GAO - NASA's Challenges Ahead

I wonder what is meant by "grossly underutilized"? I read in the report that the US plans to use only half of its racks for research. How are the other partners doing utilizing their research space? Are the other racks going unused because they can't find people who want to do research on ISS?

Looks like the GAO has made a good case to keep flying the shuttle until something else can do the job. As for how NASA handles cost overruns and funding leaks well..........

Carl Surfduke Hewlett
"The best way out is always through.", Robert Frost

NASA does have many challenges. I am not so sure Bolden and Garver are up to the challenge, but time will tell.

Challenge 1 - NASA needs to grow with the times. Constellation has shown that, no matter how much bipartisan support you generate, if you don't manage large programs will, they are not sustainable. That being said, they need to be careful not to get caught up too much in the SpaceX, "commercial market is coming" philosophy. It could sink them just as fast as mismanagement of Constellation did. Therefore, they need to focus on some sort of mission statement that makes sense. I believe they need to move more to a phiosophy of US HSF is important and in order to guarantee that, thay need to define a clear mission. I feel it should be: Guarantee US HSF access to LEO on US vehicles, once that is assured, make sure that the hardware that they are using are extensible to broader ranging purposes (beyond LEO, etc). develop those capabilities with purpose and drive. As this develops, opportunities will become more clear and destinations can start to be defined.

Challenge 2 - Stay outside of the politics. Define the mission statement and stick to it. Don't be swayed by "commercial" or "big program" politics. So in supporting goal #1 (assured US HSF acccess to LEO), focus on an extensible vehicle design. I don't want to use the term "spiral" development, because that is overused also but develop a block plan that makes sense. I think Orion is there, NASA just needs to take their overmanagement out of it and let it go forward. Also in supporting goal one they need to "procure" launch vehicles and "procure" alternate HSF access to LEO. And don't overmanage them.

Challenge 3 - NASA needs to create value. This is a tough one but the ISS is important in that. There is a ton of money in it and it does have value. They need to keep it alive and need to make that one of their shining points like Hubble. Therefore they need to "procure" ISS cargo capabilities. They need to look to what can be added to the Space Station to add value and how to maintain it ince the current modules start exceeding their functional life.

Challenge 4 - Safety and effective management. It is clear from the Challenger failure and the Columbia failure that NASA needs to be really smart in how they do things. No one wants to see any astronaut die on a space mission. NASA has some good lessons learned but they need to instill that vision in contractors and let them handle it. You can't assure safety just by coming out with 1000 NASA standards that just drive paperwork. People need to work with vision, not lots of papaer drivving them. That being said, they need to work like DoD. They need to define requirements and procure to those requirements. They need to have faith in their requirements and let the contractors do their job. Do they need $3B in center management to do this, probably not and those funds could be put towards good procurement practices. Also they need to get away from the "astronauts don't care what vehicle they are riding." They need to move towards "we are going to make the vehicles that assure safety and reliable crew access to space"

Challenge 5 - They need to be responsive. They do need to be responsive to those who say 1000s of jobs will be lost. While they can't cancel anything right now, they should have teams working on many RFPs to support the mission statement. They need to get those to contractors as soon as the budget deliberations are over and be prepared to award contracts in a month or two, not years. They need to find a way to improve competition. Responses to RFPs are typically a lot of pictures with what the company thinks is the cost bogey that NASA wants to hear. There needs to be a better way to do that. The companies need to define capabilities, experience, and engineering skills and NASA needs to pick the right capability for the task.

The money is there to do great things and enhance the Aerospace industry, but NASA has to meet those challenges or they will fail. And all of the above only covers 1/3 of the total NASA budget. They need to take the rest and really "explore" with robotic vehicles and do resarch. Super HLV procurement is in there somewhere, but that will take some care. A super HLV with nothing to carry doesnt do any good. Delta IV heavy doesn't even have that much to carry right now.

