Science Committee Chair James Sensenbrenner opened the hearing by reading from a prepared statement. He focused in immediately upon the fact that at the 105th Congress began, NASA was testifying about problems with the ISS Service Module - noting that at that hearing, NASA was concerned that it might not meet its April 1998 launch date. Sensenbrenner then said "but here we are again. The problem has not been fixed. Instead, it is getting worse. Two years later and the American people are still waiting for their Space Station. We are still waiting for the first element launch."

After listing the various funds paid to Russia for Mir and ISS, Sensenbrenner said "What's worse is that the Administration does not have the courtesy or the courage to be up front and honest with the American people about the cost of this bailout."

Sensenbrenner then turned to the issue of the Russia's ISS contributions being in the critical path of ISS development noting that "The President promised me in writing in 1994 that we would not be dependent on the Russians to build the International Space Station." He went on to characterize subsequent actions as being indicative of the fact that the Administration "lied" when it said that the Russians would not be allowed to be put in the critical path.

Sensenbrenner recalled his initial opposition to bringing Russia into the ISS program and noted the extensive lobbying effort which had been done by NASA and the Administration to sell Congress on the idea. When problems first arose, Sensenbrenner noted that he and Rep. George Brown had submitted an amendment, since passed, which placed performance requirements on NASA. With this latest request for funds, Sensenbrenner said "I've seen nothing since passage of the Sensenbrenner-Brown amendment that would lead me to believe that NASA, the White House, or the Russians would make good use of the money."

Sensenbrenner then focused his frustrations in on what he felt was the core cause of ISS problems: "the plain truth is that the White House is addicted to the Russians. I'm beginning to think it doesn't care whether the Space Station gets built, so long as the Russians are happy. The problem is that our relationship with the Russian space program is fundamentally flawed and is hurting our national interest. What makes me particularly angry is that all of the talent, the creativity, the energy, and the passion that exist for space within NASA is being wasted in frantic efforts to create ad-hoc, short-term Band-Aids that enable the White House to indulge its addiction to Russia instead of being channeled into actually building our Space Station and opening the space frontier."

Sensenbrenner noted that OMB Director Lew and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott had been invited to testify but did not show up. While Lew sent a letter of explanation, "Mr. Talbott did not have the courtesy to say that he would not appear" behavior which Sensenbrenner termed as being an "insult to Congress".

Sensenbrenner closed by issuing a warning - one which has heretofore not been mentioned in Congress: "If we don't see some willingness to meet Congress in the middle and some acceptance of reality from the White House soon, then I plan to spend time working with the other members of this Committee and drafting legislation for the next Congress that will put an end to this problem, one way or the other. My colleagues and I may find a way to do that and keep Russia in the program. We might not. I would prefer to work with the Administration, but we cannot keep waiting for leadership that may never come."

Ranking Minority Member George Brown distanced himself from the more critical statements regarding Administration actions made by Rep. Sensenbrenner. In reading loosely from a prepared statement, Brown attributed OMB Director Lew's absence as being related to recent passage of the VA-HUD appropriations conference report - something requiring Lew's attention.

Brown agreed that the premise for and calling of this hearing was correct - and that he commended Sensenbrenner for doing so. While openly admitting that Russia has internal problems and an inability to meet external commitments, he noted that U.S. contractors had also been experiencing delays.

Brown urged that the hearings focus on how to evaluate the proposal by NASA for dealing with Russian problems instead of focusing on criticizing NASA and the Administration.

Rep. Roemer opened by noting that the initial justification for bringing Russia into the ISS program was to save the U.S. taxpayers $ 2 billion. He then characterized the $400 million the U.S. paid Russia as having been used "to put out fires on Mir" and the proposed $1.2 billion as being needed to "to rent time on a space station that is not already built". Roemer said that it was now time for Congress to take the lead on this issue and "do something about the Space Station". He closed advocating that Congress "cancel the Space Station in order to save NASA from itself".

Dan Goldin then began his 5 minute summary of his written remarks. He noted Russia's continuing internal problems and its ability to meet its obligations -an inability rooted not in technical capability but instead within Russia's unstable government and its unstable economy.

