What Happened to "Apollo on Steroids", Mike?

Geesh!

This Griffin guy is like Jason in the Friday the 13th movies!

Just when you think he's gone, he pops back in to terrorize us once again.

As one of the young innovators who was unfunded for years under Mike's Apollo-style NASA, I'd say the answer is innovative game-changing technologies. Next.

Why don't we do something simple. I think we need a generic mid- sized sedan, or a minivan concept for just getting up there. We don't have to reinvent the wheel here.U think just a simple, robust design that uses what we have in terms of engineering and materials, you know-Use the KISS principal; Keep It Simple Stupid. The Soyuz is a rudimentary,safe, spacecraft with 45 year old technology, and that is our only ride up after the Shuttle retires. Why in the world dont we have a simple taxi????

I've spoken to quite a few engineers working on different NASA projects who've on occasion had an opportunity to be with Griffin when he's been interacting with other engineers and to a man they've ALL been extremely impressed with his intellect - his engineering smarts. One guy, an old-timer whom I deeply respect, went so far as to say he's probably the smartest administrator since von Braun.

Charlie makes, as we ALL know now, a very good yes-man.

Griffin just does not understand Apollo. The goal of Apollo was to take a person (man) to the Moon land them safely and then return and do it in a decade (or less).

The goal was not some particular hardware or operational config in orbit. The folks who put Apollo together chose the route which would accomplish all the goals. And had lots of money.

Griffin in his time in the saddle thought redoing Apollo or doing it on steroids meant doing what Apollo did only bigger and with no real timeframe. The time frame for Apollo was essential and the folks who made the project work did whatever their smarts allowed them to do (like LOR) to make it happen in that timeframe.

If Griffin was the smart guy everyone (Jay Barbee for instance sigh) claims then he would have put some method together which was going to make the plans happen in a politically viable timeframe.

Instead he chose something that was an entitlement for NASA. Sorry Mike. You failed on everything.

Robert G Oler

Astropat, that was exactly what the Ares I was supposed to be. Maybe people forgot this, but the argument was, if you want a vehicle to JUST put people into space, why use a space-cargo truck like the shuttle. Instead, why not something small and (relatively) simple. The Ares I stack was supposed to be that. Yes, it had a lot of technical problems and costs front ended, but it was basically hardware that had no expiration date. If human beings were going to the Moon in 2025 or to Mars in 2037 or an asteroid somewhere in between, so long as the larger transit vehicle was assembled in space (using one or more Ares V launches), there isn't any reason the "simple" task of getting people there couldn't be accomplished by an "American Soyuz" like Ares I.

But things got complicated. Orion was overweight and overly complex for what should have been a relatively simple capsule (mostly due to its Moon mission profile). The second stage had some problems. And then there was the political problems. The DIRECT folks waged a pretty nasty campaign against Ares I in particular, even has hardware was being fabricated (which should have been a clear message for "you lost the argument, move on"). Some people think that parts commonality with Ares V in an "Ares IV" config would have been more affordable than the very different Ares I.

So on and so forth.

And what did NASA get for it? Well it's 2010. They're in exactly the same place they were in 1999, when computer art of the X-33 or Venture Star was plastered in the Boston Globe's science section. Computer art. There will be years more studies. More computer art and promises of some new exciting vehicle or destination down the road. Who knows. Let's be frank, all this stuff about making "Orion Lite" an escape vehicle to be launched on non-manrated EELV launchers is really about a country that will shell out $5 billion for "Cash for Clunkers", but not a country that can be bothered to man-rate its "American Soyuz".

23 February 2001
"At an Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel meeting held February 8, Goldin angrily singled out JSC and shuttle contractors as "trying to make sure theres no competition to the shuttle."

"I know who they are and what they are doing," Goldin said at the meeting.
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/missions/abbey_jsc_010223.html

LoL, sound familiar? hmmmmmm.......

While I don't agree with the path chosen by Griffin for carrying out the Vision for Space Exploration, the path chosen by Obama to upset the cart and seek out "game changing technologies" is inherently high risk technically. Obama's "burn the ships" approach without having a readily available replacement is just plain foolish and points out the naivete of his advisors. Evolution is the best course for low risk and maintaining a highly competent workforce through any transition.

clarification: von Braun was never the Administrator.

von Braun was excellent as a team leader, manager, and salesman. von Braun, even though a NAZI, was regarded for his basic support of people, particularly his own people.

No doubt Griffin is smart. All of his degrees reflect that.