Also note that the above plan "is" the market that the commercial folks want. If downstream this results in 100s of people floating around in space and doing great commercial things, I am all for it. But NASA needs to focus on what they can do to help not what they think sounds good.

That is coming from an ex-Constellation, big NASA program supporter and is now a "lets do the right thing" supporter.

In some ways GAO adds to the problem. Sometimes I get the impression that the people of GAO are MBAs rooted in academia. GAO would like that an organization minimizes risk before going on to the next step. But sometimes one must have faith that engineers can solve problems on the fly and also have faith that a part of a system can be in production while another be under development. I know it is risky. And I know it is not ideal nor does it lead to ideal systems. But some components have such long lead times, one doesn't have a choice, except of course to stretch out the schedule. Which increases cost since some resources become idle. Furthermore, bringing up schedule and cost overruns is getting old. Geez, that's not new, and I don't think there is a way around it. The ironic part about that is that one can factor in cost overruns in a cost estimate but that messes up your cost estimates down the road. OK, lets say you bump up your cost estimate to factor in historical cost overruns. Then, you pass out the money to various groups. And you need to pass all the money out, or lose it. Of course everyone is always optimistic about what can be done, that's human nature. Then one finds out down the road where people were over optimistic and that you are faced which cost and schedule overruns. Then, the next system comes along and you factor in the previous system's cost and schedule overruns into your cost estimate for the next system. And the cycle continues.

> Challenge 1 - NASA needs to grow with the times. Constellation has shown that, no matter how much bipartisan support you generate, if you don't manage large programs will, they are not sustainable.

While at this point in time I support the decision to cancel Cx, I think Congress shares much of the blame. I watched all these house or senate hearings where they would bemoan "the gap" and how unseemly it was to depend on Russia to get to ISS, and Griffin kept saying we can close the gap if you give us more money.

But the additional money never came.

Likewise, I heard time and again members of Congress complaining about the planned shutdown (or "unfunding") of ISS in 2016, but scuttling ISS was needed if Cx had any chance of staying on track given fixed budgets. Congress wanted ISS extended, wanted Cx, wanted to close the gap, but they never volunteered to authorize the money to do any of that.

NASA's biggest challenge, at least in HSF, is that the people that are put in key positions (senior management, program/project management, senior systems engineers, etc.) do not have the experience to do their jobs. That is, a large majority of the workforce is incompetent. It's not that they are stupid, it's that they just do not have the proper work experience. They are ALL operations people with absolutely no design and development experience. Until this problem is addressed, everything else is irrelevant. There is a huge fallacy in senior management that they think anyone can be put in any position and will perform successfully. So they put their buddies and friends in key positions and they have no clue how to succeed. There is no hope to fix this because you cannot tell management who to hire and who to assign to do what, yet they are unable to do this on their own accord. The emperor wears no clothes and you can't tell him he's naked or you will be squashed. I hate to be pessimistic, but it doesn't matter what the architecture or program is, we will fail and there is no chance to succeed. The only way HSF at NASA will ever go anywhere is if we are given unlimited budget and as much time as it takes because there is no talent to manage design and development within any kind of constraints.

There's no question that Congress is to blame, along with the Bush administration (which never asked for the additional funds).

Speaking of the Shuttle, I'm all for continuing low flight rate operations until a new vehicle is ready. Retiring the Shuttle before a new system is operation is just plain stupid.

> Retiring the Shuttle before a new system is operation is just plain stupid.

Un-Retiring the Shuttle after years of executing the retirement plan is just plain stupid. Only the keyboard warriors don't know why this is so...

You would think that if anything would be cause for NASA management to fix this it would be the failure of Constellation's management over the last few years.

You are 100% correct, of course.

You can look at virtually the entire Constellation management from a Program Manager and Deputy Program Manager, neither of whom had never managed any kind of a projector served in any sort of a Deputy position on a program, or an Orion Project Manager who had never managed a project previously, or Flight Directors placed in charge of systems engineering, integration....astronauts and scientists put in charge of communications and outreach.

