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Statement of Daniel S. Goldin Administrator National Aeronautics and Space Administration before the Committee on Science U.S. House of Representatives October 7, 1998
I am pleased to appear before the Committee to answer your questions regarding the progress on the International Space Station (ISS) program. Today, the flight hardware for the first four shuttle flights is at KSC being integrated and checked out in preparation for launch. However, as in any development program of this magnitude, the hard work is not complete and there is still a great deal of effort ahead of us. Addressing the Committeeís first two questions, I will summarize the status of the Russian contributions to the ISS program and the results of the General Designers Review (GDR), which was held on September 28. The following is an overview, with a more detailed status of the Russian elements provided as Attachment 1 to this testimony. Mr. Joseph Rothenberg, Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, and his team have just returned from Russia where they observed that the Russians continue to make progress on their contributions to the ISS program despite their funding shortfalls. At this meeting, the Russian Space Agency (RSA) and its enterprises reported in detail on the status of the early Russian elements and acknowledged that funding delays have pushed the launch of the Service Module from April 1999 to no earlier than summer 1999. RSA acknowledges that inadequate funding is the cause of the delay. At the GDR, RSAís contractors reported that while manufacturing for Soyuz and Progress vehicles continues, in some cases key components for these vehicles and the Service Module are being retained by subcontractors until payments can be made. Although the focus of this meeting was not the follow-on elements, such as the Science Power Platform and the Russian research modules, our team observed little progress in these areas. Despite the economic and political turmoil in Russia, a high level of commitment to the ISS Program within the Russian Space Agency and their contractor team remains. Regardless of the level of their commitment, however, the fiscal realities confronting the RSA have not changed. Additional delays in assembly result in increased costs not only for the United States, but for our other International Partners as well. NASA recognizes the value of Russiaís active participation in the International Space Station program, and while I cannot overstate the Russiansí technical capabilities, I understand why members of this Committee have great concern about the critical nature of Russiaís contributions. We share those concerns. Our reliance on Russian capabilities has to be reduced, not by eliminating their involvement but by adding layers of protection. For over two years, NASA has been actively working with representatives of the RSA to understand their fiscal situation and to determine how best to ensure that their contributions to the ISS are adequately funded by the Russian government, reliably produced, and promptly delivered. NASA recognizes that without the timely delivery of critical Russian components for ISS, including the Service Module, the schedule for the first launches of ISS hardware are at risk. In attempting to minimize U.S. cost growth, the NASA ISS Program has taken the approach of incrementally buying down risk. An example of this approach is development of the Interim Control Module, which will provide backup contingency for reboost and attitude control as we assemble the ISS. This risk mitigation approach has allowed us to progress to the point where we are now in final preparation to launch the first elements to orbit this year. During the September meetings with the RSA, we signed a protocol that would provide immediate funds to the RSA for the purchase of additional stowage space in the Russian segment and U.S. use of research crew time during the ISS assembly period. Both volume and crew time are premier ISS resources. NASA continues its practice of contracting directly with RSA, which is solely responsible for goods and services, rather than Russian industry; we have confidence in this approach based on the proven track record that RSA has had in meeting contractual commitments established during the Shuttle-Mir Program. We will continue to adjust the deployment schedule for research facilities to closely track the buildup of station accommodations, in order to ensure the research program ramps up as soon as capability becomes available. During the early assembly period, the Express rack program will continue to provide valuable flight opportunities for middeck locker scale experimentation and product development in the areas of microgravity biotechnology, biomedical sciences, fluid physics, and combustion research. Despite delays in the utilization flight plan, we have effectively doubled U.S. research crew time through our recent negotiations with Russia. As a direct result, the research program will be significantly enriched because it will allow a greater number of experiments to proceed for longer periods and at increased frequency, thus obtaining many more processed samples and empirical data. NASA will fly an additional Space Shuttle mission in the year 2000 to enhance access to space for future ISS researchers. Designated STS-107, this mission will build on management innovations that have helped to ensure the success of STS-95, the mission that will carry Senator John Glenn into space later this month. STS-107 will employ existing hardware to extend results from STS-95 and earlier Shuttle missions in preparation for ISS. We are studying the potential for two additional dedicated research Space Shuttle missions. NASA has negotiated a contract payment schedule with RSA that is tied to confirmation of RSAís completion of milestones necessary to ensure the completion of critical early assembly activities related to the final integration and launch of the Service Module and initial Soyuz and Progress spacecraft. RSA and all Russian enterprises involved in the Service Module, Soyuz and Progress provision for ISS confirmed at the September 28 General Designers Review that if the modification of the NASA-RSA contract for $60 million is executed immediately, they have high confidence of meeting their near-term objectives. These objectives include a First Element Launch of Zarya on November 20, 1998, a summer 1999 launch of the Service Module, and availability of the requisite Soyuz and Progress vehicles. This payment is the basis for the September 29, 1998 operating plan letter transmitted to NASAís Appropriations and Authorization Committees, for which we are waiting approval. NASA has reallocated funding for this activity by reducing the Programís obligation plan in FY 1998 for ISS development ($40 million) and ISS operations ($20 million). This reallocation uses non-prime development reserves and reflects the deferrals