The Email NASA Is Saving May Be Yours

Message from the NASA Chief Information Officer NASA Records Management and E-mail

"The purpose of this memo is to bring to your attention NASA's policies regarding e-mail records management. In order to comply with the Federal Records Act, NASA is legally obligated to preserve records that document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, and essential transactions of the agency."

That Culture Stuff is Back at NASA

NASA GSFC Solicitation: Cultural and Current State Assessment of GSFC

"Over the next several months the Center will undertake a systematic future planning process. The foundation of this effort will be a cultural and current state assessment of the Center. Upon completion of this assessment, the Center leadership team will conduct a series of planning processes and establish the strategies for implementation. The cultural and current state assessment and subsequent planning processes will be designed, implemented and managed with consultation, support, and a proven track record in facilitation of the process from Frontier Associates."

Editor's note: This is curious. Shortly after Mike Griffin arrived, all of the 'culture' contracts NASA had put into place after Columbia were quickly ended. Now, the need for such activities has (apparently) resurfaced. I wonder what would have happened if NASA had simply stuck with what it was already doing (culture-wise) back in 2005.

Griffin and KSC Management Warned Over Alleged Political Activity

Watchdog agency closes investigation into NASA chief's comments about disgraced former congressman, AP

"A federal watchdog agency has closed its investigation into whether NASA's chief administrator violated the law when he urged an audience to support former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay. But the Office of Special Counsel sent a warning letter to NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, saying he should have used better judgment, even if he did not break a law against using official authority to influence an election. ... Separately, the agency found that NASA officials did violate the law when they allowed a speech by Sen. John Kerry at the Kennedy Space Center to be broadcast and played over the Internet to workers at the facility. Kerry was running for president at the time, in July 2004."

Griffin (apparently) Flip Flops and Endorses a Political Candidate, earlier post

Griffin Email on Endorsement Issue, earlier post

NASA denies chief made formal DeLay endorsement, Houston Chronicle

"The space program has had no better friend in its entire existence than Tom DeLay," Griffin said Friday of DeLay's legislative support of the agency. "He's still with us and we need to keep him there."

There are fake Klingons in the White House

Editor's note: Just when you thought the White House doesn't have anyone on staff with any space smarts Rep. David Wu (D-OR) drops this bombshell: "There are Klingons in the White House." Wu then goes on to note that these are actually "faux Klingons". I guess he is refering to the Klingons we saw in the original Star Trek series - you know, the ones without all the bumps on their heads. Wu then laments the lack of Vulcans in the White House. Of course we all know that the only Vulcan working on space in Washington is Mike Griffin. Rep. Wu has been on the House Science Committee for a number of years. Let's see if he raises this issue with Spock Mike Griffin and Shana Dale (she used to work there) when hearings commence in a month or so.

Watch, C-SPAN (via YouTube)
Scotty: I need that CEV in 2010 or we're all going to die!, earlier post
Shana Goes Native, earlier post

The White House Is Afraid To Admit What They Think About Their Own Space Policy

The President's Space Policy: The Facts, The Truth, and The Myths, Washington Space Business Roundtable

"*Please note all parts of this presentation are to be strictly off the record."

SPEAKER: Damon R. Wells, Senior Policy Analyst Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

Editor's note: It sure looks like Damon Wells and the rest of OSTP are afraid that taxpayers will be able to learn about what they have to say about the nation's space policy - you know, the one they developed. Small wonder that Mike Griffin and Shana Dale (who used to work at OSTP) never mention it - or that the White House never mentions the VSE in their new space policy. What I simply do not understand is how a civil servant, speaking in an official capacity, can talk to a group of people about what they are paid to do (with tax dollars) - yet their comments cannot be relayed to the tax paying public. There's an ethical issue here, folks. Indeed, this is the height of arrogance as far as this Administration is concerned. For the Washington Space Business Roundtable to agree to such conditions calls their own ethics into question. This is abject cowardice on the part of Damon Wells and the White House.

A space policy that cannot be discussed in public is one that is doomed to fail.

Election Implications For NASA - Part 2

Democrats Take Control of the Senate, AP

"Democrats wrested control of the Senate from Republicans Wednesday with an upset victory in Virginia, giving the party complete domination of Capitol Hill for the first time since 1994. Jim Webb's squeaker win over incumbent Sen. George Allen gave Democrats their 51st seat in the Senate...."

Editor's note: Sen. Allen has just conceeded the election to Jim Webb.

It is one thing if only the House is run by Democrats. It is quite another if the Senate is run by them as well. Given that the Democrats seem to be intent upon placing all of the Bush Administration's activities under closer scrutiny, NASA should expect much more oversight than it has had in previous years. And that scrutiny is no longer going to be modulated by the White House.

Sen. Byrd (D-WV) would be in line to chair the Senate Appropriations Committee (more good news for IV&V). The Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee would likely be chaired by Sen. Mikulski (D-MD) (good news for GSFC). Of course, this means that Sen. Shelby (R-AL) would find his ability to bully NASA into a corner (when it comes to MSFC issues) greatly diminished.

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation stands to be chaired by Sen. Inouye (D-HI). The Science and Space Subcommittee will almost certainly be chaired by Sen. Nelson (D-FL). If Sen. Allen (who is on the committee) does indeed lose, then LaRC will lose a supporter. Sen. Hutchison (R-TX) won re-election and will continue to serve to represent JSC's interests.

At first glance, it is likely that the Senate's oversight of NASA is much less likely to undergo any dramatic changes in the short term given the way that the Senate has been handling things. Indeed, Sen. Mikulski and Sen. Hutchison (who sits on both the authorizing and appropriations committees that oversee NASA) have had an interesting mutual cooperation pact for the past few years, so it is likely that this will continue. Mikulski and Hutchison have developed a plan whereby they hope to give NASA $2.4 billion over the course of several years so as to allow NASA to gain back the funds it had used to cover the aftermath of the Columbia accident.

Of course, it is likely that oversight as to the Shuttle fleet and its replacement by the CEV will increase once Nelson assumes the chairmanship. Issues relating to the use of the ISS will also be of interest to the committee.

It is much more likely that we'll see some political theatre in the House Science Committee. Things to watch out for: hearings on the cost of the VSE and its architecture, balancing the VSE against science cuts, and the Administration's stance on global warming research.

One thing is certain, however. While there is a Republican majority in Congress, explaining the rationale behind the VSE as being "because the President has directed us to do this" works well enough. However, with the prospect of losing control of both the House and Senate, this will no longer suffice as far as Congress is concerned.

Supporters of the VSE at NASA and the White House (if there are any left) are going to need to find a new, non-partisan underlying rationale for the VSE. The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 was a start - but it is going to take more than a piece of legislation to keep the VSE on track as a new Congress puts its costs and plans under a microscope.

Election Implications For NASA

Democrats on Track to Win Control of House, Senate Remains Too Close to Call, Washington Post

"Democrats were on track tonight to win control of the House of Representatives, chalking up a steady stream of victories against Republican incumbents. But a majority in the Senate remained up for grabs, with several key races too close to call."

Editor's note: What does this mean for the Democrats who sit on committees that oversee NASA? Given that there are many issues with how the VSE is being implemented, it is likely that members of the opposition party will be much more likely to take NASA and the Administration to task than has been the case in recent years.

On the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, Alan Mollohan (D-WV) is the ranking member and the likely new chair. Watch IV&V get healthier. And of course, Bud Cramer (D-AL) will be there to push for MSFC's interests. Alas, Rep. David Obey (D-WI) is seen by many as a likely chair for the full committee and he is not a fan of NASA.

On the House Science Committee, Bart Gordon (D-TN) is all but certain to be the new Committee chair - good news for MSFC as well. Mark Udall will likely be the chair of the subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics - good for Lockheed Martin and Ball Aerospace. Michael Honda (D-CA) was reelected meaning that ARC will have a seat at the table. With Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) hammering her opponent and Nick Lampson returning to Congress (likely seeking to rejoin the Committee as well) JSC will be well represented.

Right now it is uncertain whether the Senate will flip to Democratic control. Indeed it may be days before this is clear - one way or the other. If it does change parties, then NASA will most certainly find its senior leadership under greater scrutiny than it has been under the management of the President's party. Stay tuned

Another Curious Omission

Speech by NASA Administrator Griffin at the NASA Langley Colloquium Series Sigma Public Lecture Series

Editor's note: Curiously, in this presentation made at LaRC today, Griffin cites a speech by OSTP Director Marburger, the President's original January 2004 VSE presentation, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. Yet no specific mention is made of the new National Space Policy quietly released 2 weeks ago - a document strong on national security and defense.

Yet in his speech today, Griffin said "In our time, while we certainly recognize that the United States will be only one nation among many on the space frontier, we have learned that "security" can involve much broader concerns than competition among nation-states." and then went into discussing defense from asteroid impacts.

Why not cite the new White House policy? This would be a perfect place to do so. Its almost as if Griffin was trying to distance himself and the agency from the military posturing that pervades the new policy document.

