"A nearly completed, $239 million weather satellite toppled to the floor as it was being moved at a Lockheed Martin plant and was seriously damaged, officials said Tuesday."

"NASA and NOAA are understandably concerned about this accident, because the NOAA-N Prime spacecraft is vital to the continuity of the polar-orbiting environmental satellite program."

"As the NOAA-N Prime spacecraft was being repositioned from vertical to horizontal on the "turn over cart" at approximately 7:15 PDT today, it slipped off the fixture, causing severe damage. (See attached photo). The 18' long spacecraft was about 3' off the ground when it fell."

Reader's comment: "It turns out that the POES group at GSFC had a training session for an ISO 9000 audit in July, 2003. Here's the link to the briefing slides: http://poes.gsfc.nasa.gov/iso/GSFC-QMS_Training_Jul_2003.pdf The accident appears to be LockMart's fault, but once again we see the benefits of an ISO 9000 program..."

Chart excerpt:

Some Audit No-No's!

• Don't be afraid to say, "I don't know, but I'll find out"
• Don't volunteer information not asked for
• Don't act like the auditor is wasting your time
• Don't guess or bluff our answers
• Don't criticize coworkers or the Center
• Don't argue with the auditor
• Don't say you don't follow procedures because ... you don't have time, or can't be done that way

Oh yes: you can see this policy in place at MSFC (1)(2) and elsewhere as well.

Update: NASA GSFC pulled this file offline. This briefing is still online at NASA Watch here.

"1. Cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing space development programs, from initial formulation through execution. Space is unforgiving; thousands of good decisions can be undone by a single engineering flaw or workmanship error, and these flaws and errors can result in catastrophe. Mission success in the space program has historically been based upon unrelenting emphasis on quality. The change of emphasis from mission success to cost has resulted in excessive technical and schedule risk as well as a failure to make responsible investments to enhance quality and ensure mission success. We clearly recognize the importance of cost, but we can achieve our cost performance goals only by managing quality and doing it right the first time."

"While the principle behind FBC was vague and open to interpretation for most of Goldin's tenure, FBC attempted to "shorten development times, reduce costs, and increase the scientific return by flying more missions in less time." Using FBC as a way to contract out services and move more of NASA's resources into the private sector, Goldin eliminated much of the civil service infrastructure that monitored and held technical knowledge of the service and products contractors provided and oversaw NASA's safe and successful operation."

Editor's note: The NASA Watch "management fad" alarm just went off. TQM, ISO 9000, FBC ....

"The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the US space agency, is poised to enter a "new world" of management consultancy by offering its Mission Control system as a business tool for industry. Nasa has teamed up with AT Kearney, the international consulting firm, to encourage manufacturers to adopt the sort of project management used for shuttle missions or space walks."

"NASA/HQ plans to award to the Corporate Executive Board a 1-year membership on The Working Council for Chief Information Officers (WCCIO). The Working Council is a unique institution that has been established to research on best demonstrated business and management practices that arise in most large complex environments: setting strategy, change management, investment prioritization, recruiting, relations with line, service quality, and innovation. The Council has access to over 1500 corporations developed over 22 years of proprietary, best practices research."

Editor's note: Is this serious stuff? - or just more in a series of pop management ideas NASA has indulged in such as TQM, ISO-9000, Faster-Better-Cheaper

"For example, one manager noted that, "People are never rewarded for telling about how they screwed-up and caused a problem/mistake". This will continue to be a problem until a way is found to allow and encourage people to talk about their mistakes without feeling that they are risking their careers," the report said."

"Lessons entered in the LLIS database are screened for relevance and to ensure that they do not contain sensitive or proprietary information."

"The LLIS is not open to the general public or to persons conducting general or academic research."

Editor's note: if everything is scanned for sensitive or proprietary information why aren't these 'lessons learned' accessible outside of NASA? Could it be that there are potentially embarassing things in this database that NASA would rather not let the outside world know? Given JSC's recent attempts to keep things from getting out about the ISS program, one has to wonder what else is sitting behind this firewall.

"If a member of the inspecting team told the engineer in question that "housekeeping" could affect his performance evaluation and/or his salary increase there is no basis in fact for such a statement, since these are the concern of line management - not inspectors. If on the other hand his line manager suggested this, the engineer has a legitimate grievance and there are methods for pursuing these at JPL. If he is unaware of them, I will be glad to assist him."

"Our CUSTOMER has requested this audit. If we want to continue to work well with them, it is in our best interest to comply. I'm not suggesting that we have to agree with it or like it, but I am most assuredly suggesting that it is the right thing to do. Talent is an asset, but don't bank on it giving you license to call all the shots. There are other talented organizations in the wings just waiting for an opportunity to gather more projects. Ultimately, the CUSTOMER affords you the facility and the tools to use that talent here at JPL. So, in my book, if the CUSTOMER says, clean-up your room, my answer will be "not a problem".

Editor's note: Just when you thought ISO 9000 was the latest management fad to hit NASA ...

"From someone@nasa.gov: Employees cited for violation of "housekeeping" were told that it could impact their annual performance review and threatened their annual salary increase. Of course, there is no official policy about what "housekeeping" is or what it entails. Violators were simply told to get their personal offices more "tidy", as there are further follow-ups by the inspecting committee. As you can imagine, these types of directives create serious disruptions and lower morale for those of us that are trying to efficiently use taxpayer money." [full text]

Editor's note: Just when you thought ISO 9000 was the latest management fad to hit NASA ...

"From someone@nasa.gov: Employees cited for violation of "housekeeping" were told that it could impact their annual performance review and threatened their annual salary increase. Of course, there is no official policy about what "housekeeping" is or what it entails. Violators were simply told to get their personal offices more "tidy", as there are further follow-ups by the inspecting committee. As you can imagine, these types of directives create serious disruptions and lower morale for those of us that are trying to efficiently use taxpayer money." [full text]

"Downsizing was supposed to make NASA leaner and meaner. Instead, it arguably has become weaker and less experienced. "We haven't broken anything