in obligations needed for FY 1998 in operations spares and sustaining engineering. Our revised phasing of obligation requirements across the Program is being assessed as part of the FY 2000 budget planning process, which includes the initial FY 1999 Operating Plan that we will submit to you next month. Reaching agreement on the protocol and the contract modification with RSA allows us to provide financial flexibility needed by the Russians to proceed with those items critical to the early flights of the ISS. In parallel with these measures aimed at reducing uncertainty, NASA will take steps to provide backup capabilities to critical Russian contributions aimed at ensuring the availability of critical supplies over the long term. As I stated above, our reliance on Russian capabilities has to be reduced by adding layers of protection. NASA has taken several actions in recent months to create those layers. This summer, NASA made the decision to embark on modifications to the Shuttle to augment its reboost capabilities. Although the Shuttle can reboost the station in its current configuration, and will do so as we begin the assembly, modifications to the orbitersí reaction control system will enhance this capability to provide even more flexibility in meeting a substantial portion of Station reboost requirements. As a further backup, Shuttle missions could carry more propellants in their Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) tanks, at a sacrifice per mission by offloading payload, to provide additional ISS reboost. In addition, we will continue the largely completed Interim Control Module (ICM) as protection against Progress fuel delivery delays. Upon completion, the ICM will be used to provide propulsion and control contingency capability held in advance of the delivery of a propellant module. NASA has completed a technical definition study for a propulsion module which would provide the attitude control and reboost capability needed, should the Russians be unable to provide necessary Progress vehicles in the future. We have received a preliminary industry cost estimate. NASA is evaluating the near-term initiation of long-lead procurements for this propulsion module. We still believe that proceeding with multiple layers of backup protection is the right decision. Development of a U.S. propulsion module, coupled with the ESA Ariane Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Japanese HTV, would provide complete replacement of Russian vehicles for ISS attitude control, reboost, and resupply, if required. NASA has been informed by the Russian Space Agency that their financial situation is virtually unchanged from the status I provided this Committee in May and August of this year. In light of the worsening economic situation in Russia, it is difficult to predict the financial status of any Russian agency. RSA remains hopeful that later this Fall they will receive necessary Russian government funding for their core commitments, but the current economic crisis could make this difficult. Such funds would enable RSA to sustain the Soyuz delivery schedule and the long-term Progress flight rate at very near the rate upon which the current assembly sequence is based. I am very pleased to confirm that even in the face of these difficulties, all of the Space Station partners reviewed and concurred with our plan to maintain the current launch schedule. The Russians will launch Zarya on a Russian Proton booster on November 20 from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan, and the U.S. Node, Unity, will launch on the Space Shuttle Endeavour on December 3 from the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. We will put this decision through two final validation checks. The first is an internal Program Readiness Review to be held in the coming weeks, which will be an overview of the Program to confirm the Program is ready to begin the launch and assembly phase. After the PRR has approved launch, NASA will then hold a Multilateral Program Coordination Committee (MPCC) meeting with all our International Partners to confirm initiation of the Program. These two reviews are in addition to NASAís normal Flight Readiness Review process, which will take place in the weeks proceeding each launch. In answer to the Committeeís third question, U.S. funding for additional procurements of Russian hardware or capabilities, as a contingency to preclude significant schedule deterioration, continues to be assessed. This is being done through development of the initial FY 1999 operating plan, in the context of the FY 2000 budget planning process. Factors in this assessment include: outside economic forecasts; our evaluation of technical progress of Russian contributions; the potential impact of a changing Russian level of involvement; and other considerations. As a basis for this contingency planning, NASA has internally used a placeholder figure of $150 million per year. We are continuing discussions with the Administration as part of the FY 2000 budget planning process. In the meantime, our focus is on FY 1999 and ensuring timely delivery of the Service Module. For several years now, the ISS partnership has had to adjust plans due to eroding financial support from the Russian government to the RSA for their contribution to the partnership. Russian funding uncertainties exist today and will likely remain for the foreseeable future. This is a key issue being addressed with the Administration as we develop the recommendations contained in the Presidentís FY 2000 budget. NASA will use the most appropriate arrangement to ensure this, whether it be a government to government arrangement, or industry to industry. If appropriate procurements of Russian goods and services are needed to ensure expeditious ISS assembly, a revision in the balance of contributions, obligations, and resources of the ISS between NASA and RSA would be necessary. The current Space Station agreements and implementing arrangements allow for such revisions. In summary, we are taking specific steps to reduce the uncertainty of Russian contributions, and are implementing contingency capabilities that will provide the flexibility to accommodate potential Russian shortfalls. We are working with the Congress and the Administration to provide the risk mitigation necessary to address concerns in Russia, as well as concerns identified by the Cost Assessment and Validation (CAV) Task Force. While challenges remain, we have made significant progress. With this Committeeís help and with support from the full Congress and the Administration, we will succeed in the delivery of a world class International Space Station, inspiring future generations with the magnitude of this extraordinary venture. Together with our international partners, NASA is moving forward with excitement, prepared to address the challenges that are before us. And on November 20, 1998, we will look up to the night sky and celebrate a new star on the horizon. |