A Cogent Reaction to the New Space Policy

Belligerent Tone Mars U.S. Administration Space Policy, Lou Friedman, Planetary Society

"The policy is officially a revision of the policy issued ten years ago by the Clinton Administration and, in content, it makes relatively minor changes from previous U.S. policy.  But is not the content that has attracted so much attention—it is the tone in which it is expressed.  It is belligerent and bellicose, and reminiscent of a schoolyard bully."

Editor's note: Finally, someone has taken the time to craft a response to the new space policy that is well written and doesn't rely on inaccurate arm waving (Bill Nye) or misquotes (NY Times).

What continues to puzzle me is why the White House tossed this policy out the back door the day before a 3 day weekend, that it took NASA a week before it even posted a link to the text of the policy on its website, and how its Administrator has apparently been silent about the very existence of the new policy.

This is quite a contrast from what was done in January 2004 when the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) was rolled out with grand pomp and flourish by the White House. Yet this new policy does not even reference the VSE ! It is almost, as as Friedman notes, "as if the White House was hoping no one would notice."

Given the political issues that will beset the Bush Adminstration in a few days, I doubt if any of the issues Friedman and others find troublesome (yes I also think that the policy engages in far too much chest thumping) will ever be implemented. And the point will be moot in January 2009 anyway. What does concern me more are the overt anti-science actions being taken right now by Mike Griffin - either at the direction of - or as a result of a lack of attention from - the White House.

As such, I am in full agreement with Friedman's last paragaraph:

"What I am saying is that the way you express yourself counts.   One of the mysteries in our Save Our Science battle with NASA is why Administrator Griffin has been so hostile in his comments about scientists and the science program.  He could have taken all the same actions with a simple (albeit gratuitous) statement to the effect, "I share your pain."   Instead, he has virulently and defensively rejected the pro-science argument.   Language counts – and he too is sending a message." 

Space Policy Is Not on Tony Snow's Top Ten List

Press Briefing by White House Press Secretary Tony Snow 20 October 2006: NASA Excerpt

"Q Tony, can you say a few words about the new Bush space policy that was released, strangely enough, on a Friday afternoon before Columbus Day, on the website of the Office of Science and Technology --

MR. SNOW: You mean the strategy that, strangely enough, was announced in July?

Q No, it was put on the website on the weekend of Columbus Day."

Bill Nye Is A Little Confused

Asking for Trouble, Creepy, and Weird, Bill Nye, Planetary Society

"Yesterday, the United States government established new laws for its "space policy."

Editor's note: Actually Bill, the White House issued the document two weeks ago - see White House Issues New Space Policy Document, posted here on 6 October, for details.

In addition to being confused about when this policy was released, Nye is confused about some other things as well.

If you read the second paragraph of this posting you will see that Bill Nye (aka "The Science Guy") is somewhat confused about what different sorts of satellites do. First he says that he skeptical that "killer satellite" technology exists (even though it has been demonstrated) - and then substantiates that claim (and confuses that issue) by citing difficulties with the means whereby remote sensing satellites and aircraft are used to determine whether North Korea conducted a nuclear test. I am not certain how the maturity of killer satellite technology affects remote sensing or vice versa.

Amidst all of his arm waving and use of terms such as "creepy" and "weird" and a statement that "This new policy brings out the worst". It is disturbing and a cause for concern", it would seem that Nye's point is that he is suspicious about the need for the U.S. to defend itself against hostile entities who might use space and space based assets to threaten us. Yes this document does a lot of chest thumping, perhaps too much, but rhetoric should not be used as a reason to dismiss a very real threat.

I guess Nye has forgotten how ballistic missiles work - and where they have to go on their way to reaching their target i.e. space. It was also recently revealed China is using ground-based lasers to monkey with our satellites. The threat is real and it cannot be ignored.

In this broad condemnation of the new space policy Nye utterly ignores the remainder of the document, which includes, among other things, a very strong statement on "developing space professionals".

In essence, Nye clearly misses the point: this document is titled as a "national space policy" not a "NASA space policy". There is a clear difference between the two. Although it is rather odd that the Vision for Space Exploration gets no mention whatsoever.

If he wants to see what Congress thinks about NASA's priorities, Nye might want to read the NASA Authorization Act of 2005. The White House signed off on this "NASA space policy" too.

Editor's note: Bill Nye writes: "To whom it may concern: Regarding the commentary regarding my blog posting on the Planetary Society site:

• I am not skeptical that there are space-based weapons; I am skeptical that governments of countries such as China, Japan, India, or North Korea have them and therefore pose a threat to the United States.
• I made no mention of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
• I wrote "yesterday," which was inaccurate. My comments were in response to coverage of announcements about the policy which were published the previous day."

Editor's note: Nye's comments not withstanding, I still think that Nye is confused and somewhat uninformed about the topics he addresses in his posting. Some additional research on his part would be advisable.

Dave King is Cloning NASA HQ Strategic Communications

NASA MSFC Solicitation NNM06169943R: Final RFP (excerpts) - Office of Strategic Analysis and Communications Support Services

Editor's update: It certainly looks like Dave King has decided to create his own version of what NASA Headquarters is supposed to be doing in terms of Strategic Communication, including direct interaction with Congress.

"Enabling message-sharing and exchange to promote an accurate and positive representation of Marshall throughout NASA and the external community with communication products and services"

"Support the strategic research & analysis function to include concentration on Agency, legislative, political, economic, social, technological, and macro- and micro- event monitoring relevant to Marshall's mission assignments;"

"External audiences include: Congressional Delegations / Elected Officials / Executive Branch Offices; Aerospace Industry Primes and Contractors; Department of Defense (DoD); Local and Regional Communities; and International, National, and Local Media."

"5.3.3 The contractor shall promote key message sharing and exchange by transmitting critical messages and decisions from senior management to those who need it; incorporating key messages and decisions that represent the Agency's vision and mission; implementing a broad range of communication vehicles to reach the Marshall stakeholders; and supporting extensive political and public outreach initiatives."

MSFC Has Its Own HQ Policy Functionality, Earlier post

NASA MSFC Solicitation: Office of Strategic Analysis and Communications Support Services

NASA HQ Media Access Update

Letter From Space Journalists to NASA Administrator Griffin Regarding Recent Security Policy Changes at NASA Headquarters

"As journalists who cover NASA, we are deeply concerned about the new policy effective October 1 barring all news media from entering headquarters in Washington without an escort from the Office of Public Affairs. This policy, made without consultation with the media, runs directly counter to the space agency's longstanding tradition and reputation for openness and cooperation with reporters and editors."

White House Issues New Space Policy Document

U.S. National Space Policy, Office of Science and Technology Policy

"The President authorized a new national space policy on August 31, 2006 that establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities. This policy supersedes Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, dated September 14, 1996."

Note to Center Directors: Don't Do An End Run Around Mike Griffin

NASA STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT COUNCIL
Meeting Minutes and Actions

VITAL MEETING DATA
Date: 15 June 2006
Time: 12:30 p.m. – 4:55 p.m. (EDT)
Location: NASA Kennedy Space Center, Headquarters Building, 4th floor conference room

First Item of Business: Agency Strategy Discussion

Mike Griffin led the members is a discussion of the need for everyone to fully adopt and support the Agency's strategic plan.

• One Agency plan: Griffin reminded members that NASA now has a strategic plan, one that has the support of the Administration and Congress. He encouraged members to get in touch with him directly if they did not understand or accept any part of that plan.
• Leaders are accountable: Griffin informed leaders that NASA's future success depends on their support of the plan; he holds members accountable for the behavior of their organization or center staff members who are working independent agendas on Capitol Hill to obtain earmarks favorable to specific programs or centers. Griffin provided several specific examples as evidence that NASA staff members or contractors are going around the chain-of-command to Congress.
• Open forums for disagreement and discussion: Griffin observed that in his four times at the Agency, NASA now has the most open forum for discussion and disagreement. Disagreement and discussion creates a healthy tension and ensures that issues are considered from all sides. He encouraged members to use council meetings to raise objections and argue issues. He reminded members that discussions lead to a decision point with winners and losers. He expects winners and losers to support the decisions made with equal grace. Media interviews, congressional appearances, contractor meetings present opportunities for members or their staff to advance NASA's plan, not express private opinions.

Griffin Announces NAC 2.0

NASA Announces New Advisory Council Members

"NASA Administrator Michael Griffin named nine new members to the NASA Advisory Council on Friday, including Dr. Edward David, Jr., Chair of the Science Committee, and Dr. Paul Robinson, Chair of the new Space Operations Committee. The NASA Advisory Council (The "Council") consists of six committees, Aeronautics, Audit and Finance, Exploration, Human Capital, Science, and Space Operations. Council Chairman Harrison H. Schmitt welcomed the new members."

Editor's note: Alas, NASA's website still lists the old members. Yes, I know, websites are soooooo hard to update.

Talking to the Press - Final Regs

NASA 14 CFR Part 1213: Release of Information to News and Information Media - Final rule

"The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is amending NASA regulations on release of information to news and information media. These amendments will establish NASA policy, responsibility, and procedure for providing information to news media on NASA activities. These amendments set forth procedures for internal review of public information, updates the designations of officials responsible for the accuracy of information contained in press releases and other forms of public information, and provides guidance to employees on authorities governing the release of information."

