Moon Walkers Briefed On Internal NASA Study Results (Update)

ummmmmm,
and both of them are on opposite sides of the question :)

No, they are both on the same side. They submitted the letter saying that the Obama plan is devastating to US human spaceflight.

I do not recall either of them signing the earlier letter from the larger astronaut and flight director group asking for the re-establishment of Constellation.

There are some aspects of the Obama plan that, in time, could make us stronger, if it doesn't kill us first. But there is a lot of illogic to the Obama plan.
- If he turns us around on ISS, why then does he still terminate Shuttle with no replacement capability in sight ?
- If we know we will need an HLV, and this is a good time to initiate work on it since other major new starts have been deferred, why does he defer HLV too, especially when it is easily synergistic with a temporary continuance for Shuttle.
- Why start on an Orion escape vehicle for which there is no requirement ?

The astronauts and others who are expecting Constellation to be restarted are dreaming. They are just wasting their breath.

Come up with a logical plan and stick with it. There is no logic to trying to maintain Constellation.

Start with what we have, which is a well known and understood: Shuttle and ISS. Shuttle provides the resources for heavy lift. ISS provides many of the resources for long duration. Expand upon those in order to extend our reach, or if a more cost effective replacement can be fielded, go with it. But don't destroy what we have in the hope that someday we'll see something better.

Doug Cooke is the right emissary for the job. He was as pro-Constellation as any reasonable person. He is now pro- the new plan.

This could be a courtesy to keep one of them from making a fool of himself in front of Congress. Jay Barbree of NBC News reported that Armstrong or Cernan may testify before one of Sen. Nelson's hearings next week.

Your questions all have logical answers.
- President Obama isn't terminating the Shuttle; President Bush and Mike Griffin did that four years ago. They systematically shut down the production of Shuttle parts, including the external tank. Trying to reopen the production lines would cost so much that it would sabotage the rest of the plan.
- He's not deferring HLV development, he's accelerating it. Ares V development wasn't going to start until Ares I was complete.
- The Orion escape vehicle isn't a requirement, it's an opportunity. Orion CRVs would carry more people than the current Soyuz capsules, so we could increase the crew of the ISS and make it much more productive. They also remove an expensive requirement from the taxi vehicles, cutting the cost of transportation to and from LEO. Orion could then serve as a basis for a BEO vehicle.

There is a line from a old Eagles tune which describes the Obama plan fans: "You can check out anytime you like but you can never leave". What a shame.

Sooooo, we are still building Ares 1 after all? AND we are still, ll working on the escape system? AND we are still building Orion "LITE"? Oh I almost forgot, the heavy lift booster too! Sounds like Constellation, or am I missing something? OH YEAH!!! We aren't landing on the moon, even though it's only 3 days away. But we are going to L1 which is an interesting thing, and the asteroids, interesting again, but I wonder how long it will take to get to the astronauts in an emergency? (Just think of what would Apollo 13 look like when they run out of oxygen???) Oh well, it all seems kinda familiar around here doesn't it? I am just wondering if Obama just wanted W's name off of this? Because it it CXP all over and shuffled up a bit...

"why then does he still terminate Shuttle with no replacement capability in sight ?"
The shuttle is a flawed system and however much some of the posters here want to spin it, your President Obama can lay the blame on the previous Administration. The Presidential nightmare is no longer MAD but another Challenger, another Columbia. This space cadet still worries from lift off to wheels stop. Magnificent though they are, it is time to move on. ATV, Progress, HTV, Soyuz and even Proton and Ariane can carry the Gap until you get yourselves sorted out. Furthermore the Chinese would jump at the chance to help! It's a global space village now!

"If we know we will need an HLV, and this is a good time to initiate work on it since other major new starts have been deferred, why does he defer HLV too, especially when it is easily synergistic with a temporary continuance for Shuttle."
A confluence of factors:
- The Shuttles are no longer on the launch pad. (u.s.)
- ATK's SRBs are too polluting. Sorry DIRECT.
- Rocket envy requires an all American RD-180 equivalent. Reacquiring the technological high ground lost by an 'operational' NASA.
- a BioLOX engine is an amusing conceit
- TAN, Aerospike and other technological tweekings may have a performance value to rival a disposable SSME
- politics
- We do not need 100t+ Heavy Lift. Medium lift is "just right" as Goldilocks declares after discovering Propellant Depots and OASIS.
http://onorbit.com/node/1400
http://spacecraft.ssl.umd.edu/design_lib/OASISEXEC_97.pdf

