How Quickly We Forget

There are definitely individual "wins" in the space shuttle program and we can certainly learn from it in countless ways. One of the lessons we should learn from it is that the design didn't create the low cost/high volume space access which is critical to the growth of the industry and at this point, it's time to move on.

The problem with the Shuttle program is that it represents an era that wasn't as inspiring to the public as the one before it. Granted, the pace of the 60's was not sustainable long term and a drop off in interest was inevitable. Today the promise of space exploration is regarded as something we did in the past, not something we're currently doing. The space program is mostly forgotten at this point.

"...but ultimately a poor program with no destination and little purpose.

Thanks Keith for setting the record straight here with your comment. When I first read this I was a bit set back by it - sounded like Mike Griffin. By now it may seem like a poor program with no purpose, but that was certainly not the case at its inception. History will show otherwise.

Keith, you're exactly right on this. While shuttle and ISS were not well aimed at going anyplace in particular, the technologies and skills as well as refinement of strategies for international collaboration we developed with them are hugely important in anything we ever want to do with human space flight. Referring to them dismissively as Lou Friedman has done is not constructive.

If one looks at ISS through the lens of scientific research that is not about the human body, one could consider ISS somewhat lacking but, like you say, as a technological achievement in building big things in space, it has been a terrific experience. One deep frustration with the Constellation program has been that it never even tried to harvest that hard-won expertise in building big things in space.

I've asked this before, I'll ask this again here: Can anybody point to some kind of report or text book to evaluate the zero-g research so far? I know of all the conference about space manufacturing etc..., but I've never found a synthetic work able to actually assess the impact on science of all these experiments.

I've no doubt lots of stuff has been done, but from the outside, it certainly seems like the same thing is repeated over and over again and it certainly isn't clear what the benefits have been. I do have hope for the ISS though once the facilities are ready and significant time is available for research.

A.

I disagree with Friedman's comments and he has done a great disservice to the space program.

Shuttle was designed as a truck; a workhorse. It made use of decades of knowledge about hypersonic flight developed during the course of X-15 and aero programs, fly-by-wire control systems pioneered on LM and Apollo, and space operations that were in their infancy on Skylab. Shuttle was state of the art at its inception.

It was disappointing that Shuttle was not as affordable nor as smooth to turn around as originally envisioned, but I wonder how much of that was because of technical issues and how much was political job maintenance?

Shuttle's inspirational value-ask most kids what a rocket looks like and they will tell you and show you a space shuttle; most know that term more than they know the term rocket; all rockets are space shuttles.

Shuttle's big disappointment, was that once we figured out how to design and build such an advanced vehicle we did not follow it with something better and more efficient. That is what advances technology, which is NASA's job. The current plans to go back to capsules is a step backward, not forward.

Space Station's original goal was to develop the technologies for supporting long duration planetary class missions. It was intended as an technology and operations base and a toehold in space for use for commercial development, which was Reagan's original reason for approving it. On the technology and operations fronts, I think it has met its goals, though like the Shuttle, at too great a cost in time and money.

The idea that the space station was principally a scientific laboratory was a concept that developed later. It might ultimately prove useful as such, and maybe we will make some exciting discoveries; but station was originally approved in the early 80s when the Shuttle-based 'main events' were things like satellite rescues and early discussion was focusing on station use as an assembly location for the planetary vehicles and a way station for departing and returning lunar or Mars vehicles, coming out of SEI.

In the early 80s, commercial prospects were on the horizon with things like CFES, PCG, and other projects being developed by the Centers for Commercial Development. NASA's bigger fear was commercial competition in the form of the Space Industries Industrial Space Facility, again aimed at commercial production operations, man-tended, rather than on scientific research. Science did not become the main emphasis until after the Challenger return-to-flight, and after a flurry of activity on Spacelab and Spacehab flights.

International participation in station was a big part right from the start, and gained more significance with Clinton in the early 90s, when the Russians were invited to participate. This saved the program.

As has been pointed out by my previous postings the COTS ISS resupply contracts cost more per pound than using the shuttle. I am totally for COTS but this just shows that the issue is a lot harder than is often stated. And the total failure of NASA to do the proper research and development on this issue.

Regarding your Dec 15 update: I had heard through the grapevine many years ago that the 'decades' of data the Russians supposedly collected on life sciences in the Salyut and Mir programs prior to our coming on board was just plain lousy science...and some zero-g info had the distinct look of having been collected on the ground, not in orbit.
Keith, you were in life sciences...any credence to this? Have you heard anything similar?

Editor's note: the science varied in quality. Some of it was simple and concise, other stuff was substandard. A lot of it was worthless. Of course, Lou Friedman seems to have no idea (once again) as to what he is talking about. But since he is inclined to be nice to the Russians nothing they ever do is wrong, and everything is o great value, right Lou?

Re: Wouarnud

"Can anybody point to some kind of report or text book to evaluate the zero-g research so far?"

Probably not exactly what you're looking for, but a few suggestions from the Lunar Library:

"Space Industrialization Opportunities", Jernigan & Pentecost, 1985 - a terrific look at much of the potential that exists for microgravity science. It was written in the heady early days of the shuttle when private companies were actually flying commercial experiments into space. Some of the stuff proposed just boggles the mind when you start thinking of the (missed) potential.