Being In (and Out) of Alignment at NASA

NASA's Goals Delete Mention of Home Planet, NY Times

"In early February, the statement was quietly altered, with the phrase "to understand and protect our home planet" deleted. In this year's budget and planning documents, the agency's mission is "to pioneer the future in space exploration, scientific discovery and aeronautics research."

NASA's Mission (1 Letter) [by Mike Griffin], NY Times

"Deletion of the phrase "protect our home planet" from the 2006 strategic plan brought it into alignment with our statutory responsibilities and actual capabilities. Indeed, it was not clear that inclusion of the phrase made sense in the first place, since it raised questions that NASA is not able to address."

Editor's note: Oh c'mon, Mike, this is just silly. The things that your predecessor did had the same White House approval as the things that you say and do today. OMB and OSTP go over all this policy stuff with a fine toothed comb before they sign off on releasing these plans - and you know it. The previous wording was just as much "in alignment" with the mood the White House was in at the time - when your Deputy Administrator worked there. If it wasn't they never would have signed off on the original document in the first place.

As for what the phrase "protecting our home planet" means, it would certainly seem that these folks - and Congress - understand what part of the phrase entails (in addition to the officially taboo 'theory' of global warming).

Near-Earth Object Detection, Characterization, and Threat Mitigation Workshop

NEO News (06/30/06) XP14 and NASA NEO Workshop, NASA ARC

"On June 26-29, nearly one hundred scientists, engineers, astronauts, and managers from NASA, industry, and academia met in Colorado for an informal workshop to discuss how best to respond to NASA's new Congressional mandate to survey and characterize sub-km-diameter NEAs in order to understand and mitigate the threat of impacts by such objects."

SFF on Griffin's VSE Plan: You Can't Get There From Here

Unaffordable and Unsustainable: NASA's Failing Earth-to-orbit Transportation Strategy - A Policy White Paper of the Space Frontier Foundation

"In developing this strategy, NASA has apparently ignored key elements of the White House's Space Exploration Policy and several critical recommendations of the President's Commission on Implementation of U.S. Space Exploration Policy ("President's Commission"). Instead of planning its exploration transportation in a way that maximizes economic (and national security) benefit, NASA is working with its incumbent contractors to develop a series of government-designed and owned space exploration transportation systems to service ISS as well as explore the Moon."

Comments? Send them to nasawatch@reston.com Your comments thus far:

For those suggesting that the SFF has anything good to say about the Big 3 (Boeing, Lockheed, and Northrop), I offer the following paragraph, right out of their ExSum:

"We will show that NASA can expand its timid outreach to America's NewSpace industry (most notably its underfunded Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS) program) to solve the near-term challenges of minimizing the "gap" and affordably servicing ISS. Furthermore, we will show that turning over low Earth orbit (LEO) space operations to NewSpace is the only way NASA can focus its talents and resources on returning humanity to the Moon and achieve the goals of the VSE in an affordable, sustainable and credible manner. Also, turning LEO over to NewSpace will broaden the U.S. space exploration community, grounded in the traditional American values of free enterprise, entrepreneurship and opportunity that opened our first frontier of the West."

Typical alt-space rhetoric, but "NewSpace" does not strike me as shorthand for the folks from Boeing, LM, or NGC.

The ulterior motive for the SFF paper may or may not be to reopen COTS to another round of competition. I don't know. But the opinions expressed in this piece shouldn't be dismissed as a mere tirade from a disgruntled group of losing proposers. We at NASA should recognize that this paper reflects some real concerns being voiced from many outside the agency.

I for one didn't read anything indicating that the SFF does not acknowledge NASA's importance to VSE. Rather, I saw a strong recommendation for NASA and industry to segregate their roles along the lines of what they do best. Industry should spearhead the first step of developing reliable, cost-effective access to low earth orbit, because this area has the most immediate potential to become a commercially viable market. Taking advantage of existing U.S. launch assets, such as the Atlas and Delta, may make a lot more sense than building a new, government-owned asset based on the most complex, operationally-intensive launch system in history. NASA, on the other hand, should concentrate on what it does best - conducting missions and developing systems and key technologies that may not have an immediate or obvious commercial application. Most would probably agree that lunar missions, space science missions, and advanced spaceflight technology fall into this category.

This philosophy started gaining steam during the Clinton years, and reached a full crescendo with Admiral Steidle and the original implementation of VSE. This philosophy was promulgated with a heavy dose of DOD acquisition strategy, which together clashed with the traditional NASA culture and way of doing business. It required simultaneous execution of a broad set of programs spanning research, technology development, flight system development and operations. Many felt that this approach, with its heavy reliance on large technology demonstrations and competitive fly-offs, would weigh down execution of VSE and result in an unnecessarily protracted effort. But the main reason why it failed to gain traction was that it emphasized industry involvement in all aspects of the program, at the expense of NASA's considerable in-house technical expertise. This didn't fly well with the congressional delegations that had NASA centers and support contractors as their constituents.

Enter Dr. Griffin - a man on a mission with a clear vision of what was needed to get U.S. space exploration back on track. His engineering and technical know-how has rightly dazzled us to the point that many have likened his appointment to a "second coming" - an answer to their prayers for the agency to recover the focus it had during its early years. However, the result has been an all-consuming focus on the near-term job of replacing an aging Shuttle fleet with a new vehicle that is supposedly simpler and safer to ride into orbit. Apart from closing out Shuttle and international obligations to ISS, everything else has become secondary.

The truth is that the NASA of today cannot go back to what it was before. The socio-political environment that spawned NASA has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. In the late-1950's and early 1960's, the country was willing to "open the spigot" to a young, maniacally focused NASA in order to beat the Soviet juggernaut and gain the high ground of space. We are now in an environment where the competition has become more economic, and our leadership in launch services is quickly eroding thanks to the subsidized efforts of other countries.

If we go back to the way things were done in Apollo, we starve the U.S. launch industry, while keeping NASA in a business line that diverts it from the core VSE mission. The SFF is right on in this respect, and we need to heed the message.

The people bashing this white paper are NASA bureaucrats trying to maintain the status quo, which in my opinion is doomed to fail just as the white paper predicts. These are not "COTS losers" representing small companies trying to muscle in on NASA funding (maybe they are, but they are NOT saying give it to us little guys). They clearly state that we should be purchasing LEO services from industry, including the big aerospace companies currently providing EELV services to DoD, NASA and industry. They are saying that ALL American companies old and new, big and small, be given the chance they deserve. I believe that US industry has proven its ability to provide reliable launch services to LEO. Their point is that there is plenty of room in this business for all. Let industry provide crew and cargo delivery to LEO (a 45-year old business) and let NASA work on exploration systems to get us back to the Moon and Mars.

They are right about one thing, NASA will spend hundreds of billions just getting back to the Moon and more that a trillion by the time we get to Mars. You may laugh now, but remember my words in 20 years. I know, I have worked for NASA long enough to know that if they say it will cost X, it will cost between 3X and 10X. Griffin freely admitted $104 billion through 2018 jsut to get to the Moon, so $300 billion to get to the Moon by 2025 or 2030 would be par for the course for NASA. The CLV cost of using the "existing SRB" has already tripled from $1 billion to $3 billion. I would bet my sweet bippy that EELV could provide the entire CLV, not just the first stage, for $3 billion. The person who said "show me some flight-proven hardware, and demonstrable systems engineering expertise, and then I'll listen to their pitch" apparently didn't read the white paper with an open mind. Boeing and Lockheed both have flight-proven hardware and systems engineering expertise far greater than in-house NASA. NASA hasn't built anything in over 25 years, and even then they hired Boeing and Lockheed to build it.

What NASA needs to do is say to industry, here are my high level requirements for LEO access and I will pledge $2 billion per year in development costs thru 2010 and will then buy $1 billion per year in launch services after 2010. This would be much cheaper than the current CEV-to-ISS effort. NASA could then focus on getting to the Moon with the remainder of its Exploration budget NOW. I know that industry, particularly Lockheed and Boeing, could meet this challenge. We can either pay them as competing suppliers or as sole-source suppliers through the current plan of the VSE. I choose the former. History has shown that competing suppliers are ALWAYS more cost effective than sole-source suppliers.

If NASA continues its business as usual, the VSE will fail without a doubt. This may be our last chance to get it right, and we are doing it all wrong. I just hope that it doesn't fall apart before I can retire.

The document itself is a very poor read with its lack of logic and misleading quotes, to say nothing of the numerous errors in it. I have never seen such a poorly written "White Paper". What I wonder though is which of the COTS losers paid the space frontier Foundation to front this document? Its nothing but a bald attempt to force NASA politically to fund a new round of COTS funding so the losers could try again to get NASA money for their pet projects.

The sad part is they hope to do it by stealing the money from the CEV, eliminating any hope of an early Shuttle replacement. This is the same strategy they used to undermine the X-33, SLI and OSP, putting us in the mess we are in today. If anything NASA should pull ALL of the COTS funding now and use it to accelerate the Block 1 CEV. Perhaps the funds could be used to conduct some of the studies the GAO has just recommended before awarding CEV contracts. In any case it would be put to far better use then having firms that have never even built an orbital launch system build the Shuttle's replacement.