"Why start on an Orion escape vehicle for which there is no requirement ?"
In contrast to the Ares-I, Orion is an investment worth continuing rather than expending the little money NASA has on termination costs. An Orion program enables:
- endurance testing of various systems needed for BEO
- an on orbit testbed for experiments that could blow up an otherwise reusable DragonLab
- a non critical hab/ECLSS/lab facility attached to the ISS
- provides an immediate downmass capability
- keeps NASA in the HSF business
- a backstop for Dragon; Boeing Capsule; Dreamchaser; whatever.
- a developmental progression to an Assured Crew Return 'escape capsule' from anywhere between SEL1 and SEL2!
- the political face saving gesture FOR CONGRESS of a continuing 'Constellation' Program with all the useless/ expensive bits removed.
Check and Mate in five moves!

There is a logical plan out there and its called Direct v3.

It meets all the requirements. Safer, Simpler, and Sooner. Why won't they use it. It is the only SD HLV right now that supports various missions we will need. I just don't understand!!!

http://www.directlauncher.com/

A big complaint with the Obama plan is that it kills US HSF with no real replacement plan in place. A real plan would have requirements and some real analysis behind it. A concern is that the time line for resumption of US HSF could take another 10 years as a result of starting over.

We could extend the shuttle, but the costs would be high. If we're developing Orion as a rescue vehicle, it seems it would be best to spend the money on making it capable of carrying a crew to space and as a backup to this commercial effort.

People confuse this all the time. The "Vision for Space Exploration" is the plan. Constellation is the program to build the hardware to exicute the plan. Obama has killed Constellation. And he seems to have unilaterally modified the VSE into who know's what.

My problem with all this is the VSE portion. What has replaced it? Vague promises of trips somewhere in 2025 or later? I don't care HOW we exicute the plan or what we fly on. But we need a goal (long term, Mars) and a plan to get there (VSE or equivalent), and the hardware to do it (Constellation or equivalent). What we have been presented with is a few bones that had they been added to the plan, instead of replacing it, would have been a smart move.

Change. Gotta love it.

There does seem to be a definate impression given of the opposition to 'ObamaSpace' trying to get all its ducks in a row. For example:

* Boeing lobbies Senator Nelson on their SD-HLV proposals;
* Senator Nelson abruptly arranges a hearing at which one or both of Armstrong and Cernan are to testify;
* Armstrong and Cernan briefed by NASA on the outcome of their internal study on the matter of exploration.

We might see Nelson finally announce his 'plan-B' this Wednesday? After a hand-picked set of witnesses give testimony pointing towards it, of course.

President Obama can lay the blame on the previous Administration.

However, based on his pro-hsf space change in position during the election, Florida voters expected he would change the Griffin path for Shuttle.

The Presidential nightmare is no longer MAD but another Challenger, another Columbia.

Too bad he wasn't as worried about another coal mine disaster or an oil spill - ya know - how they have so much better snazzier safety prevention technology these days, huh?

ATK's SRBs are too polluting. Sorry DIRECT.

Agree, that's why CxP would be done too. Same for any Orion components using solids, if any.

Orion is an investment worth continuing

Maybe, but wasn't there some safety redundancy issues that a Chief engineer got fired for dissenting about and an independent Safety Panel having serious issues with Hanely's modus operandi?

a backstop for Dragon

and expendables don't seem to be a great plan for hsf use either for that matter:

"But the failure has left me with one general observation: SpaceX is doing things the hard way.

Developing expendable rockets is always going to be painful and expensive. Throwing the whole rocket away on each attempt not only costs a lot, it also hampers figuring out just what went wrong, because you don't get the rocket back for inspection.

http://www.newscientist.com/blog/space/2008/08/spacex-rocket-failure-due-to-new-engine.html

so what was Boeing's idea?

dancin in the moonlight, everybody's feelin warm & bright

Boeing's already stole the DIRECT plan and made it better, IMO, by adding a people shuttle (Jupiter without the SRBs) to the family. Although all of these concepts are really derived from the old NLS program.

A pdf of Boeing's new HLV concepts can be found at:

http://pdf.aiaa.org/getfile.cfm?urlX=6%3A7I%276D%26X%5BR%5B%2ES%40GOP4S%5EQ%3AO%225J%40%22%5FP%20%20%0A&urla=%25%2ARD%26%220%20%20%0A&urlb=%21%2A%20%20%20%0A&urlc=%21%2A0%20%20%0A&urld=%28%2A%22H%25%22%40%2AEUQX%20%0A&urle=%27%282D%27%23P%3EDW%40%20%20%0A

Marcel F. Williams

"- President Obama isn't terminating the Shuttle; President Bush and Mike Griffin did that...."