Then take a look at how Constellation failed. You see the failure precisely reflected by the lack of experience.

Charlie Bolden knows, from his experience in the military, that you have to accumulate the appropriate points in the appropriate functions and disciplines before you are eligible to be considered for certain positions. In NASA they have become so corrupt because this kind of cronyism has been going on for decades.

What surprised me, was that even as the Constellation management was failing; failing to do anything to take control of the situation, higher levels of management did nothing. Virtually everyone was left in place. They failed, and then they failed again, having learned nothing. And they are all still just about right where they started.

If NASA management is not doing their job, then you would think that the IG or the Office of Personnel Management would come in to fix the problem.

> If NASA management is not doing their job, then you would think that the IG or the Office of Personnel Management would come in to fix the problem.

The answer to this quandary is that leadership comes from the top, and there was no leadership at the top. Pick your top. Thus there was no leadership anywhere else

I guess this is where Charlie Bolden's leadership needs to be put to the test.

@RC

'Un-Retiring the Shuttle after years of executing the retirement plan is just plain stupid.'

Exactamundo. Large parts of the supply chain have already been shut down. It would cost a fortune to restart it all.

@JeremyL

'from a Program Manager and Deputy Program Manager, neither of whom had never managed any kind of a project [] or served in any sort of a Deputy position on a program ... knows, from his experience in the military, that you have to accumulate the appropriate points in the appropriate functions and disciplines before you are eligible to be considered for certain positions'

So how exactly are NASA personnel supposed to accumulate this experience when the only large operational program where they could accumulate it is being canned, in favour of a future of small R+D programs?

'I guess this is where Charlie Bolden's leadership needs to be put to the test.'

You're not really so gullible as to believe he's the person really running the agency now?

Anyway, all the NASA workforce needs to know about Bolden's 'leadership' they learned from the way he rolled out this massive shift in direction: he treated almost everyone in the Agency, outside of a select few at HQ, like mushrooms - and then announced a 'plan' which had no real plan in it at all.

Yeah, they're really impressed with his leadership to date.

JeremyL;

I disagree with the comments above about CxP management being "just about right where they started."

Regardless of whatever failures people want to admit to or whatever, everyone has learned a lot and NASA's capabilities have continuously improved. It was no small task rebuilding the design capabilities and structure to make two new rockets and integrate various contractors.

Whatever you want to say about the president's plan and Bolden's acceptance of it, it has been poorly executed so far and the risk is high that years of rebuilding will be wasted, or at least mis-handled and much of it lost.

Announcing a "bold new direction" and schmoozing it up with new commercial partners before congress buys off on it is a mistake. It has already caused more disruption and delays at NASA than it is worth.

If CxP is retained by congress as is or refined in some way, the delays will be costly. That won't be the fault of CxP management, but they will have to recover from it.

"Un-Retiring the Shuttle after years of executing the retirement plan is just plain stupid. Only the keyboard warriors don't know why this is so..."

That's a very telling statement since you actually expose your own ignorance by making it. Richard Covey, CEO of United Space Alliance, has gone on record stating that USA could support continued Shuttle operations at low flight rates. This includes restarting external tank production by Lockheed Martin at Michoud. Lockheed-Martin has components for several tanks on-site already. Full production of additional new tanks would take much longer but is still possible. Some Shuttle extension plans also call for sequentially retiring orbiters and then using parts from those vehicles for the remaining fleet (which is also forced by OMDP deadlines).

Obviously USA and the supply base have a financial incentive to continue Shuttle operations. Restarting production would certainly be expensive, but not prohibitably so. Besides safety concerns (which are manageable) the whole reason for retiring the Shuttle before CxP flew was to free up money for development of Constellation itself. With the elimination of Constellation, NASA suddenly finds itself with a lot of extra money in it's HSF budget (even with ISS extension).

