An Editorial That Is NOT Written By A Moon Walker

I understand Mike's view. The Shuttle is (by current standards) an extremely advanced vehicle.

But let's look at the facts. Cost aside (It's more expensive than Saturn V) it launches 110 metric tons into LEO but can only deliver 25 mt of payload - does that sound sensible for the cost?

In the future, with the forthcoming industrialization of Space, the industry will need a sizeable down-mass vehicle, but we're haven't achieved that level of industrialization in orbit yet (the reason why I referred to the Shuttle as advanced).

So the Shuttle is way ahead of it's time and the orbital industrial infrastructure simply doesn't exist to support such an expensive resource.

Until LEO industry is at a sufficiently developed stage to require a down-mass shuttle, it's simply redundant.

In addition, the problems of safety re the shuttle (IMHO) are a direct result of deviating from the original work of the "Lifting Body Team".

A new approach is required re down-mass vehicles, and that won't be required until the ISS is fully utilized and thoroughly exploited to make that endeavor a reality.

It's time to allow the market to develop. Patience is the key word, and support is the other.

The rewards will be enormous...

Bravo Mr. Snyder!

It is not too late to reverse this terrible mistake!

I have gone back and forth on it myself, but the gap getting bigger, ISS needs, and the future getting nebulous (thanks Obama) has convinced me that extending shuttle is critical.

Mike Snyder....finally someone has hit the nail on the head. Someone with a clear unencumbered understanding of what the Shuttle is for and how the time line with the new vision makes no sense. We cannot abandon our investment on a plan with no thought for the immediate future needs and be held hostage for who knows how long by countries who have little investment ( we have the majority invested in the ISS), the American Tax Payer Me ! Your input has been the most rational and logical path to proceed while we take other portions of the vision and work them on a parallel path. I'll raise my Tax to a penny if needed to maintain our leadership in space. Great thoughts....lets hope they get acted upon.

!damned right!!

Too bad none of our space leadership has the intelligence to make this plea.

One think that many forget is that it is possible that ISS could have an unforeseen problem which might only be handled by a Shuttle logistics or maintenance flight.

In such a case we simply ditch the ISS for lack of intelligence amongst our leadership.

I think you are full of it!!!

You are looking at it as though all Shuttle does is carry something in its payload bay.

The Shuttle is in many respects the payload. It also carries 7 crew, and robotic capability and an airlock, and a large pressurized module, not to mention the only vehicle with return capacity.
So the only way in which it is semi-comparable to anything else is the heavy lift launch capability of an HLV Delta, Atlas, Ariane 5 or Proton, all of which are quite close in price to a Shuttle launch but none of which offer the same capabilities.

I'm not sure where you pulled the comparison of a Shuttle launch to a Saturn V. In today's money you get about 4 shuttle flights for $2.5 billion for the end-to-end mission cost. In 1969, there were 4 Saturn V launches and it cost, in today's dollars, about $ 3 billion each rocket, 4 x $3b. So you are way off the mark. That does not include the cost of the Apollo or the mission.

Well, I'm also an Engineer in Houston on the Space Shuttle Program and frankly- I'm sick of hearing this argument made for Shuttle extension.

Has everyone forgotten that the reason we are going to stop flying the Space Shuttle is because on an early morning back in February 2003 seven people's lives were lost which were more or less attributed to a flawed vehicle design? The CAIB report directly stated that the risk of flying Shuttle was significant due to the tiles and RCC leading edges of the Orbiter being exposed to a hailstorm generated by ice formed on the outside of the ET from the cryogenic propellant within.

And Shuttle is not necessary to "fully" utilize the ISS either- that is classic group-think which has been advanced by the workforce due to their bias of not wanting to lose their jobs. What else besides the Control Moment Gyros will not fit into: Progress/ATV/HTV/Cygnus/Dragon? The Shuttle was required ONLY for construction due to the ISS modules being designed for delivery with the Shuttle. So once the ISS is finished; the Shuttle role is finished. Continuing to fly it to do crew rotation and perishable replenishment would be like driving a moving van to work everyday. Sure you could do that, but it certainly isn't the most efficient mode of transportation. And the reason to keep driving the moving van to work is not simply because you failed due to poor planning and execution to ever purchase a car. Instead you car pool with your friend whom actually owns a car, and you pay them for the trip for their trouble.

We're not going to be able to get to orbit indigenously anymore, probably for quite awhile. And yes that sucks, but what did everyone expect? How many times has NASA failed to build a new human transportation system in the last 30 years?

National Space Plane - Fail.
VentureStar - Fail.
Orbital Space Plane - Fail.
Orion - Fail.

When you make repeated bad decisions you eventually have to pay the piper. And he wants his dues at the end of this year, we can't put it off any longer. This the end of a story that has been decades in the making.

Personally, I plan to change careers to something more sustainable and less frustrating. My recommendation to the rest of the workforce is to do the same, the financial and technical challenges of human spaceflight are hard enough. When you add the dimension of politics- it is damn near impossible.

Mr. Synder is exactly right! The Obama administration is being penny-wise but pound-foolish on this issue. We need to keep operating the shuttle until replacement vehicles are ready.

Ironically, there are many ways that the space shuttle could help the emerging manned spaceflight industry.

Shuttles could be used to deploy several Bigelow space station modules into orbit. This would give the Bigelow space company a chance to display the features of its space stations to potential investors and potential customers. And the shuttle could help them do that not 4 or 5 years from now but next year or the following year.

Such a space station could also be used to test the docking ability of privately operated manned space vehicles without any potential risk to the ISS.

Later on, NASA could use this space station, which would be in a more appropriate orbit for launches from US soil, as a way station for beyond LEO missions.

Marcel F. Williams

James asks, "What else besides the Control Moment Gyros will not fit into: Progress/ATV/HTV/Cygnus/Dragon?"

I would point to the SARJ issue as a good example of where the unique capabilities of STS are needed. Perhaps also radiator panels (there's a damaged one up there right now) or solar arrays? And losing the MPLM upmass and downmass capability will certainly hurt. Can we count on COTS to make up for that? I don't know, but I won't be surprised if maintaining ISS in the wake of shuttle retirement becomes very problematic.

"Personally, I plan to change careers to something more sustainable and less frustrating."

As an unemployed aerospace engineer I'm right there with you...I've sort of given up on finding a job in my field, and am going to try to go back to school for an MBA.

Unfortunately, re-starting production lines to extend shuttle consume the rest of the budget for the foreseeable future. No $$ available to come up with a replacement.

Mr. Snyder is too late. President Bush planned to retire the shuttles because they were determined to be unsafe, i.e. too risky for astronauts after Columbia accident, and too expensive to maintain and operate which hold NASA back from its various missions. Unfortunately, Mr. Griffin chose another unattainable program, i.e. Apollo on steroid, to replace the shuttle program.

