

However, we are forced to recognise that -currently- experiments in these topics on the space station are, to say the least, not the most visible part of the program... In fact there is a very relevant book writtent by a French journalist recently ("Impasse de l'Espace", i.e. dead-end in space) that describes the public-visible side of the discourse of most astronauts and their mission in space:

1) Prior to launch, we are talking with hardened professionals, it's all about the experiment, and they're only being sent up there to perform it.

2) During the mission, the experiment is hardly talked about: We only see the people having fun in freefall, drinking water in a ball, describing how to pee in the infamous zero-G toilet, etc...

3) After the mission, the talk shifts to how this was all like a spiritual experience and many come up with a born-again ecological and ethical view about the planet (even though many of them were piloting jet fighters in wars before). The experiment is forgotten, because half the time there was no time to do it or it didn't work.

I can unfortunately recognise this pattern now that it's pointed out, and I think it's a shame. I plan to read indeed these space manufacturing conferences, but the volume of litterature is scary. I'm trying to find a shorter text, like a book, instead. If you know of one let me know.

Anyway, enjoyable conversation, a nice change from the Ares v Direct v whatever usual flame wars here...

A.

One reason the era of space manufacturing was didn't happen was 51L. The companies that were getting excited about flying didn't know when they could get on (or back on) the manifest. Their shareholders couldn't afford the long waits, and they weren't happy about the uncertain future. Within NASA, the focus for flights changed, industry payloads and payload specialists weren't going to be commonplace.

I evangelized payloads as soon as I arrived at NASA. I'm still a believer.

But over the years, I came to appreciate the difficulty of merely creating and maintaining a home in space.

Some people conclude that it's a waste to send people up, if most of their time is spent on maintenance and construction. I disagree with that notion for several reasons:

I think the goal of figuring out how to live and work in space is an imperative for our future. One example: ISS triggers advances in the science of operations, most notably EVAs.
And although I'm a big believer in scientific experimentation, I think that the goal of exploring is sufficient reason to have a space program. If we put off exploring until all our problems are solved... we won't be around to explore.
In many experiments, failure is just as important as success. And it may take a series of failures before a success. But most people don't hear about experiments that merely returned data that says "try again". And the public's lack of tolerance for failure would either defund the experiments or result in mediocre science.
If we put the experiments in a National Lab under the same metaphorical microscope, with live TV in the lab every day and twitter feeds back and forth, the work of the lab would suffer. As we used to say "the public doesn't want to watch wheat grow", but that wheat growth experiment may be a critical one, nonetheless.