COTS Commercial Crew Transportation RFI Released

Here is another example of the administration putting the cart before the horse and having made a political decision to cancel Constellation rather than one based on facts. This RFI is asking good questions, but this was after they requested that Constellation be canceled.

uh...shouldn't NASA have floated this about five years ago ?

This is the best and most thorough article I've read so far. It covers both CxP and Merchant7 thinking flaws:

The forty-six-page report the group delivered provides an elegant summation of the agency’s bind. "In the mind of the public," it concludes, "human exploration is NASA’s brand. The space quest is a human equation, not just a technical mission." The further NASA got from that mission, the more the agency shifted in taxpayers’ eyes "from a household item to a luxury item"—the sort of thing that would be nice to have, but not necessarily if money is tight

Would-be taxi providers have thrown out numbers, ranging from a highly unlikely low end of $300 million to an only slightly less unlikely high end of $1.5 billion. But the truth is that no one really knows—NASA hasn’t figured out yet what its requirements will be. The agency has spoken of doing less oversight and more "insight"—that is, working with the commercial ventures to come up with a safety code and trusting them to follow it. But it’s not hard to see the huge problem that this sets up: would you trust a company whose business is entirely dependent on fixed-price government contracts not to cut corners when nobody’s looking?

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1005.homans.html

btw, does anybody know why John Glenn ever hired Garver in the first place? seems odd.

I wonder how willing NASA will be to allow the Merchant 7 CCT providers to 'ignore' those HSF requirements the Merchant 7 deem excessively expensive and unwarranted. Will those at NASA who own those requirements, that might still be upset at the new direction Obama has set, dig in their heels and insist every HSF requirement be met by the Merchant 7 CCT systems?

From a leverage stand point, NASA is in weak position here. There is no alternative to the CCT provided solutions; The Merchant 7 know NASA is in a barrel and could hold them hostage , forcing NASA to spend a lot more on CCT than originally anticipated - especially if the disgruntled within NASA dig in their heels

Will be very interesting to see 5 years from now how well the 2011 budget intentions were met.

This Washington Monthly article is a decent historical perspective on the mess in which we currently find ourselves. I'll take exception to only two items:

The claim that the thrust oscillation issues would take millions of dollars and years to resolve is simply wrong. The Ares First Stage and Upper Stage projects have already designed and analyzed multiple different fixes. NASA has downselected to one, and the whole effort took less than a year. And, in another interesting twist, both SRM ground tests and the Ares I-X test (accused of being technically worthless) have proven that initial estimates on thrust oscillation were grossly exaggerated - we may decide not to even bother implementing the solution that was developed since the problem is now so insignificant.

I also must take exception to the claim that human spaceflight knowledge is well housed within NASA. Granted, there are a lot of very smart people that know an awful lot about the Shuttle. Unfortunately we haven't seen much stellar thinking on the part of NASA with respect to Ares/Orion. Telling the contractors that NASA has grammatical preferences in a requirements document (forcing months of document iteration and who knows how much $$ on a non-technical revision) doesn't constitute technical excellence. Imposing a standard on a contractor, and requiring them to comply with all referenced and sub-referenced requirements documents is an easy way out for those without technical competence. It's essentially telling a company "you must comply with the the United States Federal Code, and all referenced and associated documents." There may be these human spaceflight experts still residing somewhere within the halls of NASA, but unfortunately we didn't assign them to Constellation.

The US desperately needs to reconstitute it's manned access to LEO, and field that system ASAP.

Opponents of Commercial Crew conveniently ignore the obvious and lowest risk solution for US manned access to LEO.

A Boeing designed capsule flying on an Atlas V is the best way to get US astronauts safely to LEO.

Boeing was almost selected by NASA for Orion. So they can't build a commercial capsule?

Atlas V launches multi-billion dollar, one of a kind spacecraft for the AF, NRO and NASA. It's Category 3 certified by NASA to launch their most critical spacecraft. So Atlas can't launch crew?

Isn't this an obvious approach for the problem that faces us? Proven Contractors. Proven heritage of delivering mission success.