Obama turned around the direction on ISS and he needs to do the same on Shuttle so that ISS has assured support; up capacity and down capacity

"- Trying to reopen the production lines would cost so much that it would sabotage the rest of the plan."

Not according to Shuttle Program Manager Shannon. He just said he only wants the lines reopened if there is additional reason, such as use of Shuttle as the basis of an HLV; he was far more concerned with the personnel rather than the dollar cost.

"- He's not deferring HLV development, he's accelerating it. Ares V development wasn't going to start until Ares I was complete."

Ares 1 is dead; Ares-1 was foreseen as the beginning of Ares 5 development. Regardless, there is no reason to defer the start of an HLV for 5 years. We know what we need to know to develop it today; many of the people are in place today; it is synergistic with the existing Shuttle resources today; we know we will need HLV in the future regardless of the program. The idea that existing commercial expendables will provide the same capability as a Shuttle derived HLV is a fabrication.

Obama is doing nothing more than using a delaying tactic.

"- The Orion escape vehicle isn't a requirement, it's an opportunity. Orion CRVs would carry more people than the current Soyuz capsules, so we could increase the crew of the ISS and make it much more productive."

Your statement is totally illogical as is the 'requirement' for this vehicle. What you are saying is we should launch our crews on Soyuz and return the Soyuz empty so we can use the Orion super lite for the crew return.

No matter how you cut this, we are wasting capacity...in general terms what goes up has to come down. Why devise an unbalanced system ? This new vehicle is unnecessary and just a stupid idea. The only rationale is that its political pork for Colorado.

"- Trying to reopen the production lines would cost so much that it would sabotage the rest of the plan."

All things considered, I'd rather see the money put into Shuttle so it could be continued on a minimal mission per year basis, while starting to develop the Shuttle derived HLV. Use the money that would otherwise be going into the unnecessary Orion super lite.

Experienced people don't by DIrect's claims because past experience shows that when you try to re-engineer a vehicle to a different set of requirements then it was originally designed for the supposed savings from commonality are significantly less then promised (by a factor of 2-3) and it turns out to be cheaper to start with a clean design that addresses the requirements. See P-7 program and T-45 as examples.

There is no logical techncial or operational reason to use Orion as an ISS Crew Recue Vehicle. Using Orion as CRV allows you to increase the crew by 1 at most (once Orion is in place we stop buying extra Soyuz and ISS goes back to single supplied by Russia for getting their crew up)and probably not that since the Russians would prefer to sell the extra Souyz seat to millionares rather then fly more crew (ISS is designed for 6 crew). No way that having two seperate vehicles and launch systems is more cost effective then one that can do both (ala the Soyuz).
Givne that Orion was ressurrected after the Colorado Democrats came a calling this clearly is pure political pork to hang on to a swing state.

The shuttle is a flawed system

Newsflash: all rockets are flawed and inherently unsafe.

The diff with Shuttle is that the design flaws were known prior to the disasters, both were identified by the lower level engineers prior to launch/landing, and humans erred in the preventative and corrective action decision making in both cases due to schedule/cost pressures.

That scenario can happen anytime/anywhere in any rocket design or operations program, more so with newcomers on either side.

Then, Fridays auto-computerized stock market "glitch" demonstrates automation's potential flaws.

perhaps new rocket design rules should be no solids, no nuclear (including name-changing derivatives) - anything else?

For the back to basics crowd - ye old "if it sounds to good to be true......."

dancin in the moonlight, everybody's feelin warm & bright

Moonstruck, you are correct. All vehicles are only so safe, and so you devise ways to use them appropriately and in the least unsafe manner as possible.

That is what Bob Thompson said in this recent editorial. Thompson was the 'father of the Space Shuttle':

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/outlook/6991750.html

If the managers had been watching Shuttle and if they had taken corrective action when warranted, then there would have been no Challenger or Columbia accidents. Both were supremely preventable. Columbia was very possibly recoverable, but management chose to disregard the technical experts.