Everyone is in a frenzy about the gap but no one is will to take the most straightforward solution to eliminate it. This whole situation has been artificially created by politicians and bad NASA management. It was stupid to retire the Shuttle before CxP was flying. It is not stupid to admit you're wrong, take your lumps and spend the money to reverse that decision. It still might end up going that way as a compromise with Congress. It preserves jobs, softens the blow of CxP cancellation and thus provides political cover.

> Richard Covey, CEO of United Space Alliance, has gone on record stating that USA could support continued Shuttle operations at low flight rates.

Great idea, where does the money come from?

"That's a very telling statement since you actually expose your own ignorance by making it. Richard Covey, CEO of United Space Alliance, has gone on record stating that USA could support continued Shuttle operations at low flight rates. This includes restarting external tank production by Lockheed Martin at Michoud. Lockheed-Martin has components for several tanks on-site already. Full production of additional new tanks would take much longer but is still possible. Some Shuttle extension plans also call for sequentially retiring orbiters and then using parts from those vehicles for the remaining fleet (which is also forced by OMDP deadlines)."
Yes this statement was made, not sure if it was Covey or Decastro (doesn't really matter), what wasn't mentioned was the cost of doing it. Chances are it will cost the same to launch 4 per year or 2 per year, you are paying for infra structure. Once you foot the bill will you have funds to do anything else? Shuttle would have continued if it wasn't a matter of funds competing with CxP.

"So how exactly are NASA personnel supposed to accumulate this experience when the only large operational program where they could accumulate it is being canned, in favour of a future of small R+D programs?"

Maybe the NASA CS need to be sent into work with the contractor workforce in order to learn ? Maybe they need to bring people with experience in from other programs, whether earlier human space flight programs, Shuttle, Mir, early ISS when hardware was actually being developed, or from the unmanned programs, or from military programs.

If you want experience and guidance, you don't throw totally inexperienced people in and hope they can figure it out, which is what happened in Constellation. There were people with experience and education and instead they threw in a bunch of their buddies.

"It was no small task rebuilding the design capabilities and structure to make two new rockets and integrate various contractors."

Which vehicles have been designed, made and integrated ? As far as I could tell the basic requirements were still changing 6 months ago. The same work that in every other program that was accomplished in 3 years is not yet accomplished on Constellation after 5 years.

"the president's plan and Bolden's acceptance of it, it has been poorly executed so far"

The new 'plan', is not yet a plan and execution has not yet begun. So far the main accomplishment is shutting down the program that was not performing.

"the risk is high that years of rebuilding will be wasted, or at least mis-handled and much of it lost."

You do not 'rebuild' a technical workforce by throwing in a bunch of inexperienced people and tell them 'to figure it out, sink or swim'.

Human space flight was a continuum for 2 generations and 4 decade and many of us still in the programs worked for decades gaining experience in specialized areas; some are still left who worked Apollo; more are around who worked Skylab. Hundreds are still around who worked Shuttle, Mir. or the early development phases of ISS. Many of us specialized in very specific areas: requirements definition and control, configuration management; specific systems: integration, systems design and engineering; payloads, payload integration; commercialization; crew compartment; mission planning and integration; safety and quality; public communications......Not only did the management not seek out experience, many of us were told 'we were not needed; things would now be done differently and better; they were looking for fresh new ideas'. These were all excuses.

Constellation management was deliberately attempting to throw away decades of experience and capability so their fbuddies could take charge.

We've now seen how well that all worked out.

> I'm all for continuing low flight rate operations until a new vehicle is ready.

The problem is that the cost of a "low flight rate" is pretty much the same as a high launch rate. The shuttle program has a high fixed costs just to keep it in place. When NASA is launching 0 flights a year or 6 flights a year, the budget for the Shuttle program is essentially the same.

> Retiring the Shuttle before a new system is operation is just plain stupid.