I also don't understand why we are soooo afraid of "the gap" and the fact that the Chinese might go to the moon before we return. What are we afraid of? That the Chinese might erase Armstrong boot print? That they might build a military base there? Fear is a great card to play these days.

We have reached the point (60 years since Apollo, that is 60 years) where LEO should be left to private sector. Competition and survival of these companies will ensure safety and access to space for the rest of us (well, maybe our children).

Even in Startrek, cargo and passenger transportation are left to the private sector. Starfleet explores the unknown where no one has gone before. That should be NASA's mission: to where no one has gone before, i.e. Lagrange points, asteroids to save our future, Mars and beyond. The private sector will follow behind to develop infrastructure for long term survival in space.

I'm sorry but in today's budget climate (which is likely to get worse) the shuttle eats NASA alive.There is no funds left over for advanced technology development or anything else. The only justification would be to evolve the shuttle into a SD HLV. With NASA increasingly talking about new designs that use liquid boosters, it looks like the shuttle is headed for retirement - unless significant funds are added to the NASA budget just for it. And would that be a prudent use of extra HSF funding?

I'd like to see - as many others doubtless might - the Launch On Need Mission, STS-135 become a real mission. Not launching Atlantis with her E.T. and stacked boosters would be a bit like not flying those two leftover Saturn Vs at the end of Apollo.

But echoing Mr Sietzen somewhat, if a relatively 'simple' Shuttle-Derived Heavy Lift launcher project is NOT initiated and the three incomplete E.T.s don't end up being used, then its apparent to me that its time to really say goodbye to the Shuttles. Although these incredible vehicles are working better now than they ever have, it is best NOT to tempt Fate - or at least sober statistics - and risk the valuable crews' lives. Then, developing a full featured Orion would be pretty neat, but giving Space-X the go ahead to man-rate and deploy 'Dragon' could be satisfactory, too.

While the Shuttle is not as robust as we thought and hoped, the Columbia accident was caused as much by human and management errors as design issues. If it is that dangerous then we should never have returned to flight at all. Besides, we've been talking for two years about stretching out remaining flights and not adding a lot more. So there would have been no added danger.

No doubt Shuttle is expensive, but we are talking about continuing on an interim basis US human spaceflight, about continuing to operate a system we have already invested hundreds of billions in, and I anticipate, because it is the only logical way, coupling Shuttle's extension to development of a Shuttle-based HLV.

All other things being in the disastrous state they are today, to best thing to do is to continue to spend an extra $2 billion a year for a year or two.

If we do not develop a Shuttle-based HLV then the price goes up astronomically, and the risk of program success will be seriously jeopardized as well.

For some reason, the US and NASA has always been too willing to throw out the old program in expectations of something different being much better. Its about time we learn from other countries and other industries that it makes the most sense to expand upon the old system to create a new one.

In regards to Feb. 2003,after Columbia accident the external tank was re-designed and modified to improve foam loss. It is now a very much better vehicle and the only foam loss is minimal compared to pre-STS 107..Building additional External Tanks would take a long time. Many key people have left or has been let go. Just a relatively small amount of people are left. If the shuttle were to be extended it would have to be real soon.

In my 32 yrs as a Nasa contractor, I have been one of the luckiest people ever to have worked on such a groundbreaking program. Yes, their were terrible mistakes made, however Apollo had it's share too. I have been defending the program on a daily basis since the call for the program's retirement. Not, because of a job, because of a vision I have had since I was a little boy on the plains of the midwest. My vision? I believe that we are on the edge of a great undertaking as a human race. With the knowledge, experience, and capability of the shuttle and building the ISS, mankind can now take the next step and build a truly interplanetary spaceship in orbit, one that can go to the moon and mars with a stop at an asteroid or two, complete with robotic space probes and unmanned missions and maybe a capsule for use somewhere. Don't you see?, there is room for all,the universe beckons us to come. What a great adventure. Is my vision better than the others? Hardly. One thing though, that all shuttle workers will agree on is; when this experience,knowledge,capability, and potential is gone, it will gone forever. I hope there will be a day before they put me in the ground, that something from this program will be utilized or used to better our quest for the stars, but there will be a day that I will not want to see, the day when this great nation, that was the leader in space exploration, admits that it made a great mistake by shutting down this program. That will be a sad for this country and the shuttle brotherhood.

While I respect some of Mr. Snyder's sentiments, you must also realize he is likely highly biased by the current plan to end shuttle as he apparently works in the program. Yes the shuttle is highly versatile. It is also hugely expensive to fly, hugely man power intensive to process, and inherently non survivable in a major hardware failure during launch and to some extent during reentry. There is simply not going to be sufficient funding available within the constraints of the federal budget, a huge financial disaster, to continue flying shuttle and to finance new launch and space vehicles. This is simply the reality. And we can put things into space much less costly with cargo vehicles and likely with private industry doing it under contract. The final issue so many shuttle people bring up is losing this US capability to put astronauts aboard the ISS. That is a canard. Whether shuttle flies or not we will still be required to purchase Russian services since the shuttle can only take a crew up for a maximum of two weeks and ISS will always require a rescue capability that at this time can only be provided by the Russians. And I also do no believe they are suddenly going to start charging us a much higher price for these services.

Ok, so lets compromise. If we keep flying Shuttle like a space truck at past rates, the odds are we will lose another one. So, reduce the rate to one per year for the sole purpose of major equipment delivery to ISS and crew rotation as needed beyond what is done by the Russians. There would always be a second shuttle on standby for emergency operations if needed. If we can send our military folks on long multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, we could do the same for ISS crew, say for one year, to reduce crew replacement rates and to allow extended studies of low-gravity, radiation, psychological, etc. effects on astronauts. Consider sending some volunteers for much longer ISS deployments to partially simulate missions to Mars and back, if that is indeed the ultimate goal of the NASA program. As I have suggested in an earlier post, the major human space accomplishment since Apollo has not been exploration but rather sustained human deployment on ISS. We really now ought to be shifting to longer duration stays of individuals and crews in space for journeys beyond the Earth, whether to the Moon, Lagrangian points, asteroids, or Mars. In a thousand years few will really care which objects we visited or in what order, but they will remember that we emerged from the safe haven of Earth orbit and made those first small steps for all humanity towards habitation of the solar system.