- He's not deferring HLV development, he's accelerating it

Gates: Cuts in Pentagon bureaucracy needed to help maintain military force

to cut as much as $15 billion in overhead costs from the Pentagon's $550 billion budget

Gates is far from the first defense secretary to promise major cuts in the Pentagon bureaucracy. Throughout his tenure, Donald H. Rumsfeld railed against the inefficiencies plaguing the Defense Department but was unable to realize significant savings. The Clinton administration similarly promised to savings by turning to private contractors, an effort that only produced greater costs.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/08/AR2010050802495.html

Time for the Clinton & Bush-esque space policy wonk "helpers" to go home.

dancin in the moonlight, everybody's feelin warm and bright

The only hard limit on ISS crew size is assured crew return. If that limit is relaxed, the limit is then imposed by such things as power and life support. It's not clear what those other limits are, but crew size could probably grow to at least seven. ISS supports more than that when the shuttle is visiting.

Increases in crew size are more important than you might think. It takes about three crew to operate the ISS, so with a crew of six that leaves three to do useful work. If fact, crew the the most critical limit on how much R&D can be done on ISS. (Frequency of up and down transportation for experiments is probably second.) Therefore, increasing crew from six to seven would increase ISS production by about a third. A one third increase in utility from a $100 billion facility would be worth a lot more than the cost of Orion. If Orion had more than 4 seats, it would be worth even more. A crew of 9 would double the utility of ISS!

"Ares V development wasn't going to start until Ares I was complete."

I guess it depends on what is meant by 'development'. If you mean the formal definition ('developing plans with enough detail to build hardware from, and the building it'), no. However, there is certainly a lot of work going on on Ares 5 already, including looking at second-generation hardware (i.e. not for the initial flights), e.g. composite structural components.

"A pdf of Boeing's new HLV concepts"

Another paper rocket. I am not impressed.

Whey they have a detailed enough design to give engineering drawings to the guys who cut metal, let us know. (And even that is only the first step, there's a long way to go after that.)

All right, let's put this one to rest for good.

"President Obama isn't terminating the Shuttle"

It's a fallacy. As we all knew back in 2004 but perhaps have forgotten, the primary reason for shutting down Shuttle was to free up funds for Constellation, recertification to fly beyond 2010 was certainly possible, but at a cost, which initially was not prohibitively expensive but logically would increase quite rapidly as 2010 approaches. While he initially did not choose this course for NASA, he made no effort to change it and the decision was his to make. If he wanted to reduce the gap by flying Shuttle or something else, he had time to make his intentions known. For the first 6 months of his presidency he allowed the previous Administrator to resign without naming a replacement, putting NASA in a paralyzing stasis without a leader, voice, or policy. Then after the final, last-ditch, absolute point no return possible at any price has passed for extending Shuttle, he finally announced a new NASA administrator and started to address NASA and make his intentions known. One may suggest that he was preoccupied with other more pressing issues during this 6 month period, but that would imply that he was actually FOR extending Shuttle but failed to recognize the finality and significance of the widely known Shuttle point of no return, thus forcing a decision he did not desire upon him, NASA, and America for the next few decades, due to a failure to act. Or that he was against extending Shuttle and the escalating costs of recertification and allowed the point of no return to quietly pass, setting a clear, no going back, stage for the new Space Policy.

Evidence to support my conclusion:

2/2004 Bush VSE: "retiring the Space Shuttle to free up billions of dollars in the next decade"
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/55583main_vision_space_exploration2.pdf

11/20/2007 Obama: “The early education plan will be paid for by delaying the NASA Constellation Program for five years,”
http://www.spacepolitics.com/2007/11/20/obama-cut-constellation-to-pay-for-education/

8/3/2008 Obama: "The Illinois senator promised he would work to add one more space-shuttle flight beyond 2010, the shuttle program's scheduled end. He said he wanted to ensure thousands of contract workers didn't lose their jobs. "We cannot afford to lose their expertise," he said."
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2008-08-03/news/obama03_1_barack-obama-moon-nasa

9/28/2008 "The provision, in a bill (HR 6063) that reauthorizes NASA's programs, gives the new president latitude in whether to keep the shuttle operating. But Rep. Bart Gordon (D-TN), who chairs the House Science and Technology Committee, says that Congress is not endorsing an extension or an additional flight to launch a scientific payload called the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer. "Rather, it reflects our common belief that the decision of whether or not to extend the shuttle past its planned 2010 retirement date should be left to the next president and Congress."
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2008/09/29-01.html

11/5/2008: Obama elected.