Keith - Great site; keep it up.

In reaction to some of the later posts on the SFF paper, the comment that "NASA's track record on bold space exploration initiatives is appalling" apparently was written by someone who has missed the reality that NASA, DOD, and the US aerospace industry are the organizations that have:

A) Made HSF in LEO operationally routine;
B) Made EVA in LEO operationally routine;
C) Made planetary and lunar exploration, via flyby, orbital observation, and surface landing and exploration, operationally routine;
D) Made HSF-related on-orbit assembly and check-out in LEO operationally routine;
E) Made earth-orbital satellite operations, in LEO, GEO and otherwise, operationally routine;
F) Made liquid- and solid-fuelled launch vehicle utilization operationally routine; and
G) Made systems engineering the standard in aerospace design and manufacturing;

And this is not even pointing out the American system of civil service/military/industry/university partnership is what got the human race to the Moon, soft landings on Mars, and orbital surveys of every planet - but one - in the solar system, all in the course of less than 50 years of dedicated scientific research, engineering development, and mission operations into the science and practice of astronautics.

In that same period, a grand total of four manned spacecraft, two American and two Russian, have been lost operationally; which, given the miles covered and hours flown, is a jaw-droppingly successful record, for both countries - neither of which, of course, relied on libertarian space cadets or venture capital millionaires to accomplish.

The above record is undeniable - the only way that the only two space-faring nations of note in human history have succeeded is by making astronautics a public - not private - responsibility, and by requiring a "national" partnership of government, industry, the military, and academe.

The same, of course, applies to China, which is the only other country to manage a manned orbital flight.

There is absolutely no evidence, from the histories of astronautics OR aeronautics, that it can be done any other way; and for those who think "prizes" are the way to go, the idea that transcontinental or transoceanic aircraft capable of carrying a useful payload would have come into existence without the impetus of publicly-(i.e., government) funded research and development, procurement, and operational use, need to read some history - 1914-18 and 1939-45 especially.

Enthusiasm is one thing; denial of the laws of nature, engineering, economics, and political reality are another.

While there are many points made here that merit discussion, the central argument is irrefutable: NASA's track record on bold space exploration initiatives is appalling (witness the Shuttle and ISS) and they are utterly incapable of accomplishing the VSE goals unless a radical transformation is undertaken. This by the way, is by NASA's own admission as well as the President's Commission Report.

The SFF White Paper is simply pointing out that there has been no profound transformation and that NASA has reverted to the "business as usual" model. It is a reasonable extrapolation to expect the same results we are sadly accustomed to: massive budget overruns, decades of schedule slippage, and a continuing erosion of the scope of the mission until we wake up decades later and realized that we wasted billions of dollars and decades of precious time... Oh wait, all this has happened already and we did not wake up: We are embarking on the exact same path.

Those who argue that relying on private space is naive and unrealistic must concede that this is merely their opinion, while relying on "business as usual" has proven multiple times to be an abject failure. Private space should be given a chance to prove them wrong.

What's the worst that can happen? Private space will fail to implement VSE, but in the process of failing it will have grown a new industry.

If we allow NASA to stay on the path they have chosen, they will surely fail, and in the process, they will have replaced the Space Shuttle with Space Shuttle II (maybe).

After reading the summary of this "white paper" I realized it was a tirade against NASA and all of its contractors offering no facts to back up their conclusions. The only thing I got out of it was anger. I didn't know where to begin to refute its findings. So, I downloaded the entire document to understand their reasoning. It was written like a propaganda document, not a balanced examination of the pros and cons of NASA's choices. It reminded me of TV shows on UFOs. The presenter presents an out there conjecture, then in the next scene, states it again, this time as a fact, as the building block for the next conjecture. By the end of the show, UFOs are an obvious fact.

The next question is why. A glance at the board reveals COTS losers, Gerard K. O'Neill and Robert Zubrin followers, and science fiction professionals. While I may not agree with their approach, the authors and the people who paid for it are thinking space professionals with a valid view of the future. OK, they don't like big government and NASA, but what are they really saying?

I came away from this with the feeling the authors do not think big government and its contractors can accomplish this mission or any large program and that space should be left 100% to small companies. It does not seem sufficient to them for small companies to be encouraged and subsidized to develop technologies and systems. They seem to suggest the entire space program should be handed over to smaller firms and the entire NASA budget should be converted to a $15b annual subsidy.

While this approach has worked in some sectors, it has also had spectacular failures. Setting the transformational risk, financial and human costs aside, if small companies suddenly become our source of space transportation, those small companies will become large companies. Will we be better off while still accomplishing our objectives?

The SFF paper is a welcomed breath of fresh air. The points that it makes are right on the mark. In unabashed prose, it describes how NASA has clearly veered off course from the original purpose and intent of the President's Vision for Space Exploration (VSE).

As the report points out, NASA's current implementation of VSE has indeed become overly government-centric. Rather than focusing its near-term efforts on expanding the frontier, NASA has decided to concentrate on developing a system to replace the Shuttle and maintain NASA "home grown" access to low earth orbit. Although this effort is couched in the framework of returning to the moon and ultimately venturing to Mars, it clearly steps on the toes of the struggling commercial launch market, which would gladly welcome the business.

Another consequence of this approach has been the dramatic erosion of NASA's space science programs and total elimination of important technology efforts. Over the last year, a cadre of NASA managers pining for the "glory days of Apollo" have systematically gutted NASA investments with an almost maniacal zeal. Ironically, these are the very science missions and technologies that would enable NASA to truly push at the frontier's boundaries.

Perhaps the most important point of the paper is that VSE was not intended to be an endorsement of Apollo and its approach. While Apollo was extremely successful in winning the Cold War battle of being first on the moon, it is no model for building a sustainable and economically viable space exploration program. The socio-political environment of today is totally different. NASA must trust in the ability of private enterprise to provide major portions of the infrastructure needed for exploration, while it focuses on the missions and technologies needed to sustain human presence beyond low earth orbit.

This stinks of another attempt to cash-in on a NASA program. This often seems to happen when someone gets a whiff of money to be made off NASA: they run to their congress-types to bully NASA, or to outright force it to do as they bid with new 'laws'. This is just the kind of profiteering crap that screwed up the Landsat program 20 yrs ago. If they REALLY have a good idea, why don't they go ahead, take the risk (like a REAL entrepreneur would) and pitch it to NASA on its own merits, instead of trying to foist it on them with arm-twisting and political maneuvering.

Until or unless an alt-space company designs, builds, and sucessfully operates a EELV or better class launch vehicle and a pressurized vehicle with soft re-entry capability from - at least - LEO, why should anyone take their opinions regarding HSF seriously?

NASA, DOD, and the aerospace industry routinely design, build, launch, and operate spacecraft - manned and unmanned - that are literally light years more complex than anything (Spaceship1 is a high altitude airplane, nothing more) that any alt-space type has yet to create and operate sucessfully. If and when anyone in altspace has a track record that even remotely approaches that of the Delta II for launch vehicles, Gemini for manned spacecraft, or Surveyor for planetary exploration, then they can offer their version of how the US should best maintain its national interests in space.

Show me some flight-proven hardware, and demonstrable systems engineering expertise, and then I'll listen to their pitch.

Of course "NASA is working with its incumbent contractors." The "standing army" of space shuttle support personnel work in states near and dear to the Bush administration and to powerful congressional representatives. It seems clear that technical decisions are being based on the need to appease the politicos by avoiding the layoffs of NASA personnel and contractors that would be needed if we started from a clean sheet of paper. Technical creativity and market forces are being ignored in the process.

The same thing happened in Aeronautics where the budgets and Center splits were established well before the technical requirements were identified and the content of the new Programs and Projects was formulated. So much for the "pursuit of technical truth" that is ballyhooed by leaders in our Agency. Sigh...

I find it very interesting that some of the board members of the Space Frontier Foundation work for firms that lost in the first round of COTS. Now they are calling for a new round of COTS, taking the money from real space firms with real engineers who have actually built space vehicles, not just viewgraphs and hype. I wonder if the Space Frontier Foundation would have issued this paper if they won?

I read the SFF paper. While I think it does have some merit, I think it toots the horn of the alt.space crowd a bit too loudly.

While I think that NASA should eventually buy servies such as LEO astronaut lofts, I don't think any of the COTS suppliers will be ready anytime in the next 5-10 years even with greater spending.

NASA needs to throw the COTS gang a bone and get them started. To use an analogy,railroads expanded greatly when they began to carry the mail. Space tourism isn't going to pay the bills…yet. Remember that most of ailine travelers are indeed business people. The COTS spacecraft are a great way to jump start a developing space industry. They're just not going to be ready in the timeline stated by the SFF or NASA.

I didn't need to read further than this line-

America is the world's most powerful nation and the world's leader in high-tech innovation because we are better at capitalism, not because we are better at socialism.

SFF apparently doesn't realize that this kind of empty, 'commie-baiting' demagoguery is a relic of the past. If this is the argument they have to use, they've got nothing. They're ideological, therefore irrational. The world has moved on in the last seventeen years; and the fossils at the SFF needs to get with the program. Nothing to see here folks, let's move along.