In an ideal world, this would be true. Unfortunately, the cost of maintaining the Shuttle program would rob most of the development costs for any replacement. Griffin knew this, and in order to come close to making the 2020 deadline of returning to the Moon he needed to kill the Shuttle and ISS as soon as possible (2010 and 2016 respectively), freeing up those funds for Constellation's development.

NASA's HSF essentially had a fixed budget with the operational cost of existing programs eating all of it up and leaving very little for developing a replacement. The only way find money to develop anything new is to kill existing programs.

It may have been said by Decastro as well but you're right, it doesn't matter. Obviously, USA stands to make money if shuttle operations continue. However, if the number of vehicles are reduced then the ground personnel to process them can also reduced since they won't be conducting parallel operations.

"Once you foot the bill will you have funds to do anything else? Shuttle would have continued if it wasn't a matter of funds competing with CxP."

Exactly. But it's not competing with CxP any more now is it? Look at how much NASA was spending on CxP and the Shuttle and look at the funds for HSF in the budget proposal. Talk about a gap!

If you've seen my previous posts you'll already know that I'm not concerned about what the Chinese or Indians are doing. I don't care about flags and footprints programs either. If it wasn't for the ISS then I wouldn't even be concerned about a gap at all. We've had them before and we'll have them again. However, because of the ISS, the gap is a huge deal. We have the ability to eliminate it. Instead of all the hand waving and moaning about it, we should just own up to our mistakes and make the hard decisions. No solution except flying the Shuttle will eliminate the gap. It's as simple as that.

"It may have been said by Decastro as well but you're right, it doesn't matter. Obviously, USA stands to make money if shuttle operations continue. However, if the number of vehicles are reduced then the ground personnel to process them can also reduced since they won't be conducting parallel operations."
You aren't getting it, you seemingly are reading just what you want. USA's labor is just one factor in the big puzzle, they don't cover they infrastructure costs that NASA has to pay for, costs from ATK, costs from Lockheed Martin, and Boeing. A new budget doesn't mean the money is there for Shuttle. Now the money is for XYZ. NASA will still be tasked with XYZ, same as it was tasked with moving forward with VSP.

Mike Schriber and Co.
If you really want to keep flying Shuttle and start another program you time would be/would have been better suited working on educating the public on space and NASA's budget, vs. all the CxP/NASA bashing. Work on more funding then the ~0.53% of the Federal Budget that they get now.

"They need to get those to contractors as soon as the budget deliberations are over and be prepared to award contracts in a month or two, not years."
----
People need to understand that "as soon as the budget deliberations are over" could well mean sometime in early 2011, assuming there is a continuing resolution rather than a real congressional decision on the 2011 budget right before the midterm elections.

Possum;

I whole-heartedly agree. If anyone took the time to look at the resumes of those we have selected as leaders in project management, IT management, and Financial Management we would see how imbedded cronyism has become in the NASA culture. Despite the fact that we have a growing workforce of qualified individuals whose positions will soon disappear, we continue to select and promote the unqualified buddies. The idea that anyone is being promoted in this very uncertain time without the proper scrutiny to ensure these individuals are the best qualified is just disheartening. The same people plus the same processes will equal the same outcome. Until NASA takes that equation seriously, we will continue to fail.

Griffin didn't set the Shuttle retirement date, Bush and O'Keefe did. If Ares had started flying when it was supposed to the gap wouldn't be that big of a deal. It didn't.

I'm not just reading what I want and I'm not forgetting about NASA infrastructure or contractor costs. Congress is screaming about jobs and the gap. Continuing Shuttle operations solves both. Putting additional funds into the Shuttle is less expensive and more effective that trying to preserve and speed up Constellation.

Most of the public simply does not care. Even when we go back to the moon (regardless of whether we stay or not) they'll lose interest after a short while. American Idol or whatever drivel is on TV is much more exciting for them. Most American's don't see the big picture and can't look past their daily lives. Politicians are the same and that's why NASA's budget is what it is.

Reducing or eliminating the gap can only be done in a fashion that placates Congress. There is only one solution that does that.