1/20/2009: NASA Administrator Mike Griffin allowed to resign.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_D._Griffin

4/19/2009: "Shuttle shutdown nears point of no return"
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-04-19/news/shuttle19_1_shuttle-nasa-space-center

5/8/2009: "We're not there yet, Shannon said. However, because of actions already taken to scale back the shuttle manufacturing process, there would be already be a gap between the end of 2010 and the ability to fly the shuttle again."
http://blogs.chron.com/sciguy/archives/2009/05/post_86.html

7/15/2009: NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden confirmed.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_F._Bolden,_Jr.

2/1/2010: Obama releases NASA budget canceling Constellation and not extending Shuttle.
http://news.cnet.com/8301-19514_3-10445227-239.html

4/15/2010: Obama JSC FlyBy not extending Shuttle
http://nasawatch.com/archives/2010/04/video-remarks-o.html

A measure of leadership is how well the leader has articulated a new future - one that inspires people, - one that has people take actions to make it happen; for without the new future, we'd all be getting the same as we're getting now.

A leader therefore has to succeed at aligning people towards movement in the new direction.

Clearly Obama and Bolden have failed in that regard.

Since Obama's plan was unveiled there has been a constant civil war re the future of HSF. So far, I don't see, or read, of movement towards any future, be it Cx, Cx derivative, ObamaSpace, whatever.

Leadership is missing. And we don't even know really what it looks like anymore. And certainly politicians make the worst leaders, in general terms.

> The Clinton administration similarly promised savings by turning to private contractors, an effort that only produced greater costs.

Oh yeah. Those damn capitalist democrats.

You're rooting for the wrong team, pal.

"Shuttle recertification to fly beyond 2010 was certainly possible, but at a cost, which initially was not prohibitively expensive but logically would increase quite rapidly as 2010 approaches."

This is a fallacy.

The Shuttle Orbiters were each built for a 100 mission life and none has gotten even half-way to that number. Every vehicle is recertified for every mission. That is what the 'Certificate of Flight Readiness' process is all about. It is done before every mission, starting with required inspections, and winding up with the Flight Readiness Reviews and certification.

This gives you some idea of the kind of havoc that a panel like Gehman's Columbia board can cause when they really don't have an understanding of the vehicle or the program.

Apparently you did not look at or read the paper. A lot of the hardware exists.

The Boeing Phantom Works paper is an excellent analysis, which is an example of the analysis that should have been completed as part of ESAS rather than 6 years later. Thanks Griffin. Thanks Constellation. You guys did us in.

If US human space flight survives it will be in spite of our NASA management-not because of it.

There is no leadership in the space program today. There has not been in many years.

Not too long ago, 'leaders', if they'd been directed to some of the plans we have now, would have thrown their badges on the table and said "not on my watch".

The top managers today, all of them, have gotten there by taking no positions, making no waves, being quiet and meek and not outspoken at all, getting along with everyone. They have survived to take the reigns except that they are all worthless when it comes to leadership since they have had absolutely zero experience at it.

Visionary leadership ?

Whats worse is that since they all got to where they are by taking no action and by specializing in nothing, and by gaining just about no experience at all, they expect everyone working for them will get to the top the same way. I got a kick out of one of the ISS Division chiefs who I used to share an office with, was commenting that he felt funny having been promoted to the division chief position, sitting at the head of the table, being asked to make decision on things he knew nothing about, and had never before had any experience with, since he'd never worked in the discipline he was now leading.

To lead you have to have some idea of what direction you are going in.

The Shuttle Recertification I refer to is the one referred to by the Augustine report and Columbia accident investigation, not a flight readiness review. They are two completely different things.

To quote the Augustine report...

'Safety. The Committee’s charter did not call for it to review the safety record or assess the reliability of the Shuttle. The Committee did, however, consider Shuttle safety and reliability in its deliberations. One of the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) spoke directly to this issue: “Prior to operating the Shuttle beyond 2010, develop and conduct a vehicle recertification at the material, component, subsystem, and system levels. Recertification requirements should be included in the Service Life Extension Program.”'

Please see page 49:
http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/396093main_HSF_Cmte_FinalReport.pdf

I said that both the Bush & Clinton policy wonks need to just go home (& shut the f*@! up).

It's the opinion of some that crops could be grown on the moon; which raises the fear that it may not be long before we're paying somebody not to.
Franklin P. Jones

dancin in the moonlight, everybody's feelin warm and bright

Amen brother! (or sister...)

I have personally seen this in spades across all levels of management; both civil service *and* contractor, and at the HQ and field center level (...and across multiple field centers!). In fact, I'm tempted to extrapolate and add that - while I have witnessed this getting increasingly worse over the years, I think it has also become symptomatic of our society in general. But I digress...