The Dragon and Cygnus is the replacement for Shuttle.I suggest that Mr.Snyder go to spacex.com and catch up on 5 years of updates,video tours,engine and thruster firings and other tests,then come back and tell us what SpaceX is doing wrong.Dragon has a external capacity of 12,000lbs.The cargo hold is 11'x11'x11'.There is a longer version and I think it could be stretched to be as long as Shuttles' cargo bay.Mr.Grestenmeir said that Dragon could carry any of the ORUs,one at a time.The NASA Demo1,in July '10, will be the 2nd test of F9,so it has a good chance.No cargo to ISS though.JAXA took an untested rocket and HTV and made it to ISS.Aren't we as good as the Japanese?SpaceX will use Dragon for crew transfer.It is 90% ready for crew.That is why they can charge less and get ready faster.4 tests flights.With NASAs' help it could fly crew in one year.If not NASA,then SpaceX Astronauts.Starting with Pres. Reagan,NASA is required to use,help with low rates with their assets when it is mutually beneficial and promote commercial when they can. It is the law.No I do not work for SpaceX.When I see something wrong with what they are doing,I speak out.Right now I do not like the parachutes being in the skirt and no airplane drop test.

Bravo...

At last someone besides a politician, astronaut, or a news geek speaks up.

Engineers need to be writing more, saying more, and bring some logic to the space fuss.

In this case, the train has left the station a long time ago. I'm not agreeing with Snyder on extending the shuttle at this point, but at least he's participating.

I too am an aerospace engineer, though with no involvement on the shuttle program or any of its potential successors (yet).

Mr. Snyder and many others calling for shuttle extensions are practicing a form of belated wishful thinking. Shuttle retirement was effectively planned in January 2004 by President Bush. There were budget reasons for retiring the vehicle, but the main reason was safety. After Columbia, it was clear that inherent design flaws in the shuttle made it less safe than we as a nation were willing to tolerate in the long term. Yes, improvements to the external fuel tank and new repair procedures were introduced -- but these were necessary even for Return to Flight. The shuttle was still deemed too unsafe to fly more than the minimum number of times needed to complete our ISS obligations and a final Hubble mission.

You want to extend the shuttle program? Go back to 2004-2005 and make a stronger case back when it was reasonable to extend the production line. You want to save the shuttle and make it a 40-50 year program? Go back to the 1970s and improve the baseline design so the orbiter leading edges are placed above the rockets and fuel tanks. Von Braun knew back then it was a problematic design, and he was right. The shuttle is an amazing, inspiring, very expensive, and very dangerous vehicle. It is not all good or all bad.

For what it's worth, I would feel safer flying on the side of an insulated fuel tank than on top of a solid rocket. But our astronauts and payload owners should not have to make that choice.

If this is truly about the value of Shuttle and not really about losing the ability to transition over to another Govt funded job in Constellation, where was this plea 6 years ago when the decision was made to end Shuttle ? The Shuttle supporters should've been trying to shut Constellation down from the beginning since there was a gap in service and reduced payload capacity from the onset.

And once again, it has already been determined (and said over and over) that in the budget NASA has been assigned: 1) NASA simply can't afford to bring a follow-on vehicle online without ending Shuttle first.....it can obviously barely afford to start devlopment of one. 2) many vendor production lines have stopped producing the one of a kind 1970s technology-based parts for Shuttle and would cost a large sum of money to turn back on. And what gets cut from the current budget to pay for that ? 3) doing meaningful/sustainable BEO exploration requires technology advancement not currently available (if you see the ops concept for a Constellation to Mars mission you KNOW this is true) and running Shuttle is so expensive it does not allow other expensive endeavors to take place.
Not to mention the original reasoning behind ending Shuttle now was via a CAIB recommendation that stated inherent design flaws already responsible for killing 14 astronauts could cause more accidents (don't shoot the messenger here, it wasn't my report) thus we should no longer fly for any further reason than to keep promises to our international partners to finish building ISS.

We can have the "CxP should've been fully funded" or "that Shuttle retirement decision shouldn't have been made" but the reality is NASA's budget, how much you can do with it, is what it is. We spend WAY too much time trying to come up with ways to save programs that would require a huge infusion of budget from some mystery source rather than dealing with reality.

I'm also an engineer in Houston and have probably been one here since before "James" was born! I am just happy I don't know him and he doesn't work with or for me, since his naivete (not to mention ignorance) is papable! The danger to the Orbiter's thermal protection system is not due to ice forming on the ET at launch--it's the foam insulation! And that risk has been finally and expensively mitigated! (The Shuttle is flying right NOW and better and more safely that it ever has!)The reason the administration (past and present) insists on retiring Shuttle is pure politics and "phoney" economics! The cost right now for US (and, as Mike Snyder points out, international--except cosmonauts)astronaut seats is $55.8M each and is due to probably triple after 2012! Multiply that times the 4 or 5 that could be taken to ISS on every Shuttle flight and you get about $223-279M, about HALF of a Shuttle flight cost! And, that doesn't even include the large payloads and the EVA, RMS and other capabilities that each Shuttle flight gives you--unmatched by ANY other space cargo/servicing vehicle!AND, here's the hidden loss that even Mr. Snyder failed to mention, NO other space cargo vehicle in the world has the LARGE DOWN payload capability needed to "fully utilize the SCIENTIFIC and TECHNOLOGICAL capabilities on the ISS"!!!"MD" (above) tried to throw that into the future "industrial down-mass" needs in the commercialization of LEO---a red-herring at this point if there ever was one!
(Plus, as even "M" pointed out, no other vehicle can take a CMG to the ISS--and believe me, at least one will fail well before 2020!) The point is, there's really NO POINT in extending ISS---except to save-face---if the Shuttle cannot keep flying--END OF STORY!
And, BTW, where does it even make POLITICAL sense to pay the Russians (and their admittedly cheaper space workers) that $55.8M (going to $155M) per seat to keep flying Soyuzes to ISS and LAYOFF thousands of US Space workers? FOOLISH!!! Surely Senator Nelson secretly dreads the day!

"In regards to Feb. 2003,after Columbia accident the external tank was re-designed and modified to improve foam loss. It is now a very much better vehicle and the only foam loss is minimal compared to pre-STS 107"

The next accident would likely not be foam related.

"I would point to the SARJ issue as a good example of where the unique capabilities of STS are needed. Perhaps also radiator panels (there's a damaged one up there right now) or solar arrays?"

There are no spare SARJs, radiators or solar arrays on the ground. If they had to be replaced then it would take several years to build replacements and plenty of time to figure out how to launch them so need to keep Shuttle around.

"And losing the MPLM upmass and downmass capability will certainly hurt. Can we count on COTS to make up for that?" Not really and ISS logistics plan accounts for not having MPLM flights anymore. Bottom line is that ISS can be operated just fine without Shuttle.