As much as some parts of the SFF white paper (including the title, which almost conveys a sense of "marketing hype") initially caused me to bristle, I must say that in most respects, the observations and recommendations are right on target.

While there is no denying NASA has encountered difficulties in working through the details of the VSE -- these are the inevitable difficulties you would encounter in attempting to implement a complex plan. It seems to me that the "White Paper" recommendations are so transparently self-serving that they cannot be taken seriously. Effectively, they are just saying give us all the money. Please. Give me a break. More to the point, give the American people a break. I don't think Griffin or the other NASA people are complete idiots -- which they would have to be if you take this critique at face value.

Attention All Space Policy Wonks

GMU Short Course on The U.S. Government Space Sector

"For the fourth year George Mason University, with the co-sponsorship of the American Astronautical Society and the Space Foundation, is offering a short course on "The U.S. Government Space Sector". Developed by the George Mason University School of Public Policy, Center for Aerospace Policy Research, the course will provide an overview of the departments and agencies, both civil and military, involved with U.S. Government space programs."

NASA Admits Error in Prohibiting Hansen Interview

NASA Admits Wrongdoing In Not Allowing Top Scientist To Discuss Climate Change Research

"Senators Susan Collins (R-ME) and Joe Lieberman (D-CT) have received written confirmation from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that a media request to interview a top official on his climate change views was wrongly denied. Collins and Lieberman raised concerns with NASA's alleged censorship of scientific views in a letter dated February 15, 2006, following media reports that Goddard Space Flight Center Chief Dr. James Hansen was prevented from fully conveying his findings."

Reader note: "Jim Hansen is at the Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York, not the Goddard Space Flight Center."

America's Space Programs - The View From CRS

CRS Report: U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial

"The Vision has broad implications for the agency, especially since most of the money to implement it is expected to come from other NASA activities. Consequently, NASA would need to shift funds away from aeronautics, space science, and earth science programs. It plans to reduce its workforce by over 2,500 people by FY2007."

NASA's New Communication Material Review Process: You Will Comply

NASA Internal Memo: Agency Messages, Tagline and Visual Design Guide Roll-out, NASA HQ

NASA Internal Memo: New Communication Material Review Process (plus charts), NASA HQ

"Everyone who creates material intended for communicating key messages or strategy for NASA, including education and outreach materials, should plan to participate in the new process. The web-based process is relatively simple to use and is available to anyone with access to the NASA network. As with any review process, sufficient time should be allowed to incorporate the process into your development schedule."

Editor's note: So far only complaints have been circulating around the agency about this process which seems to make the process of getting NASA information out more - rather than less - burdensome. Stay tuned. This is a work in progress.

Reinventing Past Facts

Editor's note: John Logsdon has a well written Op Ed titled "The Road Ahead for NASA" in the 17 January 2005 edition of Space News. The article makes some good observations and is well worth reading. Logsdon's affiliation with George Washington University and his service on the CAIB are mentioned at the bottom of the article. Curiously, even as he mentions a variety of recent political influences within his piece, he neglects to mention that he spent most of 2004 as a space advisor to the Kerry campaign.

I find it fascinating that someone as well known and oft quoted as Logsdon can write nice things about Sean O’Keefe and his management of NASA with a straight face when, a scant few months earlier, he was telling senior NASA officials, reporters, and aerospace company representatives that he thought O'Keefe had "overly politicized" NASA, that the vision was not a serious effort, that the people he was bringing into the agency were not up to the task, and that when (if) Kerry won there would have to be a "house cleaning" at NASA.

In the same issue of Space News, a reader takes issue with another Kerry campaign space advisor - Lori Garver - and her contention that she has always supported the President's Vision for Space Exploration, when in fact, she has not - as the letter writer and I have pointed out.

People should certainly be allowed to be wrong or change their minds - even people who are regularly interviewed by the press. There is nothing wrong with that - so long as they are honest about being wrong or changing their minds. Alas, Logsdon and Garver seem incapable of doing so.

C'mon John and Lori, fess up.

Speaking Out - A Double Edged Sword

Putting Some Heat on Bush - Scientist Inspires Anger, Awe for Challenges on Global Warming, Washington Post

"[James E.] Hansen, a lifelong government employee who heads NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York, has inspired both anger and awe in the nation's scientific and political communities since publicly denouncing the Bush administration's policy on climate change last year."

2004: It was a very good year

A tale of two victories, James Muncy, Space Review

"Two "good news" space stories of 2004 stand out in particular as possible breakthroughs for humanity's future in space, perhaps especially because they occurred in a city not always judged as foresighted: Washington, DC. Both of these developments were surprising—and arguably unprecedented—political victories for fragile new space enterprises seeking support from the US Congress in an especially partisan election year."

Roadblocks for Prizes

2 December 2004: Analysis: Congress impedes NASA prizes, UPI

"NASA is embarking on a bold new strategy to spur new private investment in spaceflight technology. If the effort succeeds, it could transform both the agency and the U.S. aerospace industry, but first there is the matter of congressional authority to overcome."

O'Keefe Letter to WIA/WSBR Space Policy Debate

14 October 2004: Letter from Sean O'Keefe to Organizers of Washington Space Policy Debate

"Since the announcement of the Vision, I have regularly briefed the President and Vice President on NASA’s progress in its implementation. The President has provided the leadership essential to set our Nation on a course for a bold future in space. Now it is up to us in the aerospace community to make this Vision a reality."

Is it OK to accept free shrimp?

26 August 2004: NASA JSC Standards of Ethical Conduct Determination: Reception at University of Houston Clear Lake honoring Rep. Tom DeLay, NASA JSC

"On August 24, 2004, the University of Houston System is hosting a reception honoring The Honorable Tom DeLay, Majority Leader, U.S. House of Representatives, at the Atrium II, Bayou Building, University of Houston-Clear Lake, 2700 Bay Area Boulevard, from 5:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Complimentary hors d'oeuvres will be served. There will also be a cash bar."

Editor's note: Word has it that this reception is under scrutiny for possible use of state funds.

What Does John Kerry See When He Looks to the Heavens?, OpEd, The Washington Dispatch

"Senator Kerry is not shy of assuming the mantle of John F. Kennedy and even of his Apollo Moon landing challenge. In his acceptance speech, Kerry said, "A young president asked what if we could go to the moon in ten years? And now we're exploring the solar system and the stars themselves." Kerry's problem is that he lacks KennedyÕs substance when in comes to space exploration."

Read this OpEd: What Does John Kerry See When He Looks to the Heavens?, OpEd, The Washington Dispatch

Senate's NASA Authorization bill in limbo

25 July 2004: Deep Cuts Loom for NASA's Fiscal 2005 Spending Plan, Aviation Now

"A Senate Commerce Committee session to finish drafting the NASA authorization bill, which at least in theory mirrors the appropriations legislation, was postponed at the last minute July 22 for lack of time for the "very contentious" debate that committee chairman Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said he expected. The NASA markup will be rescheduled in September, he said."

Space Vision Funding hits roadblock

21 July 2004: Bush's NASA Plan Hits Speed Bump, Wired

"Despite these concessions, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas) called the cuts "unacceptable" and suggested that he would stop the bill from being passed if it remains in its current state. "Yes, we are at war, just as we were when Neil Armstrong walked on the moon. And yes, the budget is constricted," said DeLay in a statement. "But for four decades, America's mission in space has been one of the surest economic investments the federal government has made."

21 July 2004: Congress cuts funds to Bush's space plan, Houston Chronicle

"However, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, the Sugar Land Republican whose district includes NASA's Johnson Space Center, called the cuts "unacceptable," then warned: "It would be very hard to get this bill to the floor if it's unacceptable to me."

21 July 2004: Panel Cuts Bush's Budget Request for NASA, Washington Post

"The committee made it clear in its as-yet-unpublished report on the proposed legislation that it did not fully agree with the president's priorities: "While the committee is supportive of the exploration aspect of NASA's vision, the committee does not believe it warrants top billing over science and aeronautics," said the report, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post."

20 July 2004: Highlights of the FY05 VA-HUD Appropriations Bill, House Appropriations Committee

"NASA is funded at $15.1 billion, $229 million below last year and $1.1 billion below the request. The bulk of these savings come from the elimination of funding for new initiatives. The reductions include $30 million for technology maturation efforts; $230 million from Project Prometheus related to Jupiter Icy Moon Orbital; $438 million resulting from delaying the Crew Exploration Vehicle; and $100 million from Space Launch Initiatives by accelerating the termination of activities. The bill fully funds shuttle operations at the requested level of $4.3 billion. The committee fully funds Mars programs at the requested level of $691 million."

20 July 2004: Big Cuts to NASA's Budget Ahead?

Editor's note: According to CongressDaily AM "The House Appropriations Committee is planning to cut as much as $1 billion from President Bush's budget request for NASA, as part of a $92.9 billion FY05 VA-HUD appropriations bill to be marked up today .... That total is $2.1 billion over last year's enacted levels for the dozens of programs and agencies under the measure's jurisdiction, and a $2.5 billion increase is pledged to veterans' healthcare programs alone."