Goldin urged that we not give up on Russia inasmuch as Russia has and will continue to provide valuable contributions to the ISS program. To deal with the problems caused by Russia's difficulties, Goldin said that NASA was attempting to incrementally "buy down the risk" with the ICM and Shuttle reboost augmentations being two examples.

In response to criticism about what the U.S. would get for the proposed $ 60 Million payment, Goldin said that there is a quid pro quo: a doubling of research time and a substantial increase in stowage volume within Russian elements to allow pre-positioning of research hardware in space.

Goldin stated that all is still go for a FGB launch in November as well as for the Node 1 launch in December.

Jay Chabrow read from a prepared statement that focused on the way in which NASA has responded to the recommendations made by the Cost Assessment and Validation Task Force (CAVTF) regarding the reduction of programmatic risk. Chabrow noted that the CAVTF had found that NASA did not have adequate reserves in place. He said that NASA had agreed and that the FY2000 budget submission contained efforts to address this issue.

Noting that no money had been transferred from the Russian government to the Russian Space agency (RSA) since May 1998, things have not gotten any better and that further delays will serve to exacerbate the situation. He said that backing up Russia's contributions would be much cheaper than if the U.S. were to assume all of their responsibilities.

He noted that the U.S. is still dependant upon Russian provision of propulsion, command and control, crew habitation, and crew return capabilities, and that reliance upon these Russian contributions needs to be addressed near term. Chabrow noted that the revised ISS assembly sequence had 2 additional shuttle flights.

The approach NASA is using to address these issues is to "buy down the risk" i.e. "eating an elephant one bite at a time". While NASA has made some efforts to address these problems, Chabrow said that he was "concerned that NASA has not yet done long lead procurement for an independent propulsion capability" and noted that "this should be one of the highest priorities within the agency."

He also noted that there have been schedule erosion on the U.S. Lab element and that the promised de-staffing plan has, as a result, not been implemented. Chabrow then said that at this point, there are two critical steps NASA needs to take towards reducing reliance upon Russian performance: procurement on a U.S. propulsion module and development of a crew return vehicle.

In closing he noted that NASA is going to need help from both the Administration and Congress if it is to work these problems out.

Professor Twigg testified to the condition of Russia infrastructure and its ability to meet technological commitments. She took issue with the standard wisdom preached by NASA i.e. that simply giving money to Russia, as advocated by Mr. Chabrow, would solve Russia's problems. She described Russia's aerospace infrastructure, a product of the Soviet era, as having run on residual momentum from the USSR era. The problems inherent in Russia's aerospace infrastructure took a long time to develop - and they will take a long time to resolve. As such, adding money into the system may not have as much of an effect as one would expect given that the infrastructure in Russia is ill-equipped to respond to such an infusion.

Twigg also noted that Russia is suffering from a "brain drain" whereby younger scientists and engineers have found more productive jobs outside of aerospace leaving an older and less flexible workforce behind to deal with a crumbling infrastructure.

She also observed that the residual, inherent problems within Russia's aerospace infrastructure made it less capable of responding to high tech projects and that it was "in danger of becoming simply a subcontractor for other nation's space programs."

Jim Oberg read from a prepared statement which took direct aim at the ability, as well as the honest sincerity, of Russia to meet its commitments. In a follow-up to Professor Twigg's comments, Oberg noted that Russia's aerospace infrastructure is like that of "an athlete put on a starvation diet for years or of an Olympic athlete who spent 10 years in a gulag". He said that you "cannot feed them a meal and expect them to compete in the Olympics".

Oberg took issue with the way in which the Service Module's progress was being portrayed by NASA and how NASA arrived at the oft quoted 98% completion figure. Oberg went on to agree with Professor Twigg in citing NASA's over estimate of the effect that a massive cash infusion would have on Russia's ability to meet its commitment.

Oberg noted that there was some question regarding the honesty of Russia's stated intention to deorbit Mir noting that senior Russian space officials were openly involved in efforts to seek financing to extend Mir's operations. Noting that Russia cannot support both Mir and ISS at the same time, he wondered whether Russia could be expected to meet its ISS milestones if Mir was to be kept aloft and operating.