I can remember people in the past who actually laid their badge on the table and said, "no." But not anymore...no way. When's the last time anyone saw a manager with actual technical expertise really make a stand about something important?

Hmmm...now that I think about it, the last one I can name was Griffin! :-0

Actually, the last one I remember was the former Orion(?) Chief Engineer that dissented with Griffin etc's safety compromises modus operandi (which was disputed by an independent safety panel also).

@Libby:
Can you be more specific, are you referring to Shuttle mgmt, ISS mgmt, CxP mgmt or what? And DC, JSC, MSFC, KSC or all of them?

Have heard that there are only a few bad apples in Shuttle (mostly folded in from reorgs) and that most of the ISS ones went to CxP, so it would be helpful to clarify if your experience is different from that.

Shuttle management was at it's best during the first flights when Rockwell was the lead. In 1984, LSOC took over and the emphasis was to ramp up the flight rate for cost/schedule - only took 2 years for that plan to fail. It was the best after Challenger when Fletcher was around. When Fletcher left, the focus returned to cost cutting - the worst of which was the Goldin era. Many people that left then thought it was just a matter of time until the next disaster. But the strange attractor thing apparently affected the Hubble & folks side of things earlier than Shuttle.

And who was Goldin's most staunch defender, hmmmmmm? Did Fletcher have any protoges?

Anyway, somebody's starting to talk the talk:
GSA's goal: No environmental impact
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20100509/FACILITIES01/5090307/1010/ACQUISITION01

And all that's to come and everything under the sun is in tune
but the sun is eclipsed by the moon.

What is it you think that we certify each time we fly? What is it that you think we are inspecting and verifying that costs so much that would be different for an additional year versus for an additional flight?

How do you think a recertification for each Orbiter for continuance after 2010, would be different from a recertification for each Orbiter for each additional flight?

I am hopeful that, at JSC, Mr. Gerstenmaier and Mr. Coats will see the changes that Mr. Obama and Gen. Bolden have proposed as an opportunity to make some significant changes in organizations, personnel and management, even though I anticipate that we would wind up no better off that we are now. But, from what I have seen so far, there are no changes being planned or considered; this is consistent with the lack of leadership.

Assured crew return is not the only limit on crew size. Consumables are also the limiting factor as well as physical space. ISS can accomadate higher numbers for short periods during shuttle missions but can't sustain higher numbers for periods as long as an expedition and I would hate to see the psychological effects from an overmanned crew without appropriate space. Given diminishing returns from adding extra crew that the vehicle isn't designed to support saying an increase in crew to 9 doubles ISS utility is simplistic and a bit naive. In any case your theory isn't why Constellation is being resurrected. Only reason is to try and save Democratic sets in Colorado.

Why would you expect any leadership? The OPM civil service rules are not designed to create or reward leaders. Promotion is based on seniority and never having made a "bad" decision. No manager has ever been rewarded for executing their assignment under budget or for taking risk. Ever notice that every decision made by NASA is done by committe rather than be an accountable individual? That's so no one person can be held accountable if the decision turns out to be wrong. Then managers can always point to the board and say "the whole board agreed and all these smart people can't be wrong, it must have been unforseen and we shouldn't be punished". This isn't a uniquely NASA problem. Saw the same problem with the civil servants at Patuxent River when I was doing flight test. Until you change the civil service personnel management rules you shouldn't be surprised by the lack of visionary leadership from any part of the government.

I'm actually a big fan of Obama's new plans for NASA. However, after watching this policy spin around the bowl for a couple of months and seeing Congress continue gallantly toward the unsustainable status quo, it all just looks like a big mess in execution. I can't imagine how NASA employees and the spaceflight business are left feeling right now - I'd bet quite disoriented and disheartened.

I clearly stated that if the crew return limit is lifted, other things set the limits, physical space and consumables among the ones I didn't list. Consumables require more deliveries, which I already said were needed. As for physical space, does anyone know how far NASA got with the Hab module? Or perhaps it would be time to talk with Bigelow?

The point is, when you lift one limit, you get to start doing trades on the others and see how far you can get at reasonable expense. For example, we dropped closed cycle life support from ISS 20 years ago and we need it even more now. ISS is the perfect test bed for new development.

Let's open up our minds a little. It's natural that the last 40 years of frustration have left many of us cynical, but it would be a big mistake to let cynicism keep us locked in little mental boxes.