NASA Hold Prizes Workshop

B>16 July 2004: NASA Office of Space Exploration 2004 Centennial Challenges Workshop Report

"The 2004 Centennial Challenges workshop was held on Tuesday and Wednesday, 15 and 16 June 2004 at the Hilton Washington hotel. In attendance were representatives from big and small industry, aerospace and non-aerospace, universities, government, and interested individuals."

COngress hears about prizes

15 July 2004: Witnesses at House Science Committee Hearing Express Strong Support for Aerospace Prizes, House Science Committee

"While establishment of a NASA prize program is certainly worth considering, we should not be lulled into thinking that it is any substitute for providing adequate funding for NASA's R&D programs," cautioned Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member Nick Lampson (D-TX).

15 July 2004: Statement of Craig E. Steidle at House Science Committee Hearing on NASA Aerospace Prizes

"Congress is important to the success of Centennial Challenges. NASA has requested specific authority from Congress to conduct large prize competitions with purses up to $50 million in size and to retain funding for prize purses over multiple years. Both of these authorities are important to maximize the utility of Centennial Challenges."

15 July 2004: Hearing Charter: House Science Committee Hearing on NASA Aerospace Prizes

15 July 2004: Prepared Statement by Molly Macauley at a House Science Committee Hearing on NASA Aerospace Prizes

15 July 2004: Prepared Statement by Douglas Holtz-Eakin at a House Science Committee Hearing on NASA Aerospace Prizes

15 July 2004: Prepared Statement by Peter Diamandis at a House Science Committee Hearing on NASA Aerospace Prizes

Armwaving instead of researching

12 July 2004: Not quite exactly deja vu all over again, Dwayne Day, Space Review

"O'Keefe was apparently involved in drafting the new Vision, although his objections and contributions to the plan remain unknown. O'Keefe appears to be an enthusiastic supporter of the new policy. Even if his enthusiasm is partially an act, it could hardly be worse than the Space Exploration Initiative experience, where then NASA Administrator Dick Truly was widely reported to be completely opposed to the new policy."

Editor's note: Instead of just guessing about O'Keefe's involvement, questioning his motives, and jumping to conclusions, why not ask him (and others) Dwayne?

Get Ready for the Moon-Mars Blitz

8 July 2004: SEA release: Space Exploration Alliance Grows as Moon-Mars Blitz Nears, NSS

Editor's note: According to an email sent out by the Mars Society about this event "some 70 space activists visiting approximately 200 congressmen, senators, and congressional and Senatorial aides to convey to them a message of strong support for the new American space policy that refocuses the human spaceflight program on the goal of sending humans to the Moon, Mars and beyond." These folks paid their own way to Washington, and took off time from work and their lives to push for something they truly believe in. However, these 70 people represent 0.007 percent of the "million Americans" the Space Exploration Alliance proclaimed to count among its numbers - and is a vastly smaller portion of America's current population of 294,000,000. In some ways this was a great turn out. Viewed from other perspectives it could be seen as indicative of just how unimportant space is in terms of being a mobilizing force among the American electorate. Indeed, often times here in Washington, turnouts in the tens of thousands for political efforts are often referred to as "disappointing". By that standard this event doesn't even register.

Comments on the Aldridge Commission Moon-Mars Report? And NASA's Reponse to it?

Send them to nasawatch@reston.com

Your comments thus far:

As to the post describing some bizarre procurement behaviors at a NASA Center. If this is an accurate portrayal of the situation, it DOES NOT represent the procurement process I'm accustomed to at my Center. Also, we are not allow to supervise contractors, even in-house, we specify a product/service desired and metrics to measure the product as to compliance with the requirements. If the metrics are acceptable and the contractor product/service complies with the metrics then the product is accepted, if not, rejected. Sounds easier than it is actually. NASA civil service are not allowed to threaten contractors to keep them from working for anybody they so choose. So, the answer is yes this behavior is not complaint to FARs and other regulations, including ethics.

For those that think that just because the see one or two cases of unethical behavior then all Centers and all of NASA are unethical- they need to stop generalizing - just because you see someone stealing in any American city it does not mean that the entire city is populated with criminals. This is pure nonsense.

There have been several comments on this board about all the "subcontracting" that NASA already does. Well, most of those subcontracts fail to reap the benefits of subcontracting that the Aldridge report desires. The current system at NASA has hordes of subcontractors who live in-house at the NASA centers. They are directed by NASA personnel to defend internal NASA designs that would otherwise be uncompetitive with industry offerings. Given their relatively weak position, these subcontractors cannot speak their minds and cannot propose for other work with external organizations that might compete with NASA - they are held hostage. For their efforts, the subcontractors are given additional funding by NASA. I have seen several instances at a NASA center in which subcontractors were threatened with their jobs if they were going to work, or propose to work, with potential competitors to NASA. (Amazingly, I have even seen NASA personnel threatened for collaborating with "competing" organizations). Meanwhile, NASA continues to say, "Well, we outsource most of our work to subcontractors, so you can't say we are anticompetitive," while real subcontractors give up "competing" with NASA.

Note that the DoD FFRDCs have been criticized for their anticompetitive behavior in a very broad review in the late 1990's, so it is not clear this option would help.

It seems to me that it is key to separate the functions of procuring the product and creating the product. NASA should pick one and stick to it (presumably the former). Note that NASA imposes a rule on subcontractors that says that the subcontractor cannot procure a service that is offered by any part of that same organization through a subcontract secured through competitive bid. This rule is supposed to prevent some company from choosing itself for subcontracts in an open bid; however, NASA CENTERS ARE EXEMPT FROM THIS RULE - THEY CAN PROCURE ANOTHER DEPARTMENT IN THEIR CENTER IN A COMPETITIVE BID PROCESS. They often do procure products from their own groups *despite public votes within their projects favoring external industry*.

I have heard it claimed that there are many things that industry will simply not produce. The many examples of in-sourcing I have seen at NASA do not cover such cases. Instead, NASA centers are busy driving large sums of money back into their organizations to do work that many others are chomping at the bit to do (and do better, at that). They have already wasted approximately $100M on a multi-billion dollar future flight mission by driving all the early dollars into their own centers. Most of that work is now being redone by those more competent to do it in industry. Further, I am now seeing the same thing happen on another mission that is a bit further into the future. One way to determine whether industry are interested in a given opportunity is to announce the opportunity and see if anyone bids.

(By the way, does anybody know if the behavior described above conflicts with any law or regulation, i.e. FAR. If so, how would one report it?)

As a 20+ year NASA Civil Servant I have to respond to some of the vindictive comments by a few folks to this thread. The stereotype image some people apparently have of Civil Servants as lazy, close-minded people more interested in their paychecks than anything else is just not true--at least for the vast majority of us. Sure there are exceptions that fit the stereotype. I've seen at least just as many deadwoods in industry over the years.

The typical Civil Servant at NASA works very hard. The personnel in my group tend to work in excess of 40 hours most weeks. It's not unusual to work 50-60 hours in a week when necessary to get the job done. All those hours beyond 40 come without overtime pay for any of us at the GS13 and above level. Pretty much all engineers, scientists, and managers are at least GS13. Some do get Comp Time for these excess hours. Often these hours get lost because the time can't be found to take it off before these hours expire (Have to be used within 7 pay periods). Many more of us never even request comp time beyond 40 and just contribute our time beyond 40 to the taxpayer week after week.

So anyone who describes NASA Civil Servants as primarily concerned about getting 40 hours in and going home is either uninformed, lying, or just singling out a few while ignoring the rest of us.

OK y'all, here's how it looks from my knothole.

Somewhere around 85% of the the NASA budget goes to contractors now. I have worked with many of them and the contractor work force contains some of the most dedicated and honorable folks I've ever met. Unfortunately, their companies have figured out that the real money (what they're in business for after all) is in selling the government the first half of a project over and over again. How many times did we half build the Space Station. A certain Prime Contractor got rich several times over on that roller coaster and never delivered anything except stack upon stack of paper. It's simple, just wait until the easy money starts to dry up then leak to Congress that it's gonna cost x times more than promised. Instant stop work (with a very nice termination fee for the poor contract company) then come up with another boondoggle. And NASA management gladly cooperates by selling new work based on the absolute best case minimum cost scenarios.

Lord knows the CS system is far from perfect. Can't fire a non productive worker to save yourself. You also can't fire the whistle blower who rats you out when you put lives at risk by cutting corners or falsifying safety data. Pity to take that power out of the hands of some of our recent management isn't it. Let's just turn everyone into good little wage slaves like private industry. Then we can get rid of the troublemakers and get on with building our own empires. FYI it was those sorry CS NASA types that got your collective butts to the Moon 30 years ago and were ready to keep right on going. It was the American people through Congress that cut the budget and gave the order; been there, done that, got the rocks, now do something else; Oh and do it cheaper faster better cause we just cut your budget by half.