Oberg said that the rush to launch ISS elements now was not at all a wise thing to do and that in so doing, NASA would hold the remainder of the program hostage to this decision.

He noted that RSA had not received money for quite some time and that one of the solutions that the government had advocated included having the space industry sell portions of itself in order to generate cash. On top of this, he noted that the government exacts a 20% value added tax on any funds going to contractors thus diminishing the ability of things to be accomplished even further.

Oberg moved on to compare the ISS program with other large space programs. Noting that the Shuttle program has initial problems, once everyone committed to placing all of the variables or "ducks" in a row, the program got off to the start it had intended. With the ISS program, on the other hand, many of these critical items are constantly being moved or changed making it hard for all the "ducks to line up in a row". Indeed, in extending the metaphor, Oberg suggested that the "ducks keep jumping in and out of the line" and that NASA is constantly "chasing these ducks around" to get them to stand in line.

Oberg moved on to the issue of honesty within the self-evaluation of Russia's problems. Oberg noted similarities between the Service Module and the Mars-96 program. Mars-96 was rushed to completion, without adequate funding, with some assembly done under kerosene lamps because there was no money for electricity. When the mission failed, the review board was incapable of coming up with any reason why the mission could fail, leaving a gaping unsolved mystery.

In closing, Oberg described the launch of the FGB and the Node this Fall, the 6 to 8 month, multi-million mile circular trip that follows, all done with the hope that the Service Module will arrive on orbit as planned, as being "the longest hail Mary pass in history".

Rep. Sensenbrenner began his questions by reading from a 24 September 1998 internal NASA memo which describes the $660 million assistance plan to Russia and the fact that Code M at NASA HQ had decided to take funds out of research payload budgets to help pay for this. He then asked Goldin why NASA continues to try and gut research programs" in order to pay for development problems.

Goldin replied that he needed to look at the document fist before he could comment. A committee staffer placed a copy of the memo on the table in front of Mr. Goldin. Editor's Note: This memo first appeared on NASA Watch and the handout given Mr. Goldin apparently had "NASA Watch" printed at the top.

Goldin went on to say that NASA had not made any final decisions on the amount required. He also noted that while there would be slips in the ISS schedule, the research program would remain fully funded.

In framing his next question, Sensenbrenner recalled that he did not want to see the Russians placed in the critical path of ISS development. On 22 June 1994, President Clinton wrote Sensenbrenner letter wherein he stated that the US would retain an autonomous capability and that the Russians would not be in the critical path. Sensenbrenner then asked Goldin "Did anyone in the White House direct you to put the Russians in the critical path? If no one directed you to put them in the critical path, who at NASA made the decision to put Russia in the critical path?"

Goldin replied that "he did not recall anyone at the White House directing him to put Russia in the critical path". With regard to the second question, Goldin said that "within the finances we had a sequential retirement of risk". He then went on the list the things NASA had done. Sensenbrenner cut him off and said "Russia is in the critical path. If they were not in the critical path, then how did they get into the critical path? Was the letter from the President inaccurate?"

Goldin started to repeat that NASA did what it could to retire the risk. Sensenbrenner replied "The President's letter says that Russia is not supposed to be in the critical path. Did someone ignore the direction of the White House?" Sensenbrenner then did a read back of comments Goldin had made at an earlier hearing. When asked to reply to his earlier statements, Goldin said that his comments "were accurate at the time".

Sensenbrenner then said that "you can't make any of us here believe that the Service Module is not a critical item." Goldin ducked the issue and stuck to his reply that "at that time, within the resources we were given" that NASA had tried to "retire the risk".

Rep. Brown then asked that he and Rep. Roemer could switch places so that Roemer could go down to the White House "to help them out". Sensenbrenner joked that he'd be happy to give a good excuse not to go down.

Rep. Roemer asked Chabrow whether he had characterized the cost of the delay in the ISS program. Chabrow replied that he saw it as being around $140 million per month. Roemer asked if this figure included the additional funds being sought to which Chabrow said yes.