Some ideas for expanding the capability/utility of the ISS, never mind how you get them up there.

http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1623/1

Actually, there's nothing really new about these designs. They appear to be a resurrection of the NSL studies done back in the 1990s which is where the DIRECT concept really comes from.

But there's no logical reason why Boeing shouldn't be able to develop new rockets using existing rocket engines with a long history reliability.

Marcel F. Williams

However if an experienced leader, like the recently reassigned Education AA, makes sound, logical and financially responsible descisions based on government regulations, they get shoved aside and reassigned with little or no explanation. NASA, and the government in general, do not want leaders they want "yes men", if you do take a stand and try to lead you better be prepared to move on.

"Can you be more specific, are you referring to Shuttle mgmt, ISS mgmt, CxP mgmt or what? And DC, JSC, MSFC, KSC or all of them?

Have heard that there are only a few bad apples in Shuttle.... In 1984, LSOC took over and the emphasis was to ramp up the flight rate for cost/schedule - only took 2 years for that plan to fail."

I do not see a lot of difference between the centers or the programs. Human space flight is adrift and in need of a leadership makeover.

Look at it this way-each of the programs has been spending between $2 and 3 billion a year. That is roughly 20000 people per program. Each of the programs is bloated, inefficient, and a formidable ineffective bureaucracy.

If you question this, take a look at what the US is spending as compared with any of the other foreign human space programs. Take a look at what the US has to show for this investment in recent years.

Shuttle and ISS have been spending at the same exorbitant rate forever, yet producing essentially nothing new except for continuing to fly. The development efforts for both, which is where serious money should have been needed and being invested, were over decades ago. Constellation, despite some excitement at the start and fairly well understood near term technical goals, made very little progress towards those goals, and as activity was due to pick up in the next few years, was quickly going to absorb the entire remainder of the HSF budget and was going to require much more than that.

For this amount of money and human capital, none of the programs has explained even in a half-assed manner, the potential value of their program. This was clearly visible with Constellation, where there was really no explanation of what they were trying to do and why. In the case of Shuttle, no one has stood up to say why the program ought to be preserved or continued. In the case of ISS, it has been repeatedly stated that the real purpose is the all important science being accomplished, even though there is little evidence that there is a lot of important science being accomplished and even though very little of the money goes to science. Does 'leadership', and I use the term loosely, really have so little self-interest?

The fact there is essentially no effort made to explain their own existence means that there is no attempt being made at leadership.

And it is not to say the people in management are necessarily 'bad apples'. It is to say they have no clue what they need to be doing and why in order to lead their programs towards efficiency in accomplishing their goals and ultimate success. They might do the technical job; that does not reflect good leadership. That is just knowledge of the technical job. That means they are reasonably competent engineers; not good leaders.

Agree with john.k above. Space is a business that carries a lot of momentum, more than even political careers sometimes. If you want to revolutionize things, you better be ready and do the homework, and execute it right. This has not happened.

We saw last year what happens when you leave things up to congress to figure out. You get something that no one wants, and it's nothing but a fight to get nowhere.

It is good to see ESMD is moving forward, The whole of NASA is not ESMD thank goodness!

I'm just curious why Cooke briefed Armstrong and Cernan. Is that so they'll look knowledgeable when they're testifying in the Senate? I wonder if other astronauts could get the same briefing.

"A pdf of Boeing's new HLV concepts"

Another paper rocket. I am not impressed.

Boeing didn't recently get into building Estes model rockets.

Their history in space exploration should give them the right to be taken seriously. This is the same company that built the S-1-C, as a small example.

How sad that people like Armstrong and Cernan have to be called upon to speak on the behalf of NASA because we have a president with very little grasp on how to lead NASA at all.

I once dreamed that Cernan would live to shake the hand of the person that would relieve him of his title of last man on the moon. But now with Obama???

This are indeed dark times.

Perhaps he will shake the hand of a Taikonaut.

"A pdf of Boeing's new HLV concepts"

"Another paper rocket. I am not impressed."

... Do you mean a paper rocket of mostly EXISTING hardware?

Ironically, new vision supporters ARE after paper rockets and architectures.

Just because a civil servant like D. Cooke is now defending the new plan doesn't mean those of us supporting CxP also have to fall in line, nor is Sen Nelson (D.) the final 'arbiter' for all things concerned with human spaceflight. The November 2010 elections are just around the corner and Sen Nelson has a vested interest in trying to stem his own party's losses. There is no need to rush into a consensus 'at any cost', nor does the current administration deserve any special favor this late in the game.