Private industry will save us! Yeah right. Private industry does not have the resources to risk on pipedreams like Moon/Mars. The payoff if there ever is one is much too far in the future for even the craziest of venture capitalists. The telecom satellite business took off when and only when it became a sure thing. Doesn't it say something significant that the X-prise is $10 million? That's not even gas money for a serious payload launch outside LEO. You have lots of underfunded hobbyists in competition to reach 100Km in a suborbital launch. More power to them, but all the dreamers crying for private development of space do not seem to have a clue what a huge leap it is from that first small step to something remotely useful let alone something with a positive cash flow. NASA has always had one legitimate mandate, to do those things that private industry can't or won't due to a lack of immediate return. Oh, and when we've paved the road and put up the streetlights, hand over ownership to U.S. companies to reap the profits. That's our job.

signed: just another lazy not so civil servant

Allowing NASA to continue to develop the primary means of human exploration would be a monumental waste of taxpayer (mine and yours) dollars. Where have they gotten us in the last 30 years? They should have been developing a reusable sub-orbital vehicles, which are just now being developed by private enterprise thanks to the Ansari X-Prize. Then work on a reusable orbital craft. These things could have been finished 15-20 years ago instead of wasting money on the shuttle (could have come later, and cheaper) the ISS (no ROI on our tax dollars yet, or in the future).

Strip NASA to the bare limits, use the money to prime the private entrepreneurial energies that exist within the citizenry to make the advancements needed for space exploration. Private industry knows better than to take "Giant leaps" because they are not sustainable. Example: What happened to the moon missions, what's happening to the shuttle and ISS programs now?

Focus on the steps that make it sustainable; Sub-orbital, orbital, intra-system each must be developed in turn so that it is cost effective, safe, efficient, and reliable. One at a time, in order. New technologies are not necessary for the first step, look at Space Ship One.

I think you're seeing what's wrong with NASA with most of the comments from the CS's so far. Having worked at a NASA center and now in the private sector I think all the folks worried about their prescious life time employment need to wake up. NASA is the most arbitrary part of the federal budget. If it were axed entirely the nation would continue unimpeded. So all you CS guys out there should go have another 2 hour lunch time run/walk, go on over to the cafeteria and have another 1 hours of coffee with your usual confidente's and then go on home at 4:30 while chalking up a full day. Enjoy the last of the free ride because hopefully it's coming to an end here soon. Don't bother jumping up and down and responding, because as you can see from the public response to going back to the moon and the aldridge report, nobody cares.

Regarding the commission s report, let s just call it like it is: a partisan report with partisan recommendations - A report that could have a very short shelf life - especially if the presidential administration changes this winter.

What troubles me more is NASA s top management approach after the report was made public. It is clear, that NASA management new what the recommendations were going to be and already had a game plane how to proceed before the report came out. We truly believe the vote for the best three recommendations was a farce. Anytime the directions tell you to only make positive comments - tells the workforce that management does not desire an open constructive exchange. After a branch level direct vote for the best three recommendations, there was a division level "representative vote", followed by a directorate level "representative vote", followed by a center level "representative vote", finally followed by an agency level "representative vote". I quote the term "representative vote" since I have know understanding how management reconciled the vote at each level. With so many levels to water down the best three recommendations direct vote, is it no wonder that NASA s workforce "culture" is afraid to speak up, and NASA s management culture appears afraid to listen to the workforce, and afraid to negotiate with the Whitehouse?

Personally, I feel like we are being railroaded! When we were directly voting for the best three recommendations, I remember one comment that we should vote for recommendations that could cause the least irreversible damage. From what I have heard and what I have experience, FFRDC are not the best way to go. The Goldin administration has shown us that cheaper, better, faster (actually it was cheaper, cheaper, cheaper - just deal with it) and more contracting out was clearly not best solution.

For the record, I have almost 20 years of a proven and successful federal service. I work in a region with many other federal agencies. From what I ve read about NASA s and the Federal Government s workforce needs, I fit into the category of highly needed. I know that can retain a job in the NASA aerospace industry if my job is (outsource or FFRDC), but at this point in my career, I definitely would look for other more rewarding work in the federal Government. Furthermore, I find it ironic that NASA s was worried about the large number of the workforce that is or will be very shortly able to retire. Therefore, requested from congress and received special recruiting and retention regulations (which have yet to be used) is now considering far more radical workforce changes - changes that will push much institutional knowledge out of the NASA workforce.

Please do not include my name.

I am a relatively new Civil Servant at GSFC, with too many years to count working in universities and contract science organizations. Fortunately, I have highly-marketable expertise. As such, all the talk of reorganization is probably just another name for "opportunity". The game, at a personal level and if the conversion to FFRDCs should happen, is to generate several offers and compete one organization off against another. This does not generate the lowest cost for the government, but that is how one negotiates. I also believe that it does not necessarily produce the best science when an organization forces its scientists to spend much of their time writing proposals, or to face management pressure to get the organizationally desirable result as opposed to the correct result, both of which tend to happen in the kind of entrepreneurial environment that the report aims to foster.

The more worrying thing about the Aldridge report to me is the utter vacuousness of what would actually be accomplished. If the report said that we were going to return to the moon by a hard date and within a specified cost cap, and then go to Mars under the same conditions, it would probably be bad for science, but at least a reasonable stab at program management. Instead, the report recommends a continuous burn "pay as you go" approach, with no clearly stated and quantified final product, significant milestones (e.g. A firm date for returning to the Moon), or justified information on the cost. This all but guarantees frittering away enormous amounts of time and money to accomplish much less than what was originally proposed. Examples of this kind of program management are the International Space Station and the Shuttle.

Equally troubling is the complete back seat that science takes in all of this. Item number 1 on the commissions charter was to make recommendations on the following.

1. A science research agenda to be conducted on the Moon and other destinations as well as human and robotic science activities that advance our capacity to achieve the policy.

In this regard, the best the commission could come up was to ask the National Academy to re-evaluate their priorities in light of the President s recommendation. I note that neither the NASA Administrator nor the President are trained scientists, nor particularly technical people. A quick reading of the names on the Commission turned up few, if any, who were National Academy material themselves. One entirely rational response on the part of the Academy would be to say that their priorities remain unchanged. My reading of the Aldridge report says that this would in many ways be the most responsible response on their part.

I find myself wondering what is going on here? It seems to me that the President asked the NASA Administrator to come up with a bold new vision to tell America about during the State of the Union Speech (a vision in line with his pre-existing agenda). In the end, the two MBAs came up with a management reorganization and a vague (but grand vision) having no clearly identified and quantitatively justified achievements/products, timetable, or cost. Isn t the Apollo or Manhattan Project model of allowing scientists and technologists to direct science and technology a better way to go?

Mr. O'keefe should perform at a comedy club doing a parody of adminstrator saying nothing for a half hour or so. He would have them rolling in the aisles.

Please do not display my name and organization.

Three Observations:

- The Aldridge Team members appear to be "Sean's Shills". They provided him with answers he was looking for without objective, in-depth analysis. JSF has enough problems to make its promotion as a "paradigm program" dubious; and DOE's FFRDC's have serious problems of their own (e.g., Los Alamos). And the recommendation that if NASA did more contracting out, some of its problems would be solved is laughable. NASA already contracts out 85-90% of its total budget. An additional 5-10% will hardly make a difference!

- Sean acted amazed that a NASA employee suggested during the Q&A session that all the hundreds (thousands?) of recommendations and action items that have flowed down for implementation over the past three years be distilled into one master, consolidated (and hopefully streamlined) list. This is not "Management 101"--- this is just, plain common sense! NASA Hdqs. would be far better served if it asked (not demanded) that a dozen (or fewer) initiatives be implemented rather than inundating a workforce that has been demoralized by stupid, self-serving surveys (NASA employees are now learning to lie when they take them just so as not to bring down more wrath/initiatives on themselves!) with a myriad of management fixes that should start at the TOP.

- It could be argued that NASA's main problem is lack of money. Give it even half the relative amount of funding it received during the Apollo years and most of its management, morale and performance problems would probably disappear!

[Do not include my name, just say. . .] One of the many, many NASA employees and contractors dedicated to giving their best to America and the quest for knowledge.

To Nasawatch --

As a layperson with a great deal of enthusiasm for space exploration, I must say that the Commission report struck me as a document pretty much intended to achieve virtually nothing.

Its rhetoric about "privatizing" various aspects of NASA as a cure-all struck me as extraordinarily vacuous. Either the Commission writers were just looking for a pretty way of saying they want to cut Federal employees, or, if they actually believe what they are saying, have -- like so many people in the current political climate -- read one too many books by Ayn Rand (or, given the context, Robert Heinlein) and come to the conclusion that if you *say* "privatization solves everything" enough times, it will magically become true.

But I won't be too hard on the Commission report, because its only job was to put some positive spin on the original Bush space policy -- which, if you read between the lines, was itself designed as a well-calibrated piece of spin on its one substantive policy position: to give a definitive end-point to the shuttle program. On all of its other proposals (moon, mars, etc.) it was remarkably commitment- and substance-free. It's hard to write a Commission report of substance on a policy which itself lacks substance.

However, insofar as the policy *did* give a definitive end-point to the shuttle program (and by implication, the ISS), it's a very good piece of decision-making: the shuttle and ISS had to go. In fact, I'd argue that most of NASA's much-discussed administrative problems will, if not disappear, at least be drastically reduced once the shuttle program is over and done with. People who talk about the need to restructure radically NASA's organization, or who go all ga-ga over the concept of "increased privatization", should consider the notion that it was precisely the attempt to design and sell the shuttle *as a money-maker* (in its re-usability, etc.) that has been twisting NASA in knots all these years. Take away the shuttle itself and you solve most of your problem.