Let's fix the LEO access problem, then move on with Exploration!!

"From a leverage stand point, NASA is in weak position here."

So very true. One reason companies try to avoid sole source contracts.

This is a very good reason to continue Orion on some vehicle. Commercial companies have a good track record for launch vehicles, but none for manned spaceflight.

"Boeing was almost selected by NASA for Orion. So they can't build a commercial capsule? "

The question isn't so much can they build it, but how long will it take (and how much will it cost). If it's a new design, to do it right (and safely) it takes time. This time includes deciding what the requirements are, a lot of analyzing and testing to do it right. For a new design, you would have to start over. That's why some of us have been saying we need to continue Orion (launching it manned, not some rescue vehicle).

When a 3 year time gets mentioned to make a manned spacecraft, it is obvious they don't know what they're talking about, as well as those that think that's doable.

What about the capsule that already is designed to NASA standards and already has metal bent etc? Passing all it's tests and reviews with flying colors?

The Merchant 7 know NASA is in a barrel and could hold them hostage , forcing NASA to spend a lot more on CCT than originally anticipate

Imagine if the Merchant 7 providers could collectively force NASA to spend an unimaginable amount of crew transport, let's say $30-$40 billion!

Or worse, imagine if each commercial crew flight cost something ludicrous, let's say around $1.5 billion!

Oh wait, that's what NASA already plans to spend for the development and operation of Ares 1 under the Program of Record.

Truth be told, I can't imagine NASA being more held hostage than they are right now to the completely unaffordable Constellation program and its Congressional enablers.

go4launch: "The claim that the thrust oscillation issues would take millions of dollars and years to resolve is simply wrong. The Ares First Stage and Upper Stage projects have already designed and analyzed multiple different fixes."

Yup, the fix is not to include anything for thrust oscillation. Not needed period.

"Opponents of Commercial Crew conveniently ignore the obvious and lowest risk solution for US manned access to LEO."

Yep....not sure why the anti-commercial crowd thinks somehow without the NASA civil servants down in the weeds with the contractor and constantly changing requirements on them for no value added reasons the commerical guys are doomed to fail.

And as far as another poster's comment:
"But it’s not hard to see the huge problem that this sets up: would you trust a company whose business is entirely dependent on fixed-price government contracts not to cut corners when nobody’s looking?"

ULA and Orbital currently launch billions of dollars in payloads for NASA, Air Force, NRO, etc. on fixed price contracts and are very successful at it--I have never heard of them being caught "cutting corners." But let me guess--those evil commercial guys would start to cut corners when a human's life is on the line ? In a bit of irony the Challenger accident was largely the result of NASA pressuring their contractor to "cut corners" in form of agreeing to launch in temperatures not proven safe to launch.

Most of the CxP fulltime workforce wasn't exactly the A team - and what's left of the A team are on Shuttle.

As to the tech problems, from these charts they really didn't get far enough along to credibly state much of anything:

http://www.vibrationdata.com/NASA_Ares1_Slides.pdf

The probability that the maturing design will move the system response below the crew spec is not known today. There are limits to the design changes that can be proposed.
• Integrated structural design is a complex balance of all loads, controls and
performance and the current margins are not sufficiently robust to allow any
design change to avoid TO loads

Both ULA and Orbital have had their fair share of launch flunks in the recent past. Orbital has also had sat flunks in the recent past.

SpaceX flunked a NASA solar sail thing launch that Jaxa just recently suceeded with, hmmmmmm.......

True, NASA has had 2 major management call flunks.

However, the failure record could be much much worse without the NASA oversight/inspections during production, testing, design change control, engineering control boards, and such.

Read the NASA oversight of USA GAO report and the CAIB findings about reductions in critical inspection points etc. etc. etc.

Your thinking is getting ridiculously juvenile - just because MMS was lax and dysfunctional with BP oversight, doesn't mean that BP should continue to be allowed to run amok...............

FormerObamanaut,

Those TO charts are over 2 years old. Go4launch is exactly right, a TO fix was designed and tested and prototypes were built. However, primarily based on Ares I-X results, it will not be implemented.