Griffin had no sales ability at all and like the typical NASA manager felt sales were not important. The quality of his work, assuming he would ever finish a job (remember this was the second time he was supposed to lead a beyond LEO effort; he was also AA for SEI) might have spoken for itself.

Griffins greatest downfall it seems was his inability to work in a team environment. In a team you rely on your players and offer assistance when they need some. Griffin's approach was that it was his way. No one else had a vote. Others should have been able and willing to stand up to him.

Remember Griffin started out insulting everyone who had worked Shuttle and Station. Not a way to make friends.

We now stand at a precipice. No one knows if the US will be successful or not. If commercial succeeds then it could revolutionize spaceflight, and if we proceed with all due haste in developing new technologies, people could be flying to Mars in 25 years.

But, proper management and leadership would not have brought the entire program to the point where it might just as easily die. We are now dependent on serious political support, a kind of support the program has never had, many years into the future if it is just to survive. Don't forget Griffin killed lots of projects and people"s careers just starting
out on his own idea.

Griffin was willing to sacrifice the entire program for HIS one BIG idea. Many of us who lived through Apollo never thought what he was doing would prove supportable or sustainable. Apollo wasn't, even though it made a lot of Americans proud. Why did he think doing it a second time would make it more sustainable?

Given that Von B. never held the office of administrator (his highest office in NASA was director of MSFC), I suppose that's useful. Being an administrator takes more than just engineering savvy, but also the ability to deal with the White House, Congress, other agencies, & the American people. Look at Webb or Glennan, as examples.

I think its a matter of perspective and understanding.

The Apollo program was a bold step forward, but it was also incomplete. A good many people didn't understand that, so to them "Apollo on steroids" meant going back to plant another flag. It was an insult.
To me it meant going back to finish the job we started. A thorough exploration and utilization of the nearest celestial body to the earth.
Its a mission we will be forced to complete someday if we're serious about expanding this nations presence in space.

My fear is that we aren't, so we wont.

Allow me to repost the first comment from Av Week's site:

- - - -
"Red" stated:

The choice isn't Constellation or game-changing technologies. The real choice in the 2011 budget is Constellation or all of the following:

- Orion super-lite crew return vehicle/beyond LEO technology base
- a line of small HSF robotic precursors
- a line of large HSF robotic precursors
- ensuring the Shuttle completes the ISS
- keeping the ISS to 2020+ instead of dumping it in 2016
- adding capabilities for the ISS
- actually vigorously using the ISS
- repairing NASA's Earth observation budget
- repairing NASA's Aeronautics budget
- increasing the human research budget by 42%
- a strong set of exploration technology demonstration missions for use of space resources, propellant depots, closed-loop life support, automated rendezvous and docking, EVAs and servicing, and many others
- heavy lift and propulsion research and development
- U.S. production of something like the RD-180 engine
- modernization of KSC and nearby facilities
- improved commercial cargo
- a new commercial crew effort
- a repaired and even vigorous general space technology portfolio

- - - -
Clearly the FY2011 budget proposal is a better (i.e. more affordable, sustainable, and beneficial) implementation of the original Vision than Constellation ever was.

Repeating Apollo requires Apollo budgets. Whining that we should have Apollo budgets does not get us Apollo budgets. Therefore, repeating Apollo is a recipe for disaster.

Thanks for the 5 year detour, Mike.

No, it was a retro spam can. A return to re live the glories of the past. A return to a disposable capsule landing in the water. A return to throwing away not only one, but two huge rockets every time you fly. A return to throwing away a lander, and service module every time you fly. A return to a mega expensive venture and arrogantly telling the taxpayer to keep his mouth shut and checkbook open.
Griffin was a coward and a con man. He lied about the cost and technical problems. He tried to sell it as a tried and true way to go but when problems did crop up, he claimed it was new technology. When The Obama administration waned to look under the hood, he refused to allow them to look. He resigned rather than face the consequences of his con game.
Orion IS a retro spam can which deserves to die. It should be call what it really is...Block 3 Apollo.

He resigned

Not in the usual meaning of the phrase. All cabinet and sub-cabinet appointees resign at the end of an administration, which is what Griffin did. A few (e.g. Gates) are asked to stay on, but clearly Griffin was not going to be in that boat.

Noel

The failure of the Griffin plan was not the rocket, it was the plan. If we had lived in an era of unlimited budgets and a national commitment to open the solar system for human exploration and development, his plan would have been a good start. However, back in the world where we currently live, that commitment did not exist, and Griffin's execution of the plan, whereby he focused on the rocket "I don't care what we do on the moon, my job is to build the rocket", failed to build any internal political or outside support for that plan.