Insofar as the Bush policy, and the Commission report that followed it, are *mainly* about ending the shuttle program, they're most welcome. One that program is safely canned, then, with luck, we'll be able to approach space exploration with clearer heads.

When that day comes, I'd like to see some more sensible discussion about unmanned exploration and its relation to the manned program, about which the Commission report was notably, if predictably, lacking in details. I find it sadly typical of NASA's cluelessness that post-Columbia and post-Bush Policy, one of NASA's first major decisions was to can the Hubble. This is just indicative of NASA's complete and utter blindness to where all its major successes have been coming from for the last thirty years: the unmanned program. Any Commission or report or whatever that does not affirm the success of this program loudly and clearly is just not doing its job, as far as I'm concerned. But NASA's boneheadedness and the Commission's relative silence are typical of the mentality held over from the space race / Apollo days, which thinks that space only becomes interesting when you put people in it. This is like saying that the only thing interesting about Mars is that we've got two rovers on it. Or that the only thing interesting about the moon is that we can send people to it. The interesting things about Mars, the moon, and space, is that they ARE Mars, the moon, and space -- not because we can put people there. That we CAN put people there is interesting, but it's a completely different kind of interest from the intrinsic interest of the places themselves -- and a sane space program should reflect that.

In a sane space program of the future, I foresee two possibilities. First, instead of competing with and muscling aside the unmanned program, the manned program should actually take its cue from the unmanned program. Let's send a zillion unmanned missions all over the solar system and then, on the basis of what we learn from them, decide where to send people. The unmanned program should lead, and the (more expensive and risky) manned program should follow. It's infinitely more sensible, both ethically and scientifically, than what we're doing now. Second, to throw a bone to those who *must* have more people in space, one could decouple the manned and unmanned programs from each other completely, so that the unmanned program would carry out all of the science missions, and the manned program would focus on one goal only: colonization. A colonization-oriented manned program could even do a good deal of its work on the ground, developing biospheres, habitats, and so on -- which would save tons of money. The point is that since our robots are very good and are only going to get better, the BEST reason to send a person to the moon or Mars will not be to do science, but to live there.

An unmanned program that does the science and a manned program that does the colonizing: now that's a space program I can get behind.

Maybe when the shuttle is finally decommissioned, things will move in that direction.

Over the years, I have worked with people from most of the NASA field centers. I even spent time at NASA headquarters. What I have concluded is very simple. Every center is very diverse from the other. There is no "One NASA". And this is a good thing. From diversity comes creativity. To see intelligent people attempting to apply a common fix to all field centers is very disappointing.

I'm an ex-NASA employee. I feel for the NASA folks, many of whom work hard for space, and don't always understand why people don't just give NASA funding and get out of their way. I felt that way myself. Being outside, though, gives one some perspective.

If you look at the big picture, you can see that NASA and it's contractors just do not work as built. The US has been outcompeted and lost significant market share in manned space (Russia), commercial development of manned space (Russia), airplanes (Airbus), boosters (Arianespace), and booster technology (USAF/EELV). All the US commercial firms who are using new technology either build it themselves (SpaceX, Scaled Composites, Boeing/EELV) or buy it from overseas (Lockheed/Russia). NASA contributes indirectly, if at all. All sorts of debates over launch technology are based on data from old projects NASA either cancelled or never explored (X-38, DC-X/DC-XA, pressure fed boosters, etc.). The work NASA does do either doesn't help industry at all, or does not help them economically, where they need it. The US investment in NASA is doing nothing for US industry, jobs, or the citizens. Having to bum a ride with the Russians does not help the Nation's imagination, and all this staggering lack of progress means that kids have no incentive to pursue space careers - so they don't. All this education propaganda and pie in the sky is wonderful, but there comes a time (late high school) when kids look around at the real world.

The alternative is not to turn over NASA's work to their contractors. That would be a disaster, as several have pointed out. However, NASA employees in particular are so used to the NASA/contractor relationship that they have a hard time seeing how competitive markets work, and work well. For instance, even though NASA folks are deathly afraid that Contractors will deliberately kill astronauts in pursuit of profits, they have a hard time noticing that the aviation industry, with NACA/NASA research, private manufacturing and operations, and FAA oversight, actually does produce very safe travel. Space is different, but not that different.

The Commission wants NASA to turn the work over to a market, NOT to the contractors - again, not the same thing. NASA today accepts private aviation cargo transport (e.g. DHL), the report wants them to accept private aerospace cargo transport. Congress tried to ease NASA into that with Assured Access, and NASA blew them off - and now, post-Challenger, it looks like Congress was right, and that NASA is incapable of helping out the commercial market without being compelled.

NASA and those afraid of these changes are missing two points: 1) NASA and space will never be sustainable until ordinary people can visit there and work there. Keeping the people in space limited to a very few selected by a hidden NASA process means that we and NASA are going nowhere. If little Jimmy can't get into space without seven PhDs and the okay of some mysterious NASA person, NASA is toast - we either won't get there or everyone will go around NASA, making NASA irrelevant (the latter has already started to happen). 2) As far as I can tell, NASA has transitioned from a very popular organization to one where only the people on it's payroll (or who make money by it somehow) support it. Everybody else wants to see NASA either radically changed, or eliminated and gotten out of the way (remember, space support does not equal NASA support). If NASA is not radically changed, it will continue to fail, and the next Commission will see unanimous testimony to get rid of it altogether.

It's time to change, folks, hard as that is to do. The NASA folks could be doing real exciting stuff, not endless rehashes of the same powerpoint presentations.

I believe the obvious solution is to strip out the manned space activities from NASA and ship the whole manned program and all the retired generals and admirals recently imported by NASA over to DOD. They have much greater flexibility (read dollars) and experience in turning high-tech programs into an operational capability. Make it a 6th branch of the military. Then let NASA do the base R&D and science that we have been historically good at.

A LaRC employee (for now!)

Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 13:12:25 -0700

To: "All Personnel"

From: Office of the Director

Subject: President's Commission on Space Exploration Report

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 17, 2004

TO: All JPL Employees and Contractor Personnel

FROM: Charles Elachi

SUBJECT: President's Commission on Space Exploration Report

This morning I held an all-hands meeting to discuss the report of the President's Commission on Space Exploration. I gave an overview of the findings and recommendations and asked all personnel to identify their top three most pressing recommendations from the report. You may access the recommendations survey and submit your feedback at http://vision.jpl.nasa.gov .

Submissions must be made by noon, tomorrow, Friday, June 18.

Here are some comments slightly sanitized by management forwarded up the food chain. I am sending this to you because I don't know how much of this will reach HQ, despite them having requested it. Each layer of management seems to filter more out. I would appreciate that it be credited only to some one at GSFC

Code 540/Mechanical Systems Division

Response to the Aldridge Commission Report

June 18, 2004

The Mechanical Systems Division would like to express their appreciation for the opportunity to comment on the June 16, 2004 report from the President's Commission on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy. The report outlines changes that will have far reaching effects on NASA, and specifically on the highly dedicated civil servants that have made this Agency the best in Federal Service.

The task as outlined by AETD management was to have each and every employee given the opportunity to review and comment on the Report, and then to pick the top 3 recommendations that should be implemented from the Report. Each Division was to respond by Noon, Friday, June 18. A meeting was held on the afternoon of June 16 to discuss the report with the Code 540 Branch heads or their designated representatives, and to give them direction to allow each Branch member to read the report. After giving each employee one day to read the report, Branch level meetings were held to give comments as to the top 3 Report recommendations that the employees felt should be implemented first. Another meeting was held on the morning of June 18 to collect the input from the Branch Heads. The top three recommendations as chosen by the collective Code 540 employees are as follow:

1) Recommendation 8-1 The Space Exploration Steering Council work with America's education community and state and local political leaders to produce an action plan that leverages the exploration vision in support of the nation's commitment to improve math, science, and engineering education. The action plan should:

• Increase the priority on teacher training;


• Provide for better integration of existing math, science, and engineering education initiative across governments, industries, and professional organizations; and


• Explore options to create a university-based "virtual space academy' for training the next generation technical workforce.

2) Recommendation 5-1 NASA aggressively use its contractual authority to reach broadly into the commercial and nonprofit communities to bring the best ideas, technologies, and management tools into the accomplishment of exploration goals;

3) Recommendation 8-2 Industry, professional organizations, and the media engage the public in understanding why space exploration is vital to our scientific, economic, and security interests.

Overwelmingly, the one singular comment from all the employees was that given only 1.5 days to read the report and provide comments, they were made to feel like their opinions while solicted weren't really going to be taken seriously. The comments as collected from each Code 540 Branch are included mostly in their untirety and unedited below.

1. My comments on the report revolve around Section II, Organizing the U.S. Government for Success. In summary, I would say:

1) Privatization of space access and mission support is a good thing, but it's not what's going to get us out of LEO. There are a lot of things we can and should do to help the private sector, but I think it's naive to beli