Now I understand why L. Lyles looked so somber when I briefly spoke with him at an event where the Augustine's recommendations were discussed. Probably that's why he didn't take the Administrator's job when it was offered to him.

It is starting to become clear that early reports of CxP's demise may have been exagerrated.

I once dreamed that Cernan would live to shake the hand of the person that would relieve him of his title of last man on the moon. But now with Obama???

where the above breaks down is that under the Constellation program Cernan would have to live until 2030 to even have a remote chance to shake the next NASA astronaut to step on the Moon.

thats not impossible of course but from the way you write (and post) it seems as if you dont understand that the POR was not going anywhere all that fast.

Robert G. Oler

"I once dreamed that Cernan would live to shake the hand of the person that would relieve him of his title of last man on the moon. But now with Obama???"

where the above breaks down is that under the Constellation program Cernan would have to live until 2030 to even have a remote chance to shake the next NASA astronaut to step on the Moon.

thats not impossible of course but from the way you write (and post) it seems as if you dont understand that the POR was not going anywhere all that fast.

Robert G. Oler

"Fast" or not, the CxP program was at least headed for the Moon. The new "direction" has no particular destination, and it's adherents (most notably Buzz Aldrin, Ed Crawley, John Holdren, Lori Garver, Barack Obama) have expressed an open animosity to a return to the Moon. (So I agree with CessnaDriver's statement.)

Having worked on or observed quite a few large government procurements, I assert that a new start today won't reach the Moon any sooner than CxP would have. It certainly won't reach it sooner than a CxP that is given better funding.

The Augustine commission concluded that CxP didn't have enough money, not that it was technically impossible.

I'm not defending the CxP status quo, but they've thrown the Lunar Surface Systems baby out with the Ares I bathwater, to grossly over-simplify the mistake they are making.

I have to agree with Libby that NASA management is too quick to bend to the prevailing winds. I still have a lot of respect for Doug Cooke, but his recent internal briefing fit Libby's model. It sounded like "I used to be for the Moon, before I was against it."

And Charlie Bolden asserts that he won't put his badge on the table because he wants to stay 'in the fight'. But in saying that, he is forfeiting some of his power.

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I'm worried about the effect of whatever NASA said to Armstrong and Cernan. What sort of creative smoke and mirrors did they use to try to convince these guys that they should preach the new gospel of "change"?

Getting them to change their position will probably dampen the hopes of many in the HSF community who support an incremental and continuous US presence in space exploration.

Well now.

CxP is crying like a little baby with diaper rash, get some baby powder and all will be better.

CxP is zeroed for a reason. Guess why???

ESMD has already been to the Moon and has a spacecraft in Orbit. Meanwhile CxP is zeroed.

have a great CxP day

Constellation might have had the Moon as a goal, but in my view it was never going to get there...not in two decades not ever.

NASA projects since Apollo always have goals. They have NEVER met a single one of them. Of all the projects in HSF that NASA has tried only two of them got to hardware (Shuttle/station) and both of them do nothing compared to what they were sold as doing.

NASA in HSF routinely over promises, under delivers, misestimates cost and timetables and in the two cases that we got flying hardware because as the project descoped the original design (which frequently was chosen for bad reasons) was stuck to...and became a flying shadow of itself. With cost that were astronomical.

Constellation was well down this road. It isnt that the vehicle was underfunded, it was that it couldnt get to flight status on 10 billion dollars (more then Falcon 1/9, Atlas, Delta). The Orion capsule had borne the burden of the downscope and doubltess Ares V/Altair would do the same.

In my view (and I predicted this on the Space Policy forum as soon as the pieces were announced on Ares) the best that might have happened is that by 2020 or something we would have a replacement for the shuttle...which would fly about three times a year to ISS.

We were never going to go back to the Moon...as one person said about Ares V "if we got it for free we could not afford to fly it".

Robert G. Oler

The reason for the delay in returning to the Moon was due to the sequential funding of the Ares architecture. Serious funding for heavy lift vehicle and the Altair lunar weren't supposed to start until after the Ares I was completed.

While sequential funding makes annual expenditures more affordable, it also makes development cost a lot more expensive in the long run thanks to inflation. The longer something takes to be built, the more expensive it is.

During the Apollo era, on the other hand, all of the basic components of the Apollo architecture were funded and developed simultaneously. So NASA was able to develop the architecture to get to the Moon just 8 years after Kennedy's announcement.