Roemer recounted how he and others had offered an amendment last year to get Russia out of the critical path, but that it did not pass. He then added that more money will not solve the current problems and asked the panel to comment. Professor Twigg noted that Russia has deep infrastructure problems "which took a lot of time to develop and will take a long time to resolve". Jim Oberg noted that Russia has pledged to make 10 launches in 2000 and that this seems to conflict with their ability to do so since Mir requires 4 to 6 launches a year now - and that Russia is "stretching its abilities" now to meet this much lower requirement.

Rep. Weldon noted that this whole process of discussing the space station seems to be akin to the acting out of a Greek tragedy - and "here we are again." Weldon asked that a recent article from the Washington Times be entered into the record. This article concerns itself with a report of how the U.S. has been subsidizing Russia's "kleptocracy". Weldon asked Goldin if he was aware of the content of this report -and if he knew whether Mr. Lew and Mr. Talbott were aware of the content.

Goldin said that he "can't answer for their (Lew's and Talbott's) awareness". He said that he had read the article, but that NASA negotiates its arrangements with Russia such that everything is laid out very specifically. Goldin said that there is no way he could track everything that happens inside of Russia but that he could vouch for the fact that NASA got real value in exchange for the funds which have been spent in Russia.

Weldon continued on this topic, quoting Ronald Reagan's line of "trust but verify", and asking Goldin how he is going to verify all of the deliverables the Russians are supposed to provide. Goldin replied that the agreement they have worked out with Russia for the $60 million has some 50 or so specific milestones attached to it. Weldon asked whether the additional research time NASA was procuring actually meant that Russian cosmonauts would be running U.S. experiments, and wondered whether it would be better to use U.S. astronauts instead.

Goldin replied that as a result of this arrangement there would be double the current amount of time for American experiments as well as a substantial increase in stowage volume available to U.S. researchers. Weldon asked again why Russian cosmonauts would be doing this to which Goldin replied "they are more familiar with their equipment".

Rep. Gordon then asked Goldin if there were "any more efficiencies that NASA could introduce into the ISS program" noting that he (Gordon) felt that NASA was "already doing all that it could". He also asked if there was a point at which Goldin would see the problems associated with ISS as having reached a point where it might make sense to stop the program. Goldin replied that he would consider "not flying any hardware for several years" as a possible situation where you'd have to question continuation of the ISS program.

Goldin then launched into a speech about what NASA has had to do since 1992 in order to comply with the Administration's agenda. After a few sentences, Gordon cut him off rather curtly by saying "I've heard all that. We need to have a plan". Goldin replied that NASA has cut $40 billion out of NASA's 5 year plan, and that everyone should be aware of this sacrifice by now noting that "I am amazed when people say they are not aware of this." Goldin then went on to say that he will not accept the viewpoint that NASA is doing a "sloppy job" on the Space Station and that "we need to cancel this if the government does not give it the money that it needs."

Rep. Sensenbrenner then interjected a request asking Goldin if he could "bring Mr. Lew and Mr. Talbott here" to get a commitment from OMB and the White House? Congress can't do this by itself". Goldin replied again that if the money to fund these proposals cannot be found then "we ought to cancel" adding that doing so would "be like a dagger though my heart."

Rep. Gutknecht opened his question by repeating an admonition given him by his "German grandmother": "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." He then noted the fact that a representative from OMB had testified before Congress only a few months earlier and said that the Russians could be expected to meet their commitments. He asked Goldin if he was "willing to bet the entire program on a partner who has failed us time and time again." He added that The U.S. has given Russia over $43 Billion in aid in the past few years and that the IMF is looking to give them $18 Billion more. Yet despite this massive influx of cash he felt that there had been "no real improvement in Russia". "Where will this money go - the $60 Million, the $660 Million?"

Goldin replied that some of the money goes to procurement of U.S. hardware. Of the $1.2 Billion figure that is often cited, Goldin said that "about half of it is for specific goods and services and the other half is for long term U.S. capabilities."

As to where the money would come from, Goldin said that there is a need to find "additional resources". He said that he has told the Administration that he needs to buy things from Russia and build up an additional U.S. capability and that these issues are addressed in NASA's FY2000 budget submission. He added that this data is embargoed and he is therefore unable to discuss it in great detail at this time.