Why do you say the CxP team isn't the "A" team? That may be true for Orion and the JSC CxP workforce, but the MSFC Ares team took alot of the shuttle programs best folks, and continues to do so.

> What about the capsule that already is designed to NASA standards and already has metal bent etc? Passing all it's tests and reviews with flying colors?

Are you referring to the Dragon capsule, which passed its CDR back in 2007 and already has quite a bit of testing and metal bent?

http://www.spacex.com/press.php?page=30

Wow. Quoting charts from 2008 as a source of little progress? Guess you haven't gotten word. It's 2010! A vast amount of progress has been accomplished. Concepts built and successfully tested, multiple options shelved. You might get better info if Keith hadn't posted charts a few years back and freaked the brass.

As for the A-team working on Shuttle, yeah there are really good folks working SSP. But Ares has good folks too. Some that haven't retired, found new work, or have been let go are working both. Lest we forget, NASA hasn't designed a new rocket in nearly thirty years. You try going to a high school reunion and remembering everyone's names without a hitch.

As for the CxP non A-team, you'd need to search this site and others for numerous posts and comments that the CxP management and workforce were mostly from Station and prior failed projects, or newbies and how Shuttle types were run-off and belittled in various ways for expressing issues. The Ares PDR and CornDogRocket comments are some examples.

There was also alot of overt anti-Shuttle attitudes expressed from the top-down, even disparaging remarks about the old grey-beards from the Apollo days. Seems like Keith had a post back when about Apollo folks conversations on that subject at the big 50th thing in DC and that there were quite a few anti-Shuttle and anti-Station cronies of Griffin's in DC as well (who may still be there, doesn't seem like Bolden has cleaned house much).

The point was that the 2008 vibrations presentation outlined integration aspects between Orion and Ares development that would continue to affect vibration issues - and neither development nor testing progressed enough to unequivocally claim that the problem was fixed.

There's an article posted in here somewhere about how Orion and Ares I and Ground systems integration were hopelessly out of synch #systems integration for major design mods being something that Shuttle excels at).

If that same vibrations team has an updated presentation that addresses everything from the 2008 report and shows the most recent status - somebody please provide it.

Let me get this right. You're using this blog and its posts as a valid source of accurate information? Wow. Enough said.

"There's an article posted in here somewhere about how Orion and Ares I and Ground systems integration were hopelessly out of synch..."

Were? Enough said.

Everyone constantly ignores the obvious solution to LEO, specifically the ISS. They are sitting on display in the Smithsonian and are called the Apollo Command Module. We don't need anything on "steriods" to support the ISS. The Apollo CM was certified for a rescue craft to land 5 astronauts for Skylab.

Sorry, I don't believe that you couldn't take one of the proven, flown Apollo CMs from a museum, disassemble it, reverse engineer anything that we don't have engineering plans for and build a new one in say a year and a half. Remove all of the obsolete wiring, computer and navigation and replace with new systems. As far as the docking mechanism there are a couple options, either adapt the current Shuttle docking adapter to the capsule or modify the Apollo-Soyuz adapter so that the old Soyuz docking mechanism is replaced with the Shuttle one and installed on a Shuttle mission (A proven solution on Apollo/Soyuz and more recently on Mir/Shuttle).
The service module would be totally new but its design would use flight proven hardware and only have to support crew activity for 4-6 days. I call this a new LEO SM. Why the limited time? 2 days for launch and rendevous and 2 days for landing plus 50% margin. Thrusters for orbital maneuvering could be from original SM or possibly Shuttle vernier thrusters. Deorbit engine could be cluster of Shuttle thrusters or single Shuttle OM. Life support gas tanks? Don't we have some up on the Quest Airlock that are flight approved?

With the generations of advancement of CAD engineering design and CNC tool automation we should be able to knock these things out at a fraction of the cost.

And of course the dirty little secret is that an Apollo sized capsule and LEO SM would fit easily in a shuttle cargo bay for delivery until an Atlas or Delta could be man rated by the NASA bureaucracy.