"Life into Space: Space Life Sciences Experiments" (3 Vols.), Souza, Etheridge & Callahan, 1995-2005. - Of much more recent vintage, LiS compiles experiments from 1965-2003. It focuses on the experiments themselves, and not the aftermath that Wouarnud is looking for. Nevertheless, it is an immensely valuable reference guide to the life science experimentation done to date. The online versions are at http://lis.arc.nasa.gov/

I paged through the copy I picked up recently at the IRC tucked in a back corner of the half-sized NASA HQ Library, and was quite impressed at how much information was collected. It even rekindled an old entrepreneurial idea I had once of buying up on the cheap old, flown experiment hardware, cleaning it up, and then leasing it to other researchers; the value-added premise being that having already flown the hardware could be expedited through the vetting process, offering a quicker means of getting research into space than the existing model of everyone designing and building their own black box.

Experience at NASA during my NASA Academy days quickly rectified that delusion.

"International Space Station Research Summary Through Expedition 10", Robinson, Rhatigan, Baumann, Tate & Thumm, 2006 - basically what it says. Much more comprehensive in its description than LiS, it does list papers associated with the experiments. One of the many freebies we were handing out at my 2007 ISDC, the online version can be found at NTRS at http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20070014486_2006252034.pdf

Hope that helps.

Editor's note: go here http://spaceline.nasaprs.com/index.html - most recent stuff is here http://spaceline.nasaprs.com/current2009/index.html You can also go to PubMed at NIH at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ and search for "NASA", "Space Shuttle", "Spacelab" etc. hundreds - thousands of research papers on space life science done on the shuttle await your examination - contrary to what Lou Friedman seems to think.

It seems like some of the comments are quite barbed against Lou. If one disagrees with Lou state why and show evidence. Which was done. Statements like "Lou Friedman seems to have no idea (once again) as to what he is talking about" are guaranteed 100% wrong at some level.

Editor's note: "Barbed"? Gee, I certainly hope they were - that was my intention. The simplest of Google searches will reveal a vast amount of life science research results from the shuttle era. There are links in my previous response. Lou could not be bothered with facts in this situation.

Re: Wouarnud and Murphy

This is a very interesting line of questioning. Planning the science, and even doing the science, isn't enough because it doesn't tell you anything about the ultimate utility of the science to the scientific community.

To offer a parallel example from long ago: The First International Polar Year of 1881-84 generated fantastic amounts of data, carefully measured by an international set of outposts in the high Arctic. It is generally praised in the historical literature as the first of its kind. True enough, but most of the data collected dust for a hundred years without being used. Only now are researchers returning to it as a baseline for climate change studies. Success or failure depends upon whether you take this step of usefulness into account.

Michael Robinson

Ken, Keith,

Thanks for that. Will go there to fill up my long wintry nights: Europe is ensconced in heavy ice and snow these days, including Copenhagen, which for a summit on global -warming- is kinda ironic.

I also agree with Miles that it's somewhat a pity the space station wasn't properly designed as a lab from the start. As I understand it (though I'm no specialist) a major problem with it is that zero-g conditions on-board are less than perfect, and that prevents experiments on manufacturing or fundamental physics, for instance.

Anyway, hindsight is a wonderful thing.

Cheers,

A.

Your posts were using incorrect numbers. CRS (that is the proper term, not COTS) is cheaper than the shuttle.

A book that outlines some of the results in the physical sciences is "Microgravity Combustion: Fire in Free Fall", Editor Howard Ross. Look it up on Amazon. I worked for Howard in the early 90's as a NASA intern and my thesis was on a topic related to microgravity combustion. There was community of people in the 90's ready to do a variety of experiments on ISS. But delays and design changes ended almost all physical science research. Problems were poor microgravity conditions (too many fans, people moving around, station keeping, etc...) and short experiment times (low pressure too). But ultimately budget cuts and delays killed the research. I had heard that in the early 2000's they were thinking of proposing free flyer spacecraft where experiments could be conducted in better micro-g and with more reactants, etc... but it wasn't to be. Now there is very small micro-gravity physical science community. You can't do good science if you don't have the tools.

Lou has his own agenda. And some of his points are obviously in ones face incorrect. For example "It is done to advance the political power and prestige of the country or countries involved. (Why else would China and India embark on it? Why did the U.S. and the Soviet Union?) Scientific, economic, or security benefits may come, but these are usually secondary gains." I disagree with the last sentence. The space program helps drive technology, for example, manufacturing, numerical simulations, materials, biology, sensors, and earth observation. And it obviously plays a critical role for the military, i.e. "security". I have to assume Lou knows the benefits of the space program are not secondary gains to a country.

So why did he say this? To me it seems like an article which was hastily put together without the thought I feel it should have received. However, maybe there is a little more to it. Does his opinion letter reveal what he feels about his audience? I'm frightened to think that he is trying to pander to the people, the taxpayers. Does he feel he will get the support of people by saying this? Does the general population think in these terms about the space program? Scary.

And, I don't mean to put words into anyone's mouth, but I assume some of you do feel that people think like this, to a degree. Thus the need for better PR from NASA. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

Overall, his opinion seems to be pro space. And he's got to know a thing or two if he is in this business. Knowledge which, maybe, he is not forthcoming with in the opinion. So, is the issue the feeling he may be trying to pander to the people?

We probably won't resolve the polar opposite opinions of Lou Friedman and Keith Cowing (that life science research on Mir was valuable or lacking in quality, respectively)--this debate has become perennial. I think Lou is right that the Shuttle decision was odd--we had a Shuttle, but no real mission for it, and I think Keith is right that, nevertheless, some decent research has been done on the Shuttle over the years.

But let's not trash the NASA/Mir program (aka Phase 1 of the ISS) as a scientific failure. While accidents and other issues reduced its utility, it was nevertheless quite valuable to NASA as a means to understand what's required to plan and operate a permanently inhabited orbital platform. We would have had--and would continue to have--a much rougher time operating ISS if we hadn't collaborated with the Mir program in the 1990's.