Gutknecht then asked Goldin if he was "willing to bet the farm on this - if so, that is a bad idea." Goldin replied that everyone needed to step back and look at the process other agencies have had to go through as they endured large budget cuts. He then said "we have given back $40 Billion, now we hope that consideration will be given for a couple of billion."

Rep. Brown interjected that it seems that NASA may well need some of that $40 Billion that has been cut. He then asked if Goldin was saying that we can longer count on the Russian government and that we should be "dealing with Russian contractors instead".

Goldin That NASA is not "throwing any money at the Russians", that "specific goods and services" were being provided in exchange. He then added that "we can't do this program by making believe we have the money." Rep. Sensenbrenner then interjected that the VA-HUD request submitted by the Administration was fully funded and that NASA had indeed gotten all of what the Administration had asked for. Goldin did not respond.

Rep. Brown asked if it was advisable to consider renegotiation of the partnership with Russia and the role of the Russians therein - or whether such an attempt would be "politically unacceptable".

Goldin replied that there was a broad understanding that the negotiations leading up to the current request for $60 million was, in fact, "a small re-negotiation of the overall agreement."

Brown then asked if such a process was used when Canada realized that it did not have the money to meet its commitments. Goldin replied that it was, adding that "when someone is in trouble you don't draw blood, you inspire them to perform."

Then, out of nowhere, Goldin added "Yes, I have thought of resignation, but I won't because of my commitment to the nation's space program."

Brown then asked if NASA had made any attempt to capture the lessons learned from this experience such that they would be available to others in the future. Goldin replied that NASA was doing this and that his recent promotion of former Code Z (Office of Policy and Plans) Associate Administrator Alan Ladwig was part of his attempt to do just that.

Rep. Rohrabacher then suggested to Goldin that NASA seems to have not learned anything from its experience and that the attempt now was to "throw more money" at the Russians. He then noted one exception: the deal wherein Russian company provided the FGB under a commercial contract, one which he characterized as being a success. Goldin agreed.

Rohrabacher then asked why NASA could not pursue additional company-to-company contracts with Russia to help them meet their obligations, since the government-t0-government approach had clearly failed. Goldin replied that Rohrabacher as "right and wrong". He agreed that the Russian government had not funded RSA and that this had caused problems. Rohrabacher shot back that if they had more money there is "still a chance they would not have performed."

Rohrabacher then said that this is all an "honesty issue" - that money tends to "disappear". He noted that he had been told this by Russians during his recent trip to Russia. He then suggested that it might be wiser to restructure the ISS program such that there is more accountability.

Goldin replied that if NASA could have a contract with a Russian corporate entity, that it would. He said, however that this was not possible in most circumstances because the Russian government controlled key things such as cosmonaut time and operations.

Rohrabacher quickly shot back that "this is an illusion Dan! " and noted that as long as we deal in this way the money will continue to disappear. Goldin replied that money has not disappeared. Rohrabacher replied there had indeed been evidence that money has disappeared. Goldin replied that "we have gotten what we paid for."

Rohrabacher responded that Congress has tried to be sure that Russia is not in the critical path, but that nonetheless, they are. He went on to say that there is evidence that some missile technology has been transferred to other countries and that future agreements with Russia should take this into account.

Goldin replied that "I am responsible for America's civilian space program". Rohrabacher shot back "- and THAT is why Mr. Talbott was invited here!" At this point Rep. Sensenbrenner interjected that he "reserves the right to subpoena Mr. Talbott if he continues to refuse to appear."

Rep. Jackson-Lee then popped in for another of her hit and run sessions. She immediately launched an attack on the Committee leadership stating that the letters written to Lew and Talbott had the date of October 2, 1998 on them. She called this another "beltway gothca" and that this was unfair. She then suggested that these people are very busy". Rep. Sensenbrenner asked her if she'd yield to which she replied angrily that she would not - "until I finish my statement". She then went on to express her support for NASA and that she looked forward to reading what had been said.