Wouldn't it be great if someone stopped and actually calculated how much it would cost to follow the CAIB's "Continuing to Fly Recommendations", including:

•increase the orbiter’s ability to reenter the atmosphere with minor leading edge damage to the extent possible;

•develop a better database to understand the characteristics of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) by destructive testing and evaluation;

•improve the maintenance of launch pad structures to minimize leaching of zinc primer onto RCC;

•obtain sufficient RCC panel spares so maintenance decisions are not subject to external pressures relating to schedules, costs, or other considerations;

•develop, validate, and maintain physics-based computer models to evaluate Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts;

•maintain and update the Modular Auxiliary Data System (MADS) on each orbiter to include current sensor and data acquisition technologies, and redesign the MADS so they can be reconfigured during flight;

•develop a state-of-the-art means to inspect orbiter wiring;

•operate the shuttle with the same degree of safety for micrometeoroid and orbital debris as is used in the space station program, and change guidelines to requirements;

•establish an independent Technical Engineering Authority that is responsible for technical requirements and all waivers to them, which should be funded directly from NASA Headquarters and have no connection to or responsibility for schedule or program cost;

•give direct line authority over the entire shuttle safety organization to the Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, which should be independently resourced;

•reorganize the Space Shuttle Integration Office to make it capable of integrating all elements of the Space Shuttle Program, including the Orbiter;

•develop and conduct a vehicle recertification prior to operating the shuttle beyond 2010 and include recertification requirements in the Shuttle Life Extension Program;

&

•provide adequate resources for a long-term program to upgrade shuttle engineering drawings

"If it is that dangerous then we should never have returned to flight at all."

Safety and risk managment isn't that black and white. Proper Operational Risk Managment requires that any additional risk you chose to accept should be balanced by increased benefit to the orgnaization taking the risk. For shuttle, the CAIB and NASA decdided it was worth the extra risk of flying the deficient shuttle design to complete ISS but once complete there wasn't a mission worthy of the extra risk to the crew to keep flying. I think that was a well thought out risk trade and is still as valid today as then. There just isn't any mission worth the risk.

Yes risk really is risk.

For all those who wan to continue Constelation or the Shuttle, I just want to ask.

"what are you willing to give up to do that"?

There are $19 Billion for all NASA activities. Moreover, we will be lucky to get that in comming years. So If you Continue Constelation or the shuttle the money for that has to come from somewhere. So my question to the steady as she goes crowd is what will you give up?

Aeronautical research? Space technology research, the ISS? It would take every dime NASA has and then some to continue CX and Shuttle. In other words, we cant afford it. Game over.

So what do people want to do with what NASA has to spend? Our Presidents plan is consistent with what study after study for decades have recomended.

We need to stop the carping and get on with it.

"If we keep flying Shuttle like a space truck at past rates, the odds are we will lose another one. So, reduce the rate to one per year for the sole purpose of major equipment delivery to ISS and crew rotation as needed beyond what is done by the Russians."

Problem is that your odds of losing a shuttle go up as you reduce the flight rate. Well documented from aircraft operations that as you decrease your flight tempo aircraft malfunctions go up. There is a sweet spot where aircraft are performing at an optimum rate yet not stressing the maintenance support. Also there will be no future need for the shuttle for major equipment delivery or crwe rotation. Other vehicles can provide that capability at lower risk and cost.

"If we can send our military folks on long multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, we could do the same for ISS crew, say for one year, to reduce crew replacement rates and to allow extended studies of low-gravity, radiation, psychological, etc. effects on astronauts. Consider sending some volunteers for much longer ISS deployments to partially simulate missions to Mars and back, if that is indeed the ultimate goal of the NASA program."

Problem is that deployments that last longer then 6 months are unsustainable in the long term. Navy studies from the 80's and the first gulf war where some carrier battle groups were deployed for as long as a year show that retention rates drop of steeply once deployments go above 6 months. Iraq and afghanistan are different in that they are land based and are able to move around, call home, watch tv and in general live a fairly normal life. Being on ISS is more like being on a submarine. So you could do a few one off experiments but you can't sustainable man ISS with rotations that are longer then 6 months.

"With NASAs' help it could fly crew in one year.If not NASA,then SpaceX Astronauts"

Pure fantasy. Space X has accomplished a lot and is much farther ahead then anybody else in the commercial world but it's going to take them at least 3 years and more likley five before they have a fully functional crew vehicle. Their first launch is being delayed almost two months just to test and certify it's self destruct system. Yet you think in 12 months they could complete design, integration, testing, certification, and manufacture of all the systems that Dragon still doesn't have?

(Has everyone forgotten that the reason we are going to stop flying the Space Shuttle is because on an early morning back in February 2003 seven people's lives were lost which were more or less attributed to a flawed vehicle design?)

Flawed vehicle design?

Hardly!

How about a flawed management design! Flawed mission managers? Skipped meetings, dismissing subordinates?

Remember......Not one head from Columbia's mission management rolled----NOT ONE!

"There are no spare SARJs"

There is a space race ring that can only be flown up on the shuttle. That was going to be brought up on one of the remaining flights, but with the AMS getting on the manifest, I don't know if it's still going.

Folks:

I'd fly the shuttles til they all fell apart if it weren't for the small (nagging) issue of crew loss.

Even if both shuttle losses were caused mostly by engineering and management failures, the bottom line still remains that there are (still) failure modes in the Shuttle design that provide no possibility for crew survival.

As I've said before, capability is what counts. As far as I can tell Spacedevs' "Dream Chaser" seems to provide all the crew capability of the Shuttle. It is closely based on the HL-20 lifting body originally designed by NASA. Crew of eight. As much or more mid deck type storage as the Shuttle. A Common Berthing Mechanism so it can also carry ISS lab racks. Room for space suites and an optional air lock. Like lopping the Shuttle off just behind the air lock and flying the front end of it. What more can you ask? NASA should absorb the Dream Chaser part of Spacedev just like they did a part of Rockwell to obtain their control of the Shuttle Orbiter.

For cargo capability there are enough options out there that can launch all but the largest of Shuttle payloads. The ATV and HTV cargo ships show that robot cargo delivery is indeed feasible.

Can it be done cheaper? Maybe not (or not by much) but all and all a much safer way to go without losing capability.

tinker

Ex Navy: So am I, two Pacific carrier deployments of nine months each in the Vietnam era. Lots of air ops, training, and other activity, never was bored. Even had close circuit TV for Star Trek reruns, which should tell you what ship I was on. But we didn't have Internet and Skype back then, only radio comms for emergency messages that could still take days to get response. There was jet crash in Alameda while I was deployed, took too long to find out that a friend back there was okay. Re comms, TV, etc, soldiers, sailors, and astronauts have it easy these days. Being Out There should be easier when you can also Be Back Here electronically much of the time. Yes, the long journeys would be challenge, but that's the next step beyond Earth orbit. I doubt that retention will be an issue. Its Mars, after all. Sign me up anytime and every time.

The Space Shuttle program is a $3 billion a year program which is insignificant relative the the overall $3.5 trillion Federal budget. For every dollar tax payer's send to Washington, they would save less than 0.08% cents if we terminated the shuttle program.

So terminating the shuttle program before there is a replacement would be of little benefit to the tax payers and would actually increase unemployment while lowering America's prestige around the world.

Marcel F. Williams

. Yet you think in 12 months they could complete design, integration, testing, certification, and manufacture of all the systems that Dragon still doesn't have?

yes SpaceX can do it. Although I suspect that two years from a standing stop is more likely...but at worse three should cover it. The F14 went from contract to IOC in 22 months.

The problems that they are having with the FTS is one of certification not development. From what I have read and heard there is also some disagreement (grin) with the Range on the documentation that the FTS needs.

This problem illustrates the long pole in the tent. At some point we have to move in human spaceflight from a "semi test environment" to one which is at least "semi operational". In other words space ops have to look less like they do today and more like at least an operational squadron in the military does (and preferably more like commercial airline ops).

There is no real reason after 50 years of human spaceflight that this cannot be done. One of the major requirements is a solid regulatory framework. We have to put "N numbers" on the vehicles.

Robert G. Oler

"If we keep flying Shuttle like a space truck at past rates, the odds are we will lose another one. So, reduce the rate to one per year for the sole purpose of major equipment delivery to ISS and crew rotation as needed beyond what is done by the Russians."

The fundamental issue is the cost, and the problem with scaling back the number of flights is that the cost savings would be minimal (they don't scale linearly with each other). Any mission involves thousands or tens of thousands of people. In NASA mission planning, we refer to this as "the marching army", and all that labor is by far the largest cost. For something as complex as the STS, you need to maintain a huge knowledge and skills base to fly any mission at all, regardless of how frequently they come. And that costs big bucks. If anything, the effective cost per flight goes up when you fly fewer missions

One of the assumed cost savings of using commercial spaceflight is that the commercial provider takes on the cost of maintaining the marching army (presumably through other contracts, whatever they might be), which unburdens NASA from having to fund the maintenance of a workforce that isn't necessarily needed at any given time.

NASA is tasked with more then it is funded with.

The battle is not to fight over how to spend the meager funds.

It is to fund NASA properly!

And no, we can't afford it is not acceptable answer when it is half a penny on the federal discretionary spending dollar.

Just the Health and Human Services increases for one year, just the increase, was more then NASA's entire budget for *FOUR* years.

http://www.federalbudget.com

We're fighting over scraps folks!

The one percent for space folks have it right!

The safety risk of continuing shuttle flights goes far beyond possible crew loss. Our human crews are by far the most valuable assets on a launch, but the vehicle itself, resupply logistics, and scientific payloads are all additional reasons to consider the risk of flight versus mission benefits. You think retiring the shuttle is going to cost us space leadership? I shudder to think what would happen to our industry and public support if NASA lost another 20% of its fleet. This is exactly why the decision to service Hubble one last time was so difficult to make (although I think it was the right thing to do).

"The Dragon and Cygnus is the replacement for Shuttle."

And what a poor, sad replacement indeed - sort of like replacing a BMW 7 Series with a Yugo!

Forgive me if I can't get too excited over "Gemini on steroids" as I doubt most other Americans will either.

If we had another accident, they'd probably shut the program down. Oh wait, they're already doing that.

Public attention and support generally goes up with something new and different, like an accident. Even when its shown the accident is the result of human error, public support does not waver.

A similar viewpoint:

The Case to Save the Shuttle Program
As documented in "Space Shuttle Disaster," the Columbia Accident Investigation Board's report makes a strong case for the shuttle's retirement, based on the design and safety issues laid bare by the loss of both Columbia, in 2003, and Challenger, 17 years earlier. Fourteen astronauts died in those accidents. The Bush administration accepted the board's recommendations and announced that the shuttle would be retired in 2010. NASA was ordered to develop new spacecraft that could take astronauts back to the moon and beyond, and many in the space community are excited by the new vision.

But there are dissenters who fervently believe that retiring the shuttle is a mistake. The movement to delay the shuttle's retirement picked up steam in September 2008, as both John McCain and Barack Obama voiced support for extending the shuttle's operation, and a leaked e-mail written by NASA's top administrator revealed that the space agency was studying the feasibility of extending shuttle missions past 2010. It's no surprise that engineers who have worked on the shuttle and its development are among the most passionate advocates for keeping it flying. One of those engineers, Allen Richardson, who appears in the NOVA documentary as well as assisted with technical questions during the film's production, requested the opportunity to express his viewpoint.—Arun Rath, one of the producers of "Space Shuttle Disaster"

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/columbia/richardson.html

Being on ISS is more like being on a submarine. So you could do a few one off experiments but you can't sustainable man ISS with rotations that are longer then 6 months.

but dont all the folks going to ISS know this going in?

If the best we can get out of the folks who are trained at enormous cost to go to ISS is six months then that does not bode well for voyages to Mars etc that might take years.

If retention is the problem then lets make the shot to ISS a one doer...ie train go up to ISS then leave the "corps" and let the next person go. It strikes me that there are plenty of people and not a lot of slots.

I dont see "retention" as an issue.

Robert G. Oler

Is the real reason behind the reason?:

Russian involvement in the International Space Station was a Clinton administration initiative meant to keep highly skilled Russian scientists away from selling their skills to rogue nations or terrorist groups. The program has been successful and now appears to be on the verge of proceeding to the next step – joint deep space missions.

http://www.examiner.com/x-958-Cape-Canaveral-Space-Program-Examiner~y2010m5d19-US-and-Russia-making-plans--past-lowEarthorbit

Columbia was lost due to incompetent program management. The foam from the ET could never have done such critical damage to a new RCC leading edge panel. This is why the commissions test could not reproduce the hole in the leading edge until they tested RCC panels that were used. KSC did test early in the Shuttle program that showed new RCC panels were practically indestructible and that after exposure to atomic oxygen on orbit, they lost strength. But the program ignored that fact because they were too expensive to replace.

We should never have lost either Challenger or Columbia. Shuttles don't kill people, program managers do.

I actually thought ISS-as-a-Russia-stabilizing-program thing was pretty well known. And frankly, I'm fine with that. It's a win-win situation.

As for Shuttle termination, I doubt that would have a major impact on Russo-American relations. We've got our indigenous launch system, they've got theirs. Us riding on a Soyuzes probably won't employ that many more people. Joint deep space missions could be a crucial step, but that would only involve the Shuttle in terms of heavy lifting and maybe logistical support, if at all.

"The Dragon and Cygnus is the replacement for Shuttle.I suggest that Mr.Snyder go to spacex.com and catch up on 5 years of updates,video tours, engine and thruster firings and other tests, then come back and tell us what SpaceX is doing wrong. Dragon has a external capacity of 12,000lbs. The cargo hold is 11'x11'x11'.There is a longer version and I think it could be stretched to be as long as Shuttles' cargo bay. Mr. Grestenmeir said that Dragon could carry any of the ORUs,one at a time. The NASA Demo1,in July '10, will be the 2nd test of F9,so it has a good chance. SpaceX will use Dragon for crew transfer. It is 90% ready for crew.That is why they can charge less and get ready faster.4 tests flights. With NASAs' help it could fly crew in one year."

Seriously, did my head just explode or did I really just read that? SpaceX can be ready to launch humans in less than a year?!?!?!?? They havent even lanched an unmanned vehicle yet and they are over 2 years behind schedule on that. Rumor has it that their first flight is looking more likely for July or August now, so I wouldnt hold my breath on July for Flight 2. 90% ready for crew? In what insane world are they 90% ready for crew? They have done minimal design for crew. They have met no human rating requirements for launch, re-entry, landing. They have no human rating requirements for ECLSS. They have no survivability requirements. They have no man-rating requirements for their launch vehicle. They have no launch abort system. As for charging less, we'll see what their real costs are once they actually start launching rockets and know what their costs are. I guarantee it will be at least double today's predictions.

Wow.

@kay1g:

Discrediting me based upon the fact that I said "ice" instead of "insulation" is semantical and even extreme. Fact: the ET shrinks when it is filled, the skin freezes and even the CAIB cited that this may or may not have led to the separation incident- it is still not well understood, and foam still DOES come off the tank. It's why we were grounded for another year after the STS-114 return to flight, it's why we can only fly 51.6 degree inclination missions to an extended stay safe harbor (just in case), it's why we take all the hi-res photography on ascent, AND its why we spend half a day of crew time scanning the bottom side of the Shuttle with a magnifying glass.

The vast majority of the Shuttle workforce has lost its objectivity and suffers from a kind of Shuttle Stockholm Syndrome. Just because you have worked on the Shuttle for a long time and it just happens to be our one means of sending humans to orbit, does not make it the coolest thing since sliced bread. In fact, this compromising/settling mindset is absolutely counter to innovation or improvement. If you are happy with what you've got, then how convinced are people going to be to push the envelope again?

The Shuttle was conceived in the 60's and 70's as the LEO truck with which to assemble a much broader infrastructure. I refer you to this website:

beyondapollo.blogspot.com

The curator has assembled a comprehensive ensemble of all that NASA wished to do following the Apollo program which are now forgotten dreams to most, and unbeknownst to the rest.

I also suggest reading:

www.astronautix.com/lvs/shuttle.htm

Where it is immediately apparent that the intended Shuttle flight rate over a decade: 546 (!) was an order of magnitude failure.

I'm not satisfied with government employees and military personnel jauntering into orbit on PR missions. This is not why I dedicated my talents to the space program. And contrary to what the Kool-Aid has suggested to those within or near the agency- it is NOT glamourous, it is NOT pioneering, and it is simply NOT interesting to most people.

People don't want the second and third-handed benefit of spin-offs and passive observation. Those selling points are non-starters. They want personal opportunity and freedom. They want to be able to pick between a career mining for gold in West Virginia and mining aluminum off of the surface of Ceres. They want to choose between an trans-Atlantic ocean cruise and a romantic lunar flyby. They want their investment to have a direct cause-effect on their happiness.

We need to stop flirting with human spaceflight and begin to build an econosphere in space that will build profit, draw investors, and pave the way to these new opportunities. Commercial may not be ready, in fact it may be decades away from succeeding. But the time is inconsequential for this is the successful route. We may not see it in our lifetimes- and that is an unfortunate fact, but this is the reality.

Urban myth created by Administration to get extra funding from Congress to support RSK. Russia was in some financial difficulty at the time!
Cooperation was largely to get superior Russian Tech/ Expertise in Station Ops.

Non partisan readers may like to see it from the Russian POV:
http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_chronology.html

Station being International is great, but it's not a win-win when the US space program is downsized and better-faster-cheapered into dysfunctionality as it was during the Bush-Goldin and Clinton-Goldin-Garver days.

It's not a win-win to outsource the Shuttle workforce to Russia, commercial, or anywhere else.

Another well written pro-Shuttle article from a former Orlando TV newscaster:

Steve Rondinaro - Space shuttle's end no 'giant leap for mankind'

And America will have no way to get our people back and forth from the International Space Station. We’re relying solely on the Russians. They’ll control all access.

In an ideal world free of political tension that might not be so disconcerting to anyone with a short memory. I find it very bothersome. Beyond that, it just doesn’t seem right to this child of America’s reach to the moon to totally cede our ability to put man into orbit.

We’ve been here before.

You can point a finger at several presidents and both political parties.

http://www#starnewsonline#com/article/20100521/ARTICLES/100529930/1004?p=1&tc=pg

"I dont see "retention" as an issue."

Then either you place no value on actual experience or you don't understand what it takes to have a successful long term operational organization. The last thing you want is a whole crew of rookies that have never been in space before. You need experienced people, on orbit to help the rookies learn the details that can't be taught by people on the ground (also folks that have never flown in space).

"but dont all the folks going to ISS know this going in?"

They have signed up for 6 month rotations and are ok with that. Extending regular rotations to a year would be a change and I think you would see a lot of experience walk out the door. It's well known that a number of astronauts refused ISS assignments because of the duration of expeditions.

"

Then either you place no value on actual experience or you don't understand what it takes to have a successful long term operational organization

what are there now over 100 Astronauts? Lets say so many get frustrated and quit so we now have 50 (a nice even number). And lets say the US gets to fly 3 per ISS crew (that is to high but)...if the rotations are two a year that means we need 6...so say 8 to have backups (but they probably fly the next year). That is a rotation rate of 6 years to let everyone fly...It can be done on half of that if the rotations are down to 1 a year.

Clearly there are to many "astronauts" chasing to few seats to have "experience" as a long term crisis point now.

To be fair, I dont think 1 year rotations are a good idea from a lot of standpoints, at least now. But to have any real hope of a Mars mission, even with advanced propulsion we do need to have people who are thinking along the lines of "longer mission" and more autonomous behavior. US forces are currently deployed in combat for longer then 6 month periods.

Indeed I would argue that the entire "notion" of astronaut needs to be redefined. We probably need a situation more like people who go to the South Pole and "winter".

If the current group doesnt like that change then I suspect that there are people in The Republic who are quite qualified who would take up the slack.

Robert G. Oler

Dragon has to be human rated for people to go inside from ISS.They will not be using spacesuits for protection.To be human rated for launch,spaceflight and return,it needs an AC.Now ISS pumps in air.It needs a system for pilot control.ISS uses laptops.Plug in several laptops and a joystick into the computer and of course seats.SpaceX is going to use a pusher system for abort.Should be easier to develop.They have said that everything has been made to human rating standards.NASA human rating standards were available to them,NPR8705.2B.Have you considered this in your time estimate?NASA has a lot of resources available to SpaceX under COTS and the Commercial space acts.Do you think that NASA could fly an Astronaut in one year using Dragon as a start?They are pretty good.The delays affecting the first flight will not hold up the second.As soon as it is gone they will be ready to assemble another.You are probably correct,but I think it is better to challenge them,rather than give excuses for them.Do you like the gap?Would you rather have something or nothing?The general public will not know the difference.They will just know the Astronauts are flying and will be happy.Kids will love a spaceship named Dragon.

Thank you for the various comments. I’ve enjoyed reading them very much and I would like to take the opportunity to address some of them as well.

First, let’s discuss safety. Statistically speaking, the space shuttle is just as safe as Soyuz. There is essentially no difference, yet some will say the space shuttle is “inherently unsafe” and then advocate total and sole reliance on a foreign vehicle with the same record. That makes little logical sense to me. Also, the shuttle flies more often, can carry more crew and more cargo in a single launch, has vastly superior on-orbit capabilities and can return cargo and other payloads to the surface in much greater quantities than anything else. In addition, and this should count for something, it is ours.

Future systems are just that, in the future. Of course it makes logical sense to do probabilistic risk assessments, failure-mode effects analysis, critical item lists, redundant design, etc. Yet, in the end, until something has some flight history behind it, it is somewhat subjective or notional and therefore somewhat invalid to say a replacement vehicle will be “x-times” safer as a complete and absolute fact. That said, quite obviously if something is simpler in terms of design, then there is less to go wrong and qualitatively this could translate to “safer”, yet it probably also means, in the hear-and-now of present technology, that it will be less capable as well.

To my friends that will immediately want to point to Atlas and Delta, I will absolutely concede those have valid reliabilities since there is a history behind them. Yet, it seems it is often overlooked that these are also only the boosters. True system safety and reliability will also have to be based on whatever vehicle these boosters carry also and how that vehicle performs throughout its mission profile. To date, those vehicles that will be carried on these existing boosters do not yet exist.

When discussing safety of the shuttle system, misconceptions have been allowed to run un-checked. These would possibly have a basis in reality if we did not follow the processes, operations and maintenance procedures that we follow or lined up shuttle after shuttle and just shot one off after another. Obviously, we do not do that. For example, upon return of a vehicle, an extensive data review is performed by the various projects and organizations. Any discrepancy is documented in a variety of ways. It must be “cleared” prior to the next launch. If something failed that we do not understand, is “out-of-family”, testing is required, etc then we do not fly until we believe the problem is understood or corrected. During launch we have spectacular views allowing us to see very small debris. The ET has been modified to minimize foam loss. We now have sensors in the leading edges of the wings to detect impacts and we have the OBSS (the inspection “boom”) that we use twice during the flight to give us the best confidence we can possibly have the vehicle is safe for entry. The vehicles themselves are performing better than anytime in recent history with very few problems during turnaround and In-Flight Anomalies are on a continuing downward trend. These are just a few examples as to why the shuttle is safer than it has ever been.

The CAIB never mandated that shuttle be retired by 2010, which is also a misconception. In fact, 2010 retirement was politically conceived for a host of reasons. What the CAIB report does say is the following (“R” stands for “Recommendation” and not “Requirement”):

“R9.2-1 – Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010, develop and conduct a vehicle recertification at the material, component, subsystem and system levels. Recertification requirements should be included in the Service Life Extension Program”

Luckily, much of this work has already been started and, in many instances, completed under a project that has been worked since approximately 2004.

Secondly, let’s discuss cost. It is absolutely true that much of the Shuttle Program’s costs are fixed. Any program, including commercial suppliers, will have a fixed cost. After all, people will still be employed and it is likely a workforce that will be required to fly people and cargo in space will still be required to be somewhat specialized. In addition, facilities will be required, parts procured, etc. All that said, it does not mean space shuttle fixed cost cannot be lower and how long it could be is also known. In addition, it seems many out there want to try to compare costs of shuttle to others without comparing capabilities and that is where it begins to break down and becomes difficult to truly compare and quantify.

Also, if NASA is to embark on this “game-changing” or “paradigm-shifting” path, how does one expect it to happen instantly and all at once? Could it or would it make sense for NASA to use the shuttle as a “pathfinder” in order to transition to a more “commercial-friendly” agency?

Finally, I would suggest that some re-read my op-ed a bit more carefully. I realize we should not or cannot fly shuttle forever. In fact, I never suggested otherwise. However, we now have ISS on-orbit. For the majority of my life I have heard that a station is vitally important to giving that “toe-hold” and permanent presence in space and a station is the “next logical step”. Just when it is finished, we are seemingly putting it in jeopardy after so much effort, time and money.

Shuttle was designed to service station after assembly complete and ISS was absolutely designed to be serviced by shuttle, and yes, Soyuz is still required for near-term crew escape as always envisioned. That does not mean shuttle cannot be replaced but those vehicles are not ready or operational. As I wrote in the article, when these vehicles are ready, then that should be the trigger for retirement. By all accounts, if commercial endeavors are really that close to being operational, it should be a relatively short extension but one that ensures ISS as the “anchor tenant” for these commercial providers if they arrive later than planned. Even if one believes we can totally outsource logistics and transportation to other nations, those capabilities will not be immediately available either and will cost the American taxpayer.

In the end, I am not biased or just trying to protect my job, as some have unfairly suggested. I am also very much aware of the status of my chosen industry and various efforts and do not need to go review publically available information on other websites. In fact by committing to this program, as many others will do to see it through, I am actually putting my longer-term well-being on the line to complete a program that I have been proud to be a part of, that is important and one that everyone universally says completing is key to the future, whatever that may be.

In the absence of not knowing the basics of how the commercial private/public partnership will really work, I offered a possible solution. In the absence of anyone telling us “how” we are to transition, or any of the other real details, in order to make whatever NASA’s future holds be as successful as possible, to try to preserve at least some of the experience, talent and dedication that is the human space flight workforce, I have offered an opinion and potential solution for a smoother transition. A transition that will protect the ISS and ensure its utilization. With ISS fully utilized, a transition that will enable and help ensure the business case for these commercial providers, of course when whatever public/private financing agreement is finally reached to achieve this redundant and robust commercial transportation. One may disagree, one may question my motives. That is fine. However, at least I am standing up, and using my real name and affiliation, to let my voice be heard in anyway possible.

Sincerely,

Mike Snyder

Also, if NASA is to embark on this “game-changing” or “paradigm-shifting” path, how does one expect it to happen instantly and all at once? Could it or would it make sense for NASA to use the shuttle as a “pathfinder” in order to transition to a more “commercial-friendly” agency?

Mike.

I enjoyed both your op ed and additional comments.

My argument for ending the shuttle is primarily financial. There is no money to do much else, unless we stop spending cash on Ares and shuttle. The station has made it during the columbia standdown, its likely it can make it here.

The above paragraph I thought was interesting.

In my view the last chance to transfer the shuttle and NASA to a commercial friendly organization was in the mid 80's before Challenger. Since then it is impossible.

Last I heard the Amateur radio payloads on the shuttle consumed around 1 million dollars to fly in terms of processing etc. it is a amateur radio that is pretty standard fare.

No group that puts that kind of requirements on such a small item can hope to ever be user friendly...much less even affordable.

I live in Houston (Clear Lake) we can have a beer sometime

Robert G. Oler

Agree with you 120%.

There is no one with any conscious rationale who can legitimately recommend shutting down Shuttle with nothing in sight to replace it. Even Griffin looked at the situation in his 2004 report, and recommended that Shuttle be shut down once a replacement is ready.

As far as how quickly anything will be ready, take a look at Constellation and Orion over the last 5 years, and its still another 5 years away at the absolute minimum.

Interesting that this week we have been discussing a fast-paced demonstration of US/JSC capabilities to develop and operate new space hardware, but with no way to easily launch it, it makes everything much more difficult.

Interesting that as soon as ISS was offered the possibility of another Shuttle flight, they immediately responded "yes, we can definitely use it next year", and that was in part to take care of maintenance on a problem that recently occurred and there is absolutely no reason to think there will not be more and far more severe problems in another decade of operating at twice the level of activity as the last several years.

The thing that is missing from this picture is conscious NASA leadership and management to express the thoughts, exactly as you have expressed them, to Mr. Obama and the nation.

The NASA leadership is in a really sorry state.

Robert,

I'm glad you liked the op-ed and the post above. Thank you for that, it is appreciated. I also believe you have made my arguement for me in reality for the following reasons.

Of course there is money for shuttle. The program costs approximately 0.08% of the budget a year. In addition, not only does it protect our investment and possibilities in ISS but it actually returns more money to the overall economy of the United States. That is a strategic investment worth making, especially now.

As for ISS after Columbia, it did not "make it". Actually, I'm glad you brought this up because this is the perfect analogy. During RTF, we reduced the crew compliment from 3 to 2. We did basic maintenance that was required to keep the ISS operational and little science. Progress and Soyuz were our only means of resupply. By the time of STS-114 the ISS was hurting for logistical support.

Today, the ISS is much larger and much more complex with many more labs and capabilities and a larger crew, which of course all demand that much more logistics support. The introducation of ATV and HTV do not remedy that because those vehicles were only meant to augment shuttle, as was Progress, and not replace it. That is why they have the low flight rates they do and, again, the station needs that much more in order to fully utilize the lab space.

How can we remove the "main cog" in the resupply chain, the shuttle, and expect the ISS to be fully utilized and supported when there is nothing to replace those capabilities? The answer is we cannot.

As for NASA allowing the Shuttle Program to be more "commercial friendly", I will respectfully disagree with you that those mechanisms are not in place today. I very firmly believe they are indeed there based on my experience and all they need is to be exercised.

As for the amateur radio payload, I will admit I have no knowledge of that specific example. However, if true and it does sound plausible, exactly proves my point. If "a group", NASA in its current form, places those kind of requirements on a payload today, how will that instantly change in order to enable commercial providers of an entire spacecraft to be more economical and more efficeint in the very near-term? The reality and probability is that it does not. Therefore, we need something that exists, something that is proven, something with known capability that NASA can learn from and use to evolve it's cultural identity.

That "something" is the shuttle.

Just for background, it is Garver championing Shuttle shutdown and her mo is apparently that upward managing thing:

Right Stuff, Wrong Staff: John Kerry Visits NASA and Blows a Photo Op
From: "Lori Garver"
Date: Sun Jul 18, 2004 10:17 am
Subject: RE: [kerryspace] Come Celebrate Kerry's Great VP Choice, Edwards!

Please don't write-off the Kerry-Edwards camp on space. The Bush initiative is simply hot-air and has made it impossible in an election year for Kerry to say much on space. What he has said -- will support increased funding for NASA R&D, will support Prizes, a more genuinely international effort, etc... is already more than most Presidential Candidates. It took Bush 3.5 years and a tragic Shuttle accident to come up with a policy. Democrats will be able to pull-off a better record -- if not rhetoric! Totally agree on futility of ISS as pharmacy source and need to retire Shuttle -- Kerry can be convinced of this, but perhaps not in the campaign.

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=966

She's as twisted a thinker as Griffin was, so she needs to find a new career too.

Mike.

again interesting points and viewpoint. I dont want to get into a back and forth that is more heat then light...but I saw this and would comment on it...and make an additional point.

"Therefore, we need something that exists, something that is proven, something with known capability that NASA can learn from and use to evolve it's cultural identity.

I dont think that there is a venue for that, other then time and events. What has to happen with commercial ops to make them a success is that essentially we "retire" NASA and its human spaceflight structure from the notions of "lift" to orbit and then eventually from its theories on how to operate spacecraft period.

NASA HSF got badly off track after Challenger. Instead of recognizing what happened (bad management decisions) correcting those and getting some more (not less) outside people in who could do sanity checks on the direction the post Challenger fixes went. NASA HSF went the other way...the entire effort just got worse in terms of setting requirements for "safety" when few of them had any real affect (as Columbia demonstrated).

Someone (like from the USN Sub community) who is use to dealing with difficult environments who could have looked at things like "the pole" and challenged the justification for it, and if those didnt live up, stop it.

There is a good paper, I'll have to dig it up, but I dont think it is online that looks at the response of the USN post Thresher and Scorpion to that of NASA post Challenger. There was a reason Admiral Rickover, who was no fan of outsiders after both events brought in a lot of process oriented "outsiders" who directed how the organizational and training response to those events happened.

The only way to regroup now, is to simply start fresh with new goals and methods and take the (painful) relearn curve from that...otherwise HSF will never be economical.

No other group functions in a difficult environment like NASA HSF does. And I am convinced that the only way to rethink NASA HSF culture is a complete "restart".

last..

The program costs approximately 0.08% of the budget

as does the alternate engine for the F-35, procuring some additional C-17's ..and others all things that are individually justifiable but not in the big picture of a budget out of control. Shuttle is a large chunk of NASA's budget...and the ISS has been getting "work aheads" for the shuttle standdown. If we have to reduce the crew we have to do that.

They are not doing a lot of substance anyway.

Commercial resupply will come. in an ideal world there would be overlap. But that ship sailed along time ago.

lets have that beer.

Robert G. Oler

I agree with you Cessna!

In fact, NASA expenditures, relative to today's dollars, are nearly half that of what they were during the height of the Apollo program. And NASA expenditures have fallen from more than 5% of Federal expenditures to less than 0.6% of total Federal expenditures in 2010.

Plus studies have shown that NASA expenditures actually create wealth.

Marcel F. Williams