Jay Chabrow

before the

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

October 7, 1998

Chairman Sensenbrenner and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you once again to address challenges in developing the International Space Station (ISS).

As you recall, last spring I chaired an independent Cost Assessment and Validation (CAY) Task Force. This Task Force concluded that the ISS Program did not contain sufficient reserves to provide coverage for all prospective technical and schedule risks inherent in such a high-risk, research and development program. In June of this year, I testified that NASA had largely accepted the Task Force's recommendations. NASA agreed that specific actions identified in the CAV Report could reduce risk and minimize the potential for schedule slippage, but specified that the details would be addressed with its FY2000 budget submission.

Although at present I am not engaged in the daily monitoring process which was necessary to generate the CAV report, I have at the Administrator's request continued to actively participate with NASA in the monitoring and evaluation of the ISS program and have continued to serve on the Advisory Committee on the International Space Station.

The Committee has asked that I comment on the likelihood that NASA's approach of procuring goods and services from Russia will solve Russia's persistent inability to meet its obligations. Having minimal insight into the proportion of RSA funding that is derived indirectly from other Russian governmental sources or what percentage of commercial revenues might be footing some of the cost, it is difficult to comment on what will likely transpire in Russia. I would suggest that there are many experts who can provide opinions relative to Russia's future economic stability and how the Russian Space Program will be ultimately effected. My awareness of the Russian situation comes primarily from the continued stream of news reports which expound on new crises which seem to occur almost every day. This can not bode well for the Russian Space Agency.

I will respond to the criticality of the Russian capabilities, how their presence or absence might change the development cost of the ISS, and whether NASA's approach appears reasonable given the current situation.

As you recall, the CAV Task Force delineated the Russian partnership as the major cost and schedule threat to the ISS program. Since May, not a single ruble has flowed from the

Russian government to RSA. Even knowing that, I will still tell you that without near-term Russian participation the cost to assemble the ISS would easily exceed the CAV Task Force's projection.

There are many areas where NASA is dependent on Russia in the near term. This includes propulsion, command and control, crew habitability, and crew return. Russia's failure to provide these critical capabilities on schedule will result in increased costs. We have already seen evidence of this. This makes it quite apparent that the U.S. should be developing its own capabilities. Without a permanent propulsion capability from either the U.S. or Russia, the ISS cannot be assembled in orbit. It will likely take three or more years to develop a U.S. propulsion module. The Interim Control Module which NASA has funded and developed can not bridge the gap until a permanent propulsion module can be delivered. This almost dictates continued Russian involvement. The absence of other Russian capabilities have their own set of negative consequences, resulting in higher cost and schedule delay. The ramifications of a shortfall in Soyuz or Progress flights can already be seen in NASA's recently revised assembly sequence, where there are now two additional Shuttle flights identified for logistics.

In the near term, maintaining Russian participation until the U.S. develops its own independent capabilities is significantly cheaper than the cost of developing the ISS without Russia. Towards this goal, NASA has recently entered into a $60 million agreement for Russia to deliver utilization resources that are in short supply during assembly. This $60M is an aspirin to Russia to cure their immediate headache. However, precautions should be taken to assure that in the process that this doesn't turn into a migraine for the U.S.

With each decline of the Russian economy the level of cost and schedule risk to the ISS program increases. The difficulty is in determining how to maintain program stability when, at this time, the program is inexorably tied to a partner experiencing economic instability. NASA

is struggling with what the Russian Space Agency will be able to deliver, when it will be delivered, and how to modify its current agreements and contract directly for specific hardware and services should RSA not deliver within some proximity to the current plan. What the ultimate price will be, the specific nature of the contracts and entities with whom NASA may contract is still to be determined. There are also uncertainties to be addressed with the Russian

government, especially as their level of partnership diminishes. To deal with these uncertainties NASA is buying down risk or, in a colloquial sense "eating this elephant one bite at a time."

I agree with NASA's approach because of the negative consequences of doing otherwise. I suggest that the committee look at the past performance of RSA and other Russian contractors when they were provided adequate levels of funding. It is clear that when funding was provided their performance was excellent, and even now, without meaningful funding, somehow, in many instances they are delivering. One would be foolish, however, to think that there will not be additional cost or schedule slips.

To avoid the U.S. being placed in a continuing enabling role to Russia, we must assure the expeditious development of U.S. capabilities. I want to convey my deepest concern that NASA has not moved forward and initiated the procurement of long lead items for a propulsion module. It is imperative that NASA expedite this development activity. I can not

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understand why this is not one of the highest priority items in the Agency. Each month that passes by without developing the capabilities necessary to achieve U.S. independence, puts the program at further risk for additional cost growth.

The Russian situation has obscured the fact that there are still challenges here in the U.S. As you recall, the CAV expressed concern and highlighted many issues that have now become reality. For example: the U.S. laboratory and other elements have continued to incur schedule erosion, the de-staffing plan has not been met, the prime contract cost has continued to grow, and multi-element testing is being pushed out by software and hardware problems.

Although there are still some open issues which were identified in the CAV report, the two major pacing items continue to be the procurement of a propulsion module and the acceleration of the development and production of a Crew Return Vehicle. Both of these activities are major steps toward U.S. independence and immediate funding should be directed toward these two significant issues. Last May's assembly schedule adjustment and an additional schedule adjustment made a few days ago provide some margin to address other risks identified in the CAV. So while I chose only to highlight the major concerns, I am still concerned that there will be additional cost growth and schedule slippage in other areas.

Finally, this a good time to state that reviews with the program management team clearly demonstrate they are implementing many creative alternatives to compensate for a Russian shortfall and budget constraints. However, they do need help from the Administration and committees such as this to successfully complete this vital space asset. I believe that's the reason for today's hearing and I appreciate the opportunity to participate.

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