Editor's Note: a few minutes later Rep. Sensenbrenner made note of the fact that Committee staff had spoken with both Talbott and Lew's offices on 28 September and they were aware of the hearing topic and date. A few minutes later, after several additional quick questions from Rep. Jackson-Lee, the bell rang and everyone went off to vote. Rep. Jackson-Lee never returned.

As a personal note I find it rather annoying that Rep. Jackson-Lee never bothers to attend a full hearing, shows up late, expects all attention to be instantly focused upon her interests, and then leaves. If she is this busy, and spread this thin, perhaps she should reconsider the number of committees upon which she sits - and which ones are actual priorities worthy of her dedicated attention and participation.

Goldin was then asked about what Jim Oberg had said about NASA's use of "creative bookkeeping" to hide the true costs of the Russian aspect of the ISS program. Goldin replied "I have no idea what Mr. Oberg is talking about." He then characterized Oberg's comments as "a challenge to the basic integrity of NASA" and challenged Oberg to provide documents to substantiate his claims. Goldin then added that he took Oberg's assertions as a "personal affront".

Oberg replied that one of the examples he had seen was the performance penalty NASA pays by sending Space Shuttles to a space station in an orbit designed to benefit the Russians - not the American launch system,

The delivery capability to the ISS inclination [51.6 degrees] is 36,000 pounds. NASA has improved it by 12,000 pounds. But this improvement to the Shuttles cost money. He then said that for every 4 Shuttle flights to ISS you have paid a penalty of one flight when compared to what would be required to loft the same payload to a space station in an orbit favorable to US launch systems [28 degrees]. With a total of 80 to 100 flights over the course of the ISS program this amounts to 20 to 25 additional flights. At a cost of $500 million per shuttle flight this amounts to billions of dollars in additional costs - all because the space station is in an orbit favorable to Russia's participation.

Oberg added that if you were to take this additional cost and compare it with the value added by Russia's participation, you'd certainly have to consider it a net benefit if the Russian contribution was worth more than the cost of accommodating their participation. But it is not. He then went on to remind the Committee that it is an open secret that NASA has always considered Shuttle flights as being "free" when discussing the ISS budget when in reality they cost $500 or so apiece.

Rep. Morella asked Office of Space Flight Associate Administrator Joe Rothenberg about the proposed $60 Million transfer to Russia - and how the milestones contained on Attachment 1 of the 30 September 1998 NASA/RSA protocol are linked to the receipt of this money. She noted that 57% of the money is supposed to be provided to NASA by 10 October 1998.

Rothenberg replied that the remainder of the funds were linked to various milestones, mostly the completion of the Service Module. Morella replied that she felt that it was incomprehensible that NASA did not have more control over the delivery of various items.

Rothenberg replied that NASA will be tracking the performance of Russia on various tasks, and that such tracking will be part of the metric used to gauge performance. Morella asked if "these enforcement mechanisms are as elusive as they are in the protocol?" Rothenberg replied that if the Russians do not provide what they have agreed to provide then we will "not make future arrangements with them."

Morella asked what the funding source will be for the items to be negotiated in November 1998. Rothenberg replied that these items would be funded with residual funds leftover in the Shuttle/Mir - reserves which amounts to less than $10 Million.

Rep. Jackson-Lee repeated her defense of Strobe Talbott noting that there were a number of events around the world that needed his attention - and that Congress has recently spent too much time on "extraneous issues". She also defended OMB Director Lew noting that his testimony has been credible, and that he too is very busy right now.

Jackson-Lee then noted that she was a strong supporter of NASA but that Congress needs to have "all of the information all of the time". She noted that it was a mistake for members of Congress to first hear of NASA's need for an additional $660 Million via news channels and not from NASA itself.

She then asked Goldin if the Russians have the "technology" to do what we need them to do. Goldin replied that there really is no technology development involved in Russia's task, that instead it is just providing hardware. He then noted that all of this is fully documented and that it is very frustrating for him when there is a suggestion that NASA is trying to hide something.

Jackson-Lee then asked if it would cost more to throw the Russians out of the ISS program than to keep them in. Jay Chabrow said it would be a mistake to throw them out and this problem is "just a matter of cash flow." Professor Twigg suggested that there ought to be a solution available that is somewhere between throwing them out and keeping them in.

Rep. Brady asked Goldin if Goldin was "willing to risk all of the American jobs, all of the companies, and all of the people" that would be at risk and stake it all on Russia's ability to comply or upon concern for "their pride?" He paused and said, "If that is your proposal, then perhaps you should consider resignation."

Goldin replied that this was not what he had intended to say. He said that Russia's pride is not a priority in his decision process, nor is keeping them in the program a priority. Goldin went on to say that he was proud of his people and that "we will need more resources to fix this situation".

Goldin then said that he does not want the program cancelled, and that under no conditions was he saying that the purpose behind his plans was aimed at keeping the Russians in the program.

Brady responded that Goldin's actions seem to support this priority and that we bend over backwards" to accommodate the Russians and in so doing "jeopardize the ISS program at a cost to the taxpayers."

Rep. Luther asked Goldin what other options were considered - and rejected. Goldin replied that one option would have been to sever near-term relations with RSA and, if so, that the U.S. would have to wait several years in order to achieve permanent human presence on ISS. He said that his aim was not to preclude Russian participation later but that he needed to adjust things so as to allow the ISS to be built now. Goldin said that NASA was going to "rifle" goods and services and, in so doing, operate under the assumption that Russia is not going to get any additional money. He added that his approach was to try and do the smart things now and to keep them off the critical path.

Jay Chabrow added that NASA does need Progress capability for reboost and logistics, and that without a U.S. alternative, there may not really be any near term options other than those being suggested by NASA. He then referred to a list had made of what the impacts would be if Russia was suddenly out of the picture: 3 years before a U.S. Propulsion capability was available; No Soyuz to serve as a CRV; more launches of logistics ($); another ICM for interim use; and "no science" while all of this is happening. He said that it makes sense to invest the money now and to wean ourselves from reliance upon Russia.

Professor Twigg noted that one of the reasons why the FGB procurement worked was the fact that the hardware was more or less off the shelf. She cautioned that anything new or requiring technology development may well be beyond the ability of Russia's aerospace infrastructure for the time being and that asking for more money is not necessarily going to yield results.

Jim Oberg added that he would like to see a more realistic approach of ISS costs without the Russians in the picture. If not having them in the picture wold mean a long delay thought could have a psychological impact on the program. He went on to say that "planning everything against future hopes, hopes which have been dashed again and again", might not be the right thing to do.

Rep. Ehlers noted that Chabrow's position that money is important to fixing this situation and Twigg's contention that money is not the answer are in direct contradiction. Rep. Lampson then said that he was troubled by OSF AA Joe Rothenberg's response to Rep. Morella that NASA was not really going to be able to enforce the terms of the NASA/RSA protocol. Rothenberg replied that the protocol lays out a series of "specifics" i.e. the goods and services to be provided and the consequences of Russia's failure to comply.

Rep. Lampson then asked what it is he is supposed to tell his constituents that they are getting for their money (the $60 Million). Goldin replied that "it is our intention that get goods and services. We are not going to 'give' money to Russia. Instead we are buying specific things." He went on to say that the $60 Million goes toward the Russian's "relinquishing their cosmonaut time" which will double that available U.S. researchers and that it will also provide U.S. researchers with more stowage volume inside Russian elements.

Lampson then noted that recent changes in the ISS program would be leading to a rather aggressive launch schedule. He asked Goldin if NASA was contemplating any additional research shuttle missions. Goldin replied that 2 additional logistics flights would be added to the ISS assembly sequence and that it was his hope that there would be some research capability on these missions. He also spoke of STS-107 as being added and that perhaps another research mission could be added in the near future.

Rep. Sensenbrenner closed the hearings by asking that The 30 September 1998 NASA/RSA protocol and Goldin's 29 September 1998 letter requesting permission to transfer $60 million be added to the hearings record. He then said "I hope we don't see you here again" (referring to ISS problems) to which Goldin replied " I have already appeared at 9 hearings this year and I'm ready for another one."

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