The difference between Von Braun and Griffin was that if there was a difference of opinion, Von Braun would have allowed the airing of that opinion, a discussion of its merits, and if he then decided that the difference of opinion was correct, he would immediately shift gears to support that idea. If this had not been the case, John Hubolt, the principal author of the LOR idea, would have been fired like John Mankins (and many others) were under Griffin's watch.

As for the comment about how the old timers respected Griffin, well not all of them or even most of them, many of whom I have known for over 23 years in Huntsville. There was an event at the Space and Rocket Center in January 2007 where the old timers turned the 50th anniversary of the launch of Explorer 1 into a review of exactly how the Apollo plan worked as an engineering effort. It was extremely illuminating and the consensus among almost all of them that I know (including the release of letters from Von Braun to LBJ explaining why a primary solid propellant booster for a launch vehicle was a bad idea) was that the plan was being poorly executed, with far too many requirements and with a leadership that did not have a fraction of the technical competence of the Von Braun team.

Yes, exactly. In addition, Von Braun himself argued against big boosters as the way to implement long-term space exploration. Many of the concepts in the new vision were exactly what he was pushing for back in the 50's and 60's. Apollo was a shortcut to win a race, and not a plan for sustained human presence in space.

Yes, exactly. In addition, Von Braun himself argued against big boosters as the way to implement long-term space exploration. Many of the concepts in the new vision were exactly what he was pushing for back in the 50's and 60's. Apollo was a shortcut to win a race, and not a plan for sustained human presence in space.

Von Braun realized at the time that the LOR architecture was finally agreed to by him that it was problematical as it limited options for growing beyond the limited sortie missions. He also worried about a "Kilroy was here" mentality that could develop after the first few mission successes with no infrastructure left on the Moon.

Here is a somewhat later document that does not refer to their misgivings on LOR except indirectly.

http://history.nasa.gov/Apollomon/apollo6.pdf

It is EXTREMELY interesting that Von Braun put managerial interfaces at the same level of risk as technical interfaces. This is something that no one even talks about these days, but which can be seen as a key factor in many of our failures in spaceflight hardware development.

Yup, indeed, the second choice to LOR was the EOR Tanking Mode, which is effectively the New Vision-style orbital refuel. The EOR Connecting Mode (effectively CxP!) was the least wanted option.

I've never been a big Mike Griffin fan, particularly after his appearance on Meet The Press after Columbia (and to be fair he did not like the letter I wrote about his appearance in AWST as well).

But what is becoming abundantly clear to me at least is that Mike's efforts as Administrator were not about currying support (which I think was lip service anyway) among the Bush administration, nor really among Congress (and clearly not among the American people) but more and more it strikes me, particularly with these comments...is that what he had in mind was cementing the program internally to NASA HSF groups/contractors and then hoping that somehow that support would translate into continued support in Congress; particularly since he seems not to have anticipated that another new administration would try and change course.

In that light, his rather frantic and to some extent unseemly efforts to remain NASA administrator in the transition seem pretty clear. As does his seeming turn around on the issues of "human rating" and things like that.

Griffin seemed to think that he was a "Dan Goldin" ie able to survive the change, because Griffin supposed that the new administration would not care all that much about what and how NASA did what it did.

Robert G. Oler

After going back and looking at the original VSE project as proposed by O'Keefe/Steidle and then Constellation I think I understand better how we ended up with COnstellation. One of the big knocks against Steilde's development plan was that it has a gap of 4 years between the end of shuttle and IOC for the replacement vehicle. There were mnay complaints at that time about the gap. When Griffin came in I have no doubt that congressional and other space constituency pressure made eliminating the gap the highest priority. So instead of doing a proper development program he was forced to put together a program that could be done quickly (not efficiently) which means old technology. I think it would be intresting to see what Mr. Griffin would have come up with if he wasn't trying to meet a politically driven unrealistic schedule.

"a gap of 4 years between the end of shuttle and IOC for the replacement vehicle. There were mnay complaints at that time about the gap. ... pressure made eliminating the gap the highest priority."

How ironic, given that all the typical schedule slips in Constellation meant that direction wound up with a gap too.

I wonder if the Steidle route would also have taken a schedule hit, had it been taken, and for similar reasons ('the difference between theory and practise is always bigger in practise than it is in theory')?

So maybe there was always going to be a gap between them - it was just that the absolute estimates for each were off?