Come on folks, lets think outside the box. My approach may sound kooky but it is no different than what was done during the Apollo 13 emergency. The engineers were given what was at hand and told to come up with a solution for the carbon dioxide scrubbers filters. You apply the same rules for a ISS support/escape capsule and our engineers would come up with what I have described.

Oh, and someone have the Drug Czar write a memo to all NASA employees stating that "Steroid" use is harmful and is banned from all future NASA activities!

Last thing I would buy is a Boeing designed capsule given their performance on ISS. Any problem that comes up their first action is to avoid fixing it and dump it on the ops team to workaround in order to save them money. So in response to Spaceman 85, yes contractors already try to cut corners with Human Space Flight. It is intrinsic to any commercial endeavour to cut costs. Unfortunately they don't figure out when they have cut too much until they kill someone. Proper customer oversight prevents that which is why NASA needs to stay hands on. They really do have the expertise.

"Steroid" use is harmful and is banned from all future NASA activities!"

ROFL and amen!

@ex_navy:

Proper customer oversight prevents that which is why NASA needs to stay hands on. They really do have the expertise.

Amen also.

(too bad Interior and MMS apparently doesn't have much oversight expertise - the NASA-in-control model could teach em a few things)

Any problem that comes up their first action is to avoid fixing it and dump it on the ops team to workaround in order to save them money. So in response to Spaceman 85, yes contractors already try to cut corners with Human Space Flight. It is intrinsic to any commercial endeavour to cut costs.

In your example, the real problem seems to be that Boeing CAN throw problems back over the fence --- i.e. it's not an effective incentive structure. Because ISS is all onesies and twosies, and NASA can't afford 2 vendors, the rules of grown-up commercial behavior can go out the window.

By contrast, Boeing airplanes sell well because they're easy to fly and maintain; that's true because the airlines have multiple vendors. If United, Delta, or AA felt that 757s and 767s were always a pain to use, and Airbuses made it easier to maintain a safe and efficient passenger operation, they wouldn't buy any more Boeings. Cost is a factor, but only one.

Thus Boeing Commercial (aircraft division) is properly incentivized by their customers, and ongoing competition is key to that. Whereas apparently Boeing Defense and Space has convinced NASA they have to spend like sheiks on ISS. This is the root of the problem: for space programs, after contractor selection, there are rarely any competitive pressures. It's also often true within NASA: how many times have you seen an in-house build get all beautiful and fancy because there's no pressure to keep it simple and control cost?

Just saw this today on SpaceDaily.com "Aerojet Validates Engine Design For Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle".
http://www.space-travel.com/reports/Aerojet_Validates_Engine_Design_For_Orion_Crew_Exploration_Vehicle_999.html

A couple things that are interesting. The article states that the "The R-1E currently provides in-space propulsion for the space shuttle and has a long history of successfully enabling space shuttle maneuvers.". So this is a direct example of what I stated in my post that a new Apollo capsule can utilize existing hardware.

What I don't understand is how come such extensive testing is necessary on thrusters designed 40 years ago and that have flown successfully on 134 missions for the last 30yrs?

"What I don't understand is how come such extensive testing is necessary on thrusters designed 40 years ago and that have flown successfully on 134 missions for the last 30yrs?"
It could be that there were some design changes for Orion. Or, (more likely) the flight conditions for Orion are different than for Shuttle, so they have to make sure it works in those specific conditions.

Does anybody know if this game-changeing composite new tech stuff for airlines is a factor in Orion and/or Merchant 7 design plans?

How far has myth making outflown the realities of plastic jets?

There are some sharp reality checks in recently published NASA documents for anyone who believes the age of lightweight breakthrough composite airlines is about to begin with the Boeing 787 or the Airbus A350 families.

These papers were released last week as the NASA N+3 studies into the airliners of the 2030s.

http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2010/05/25/how-far-has-myth-making-outflown-the-realities-of-plastic-jets/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CrikeyBlogs+%28Crikey+Blogs%29

Could be but don't you think Aerojet would advertise it as "new and improved"? I suspect this is just a form of corporate welfare.

Hopefully we aren't funding GM to test the Vega engine for it's 2015 car models. But with government involved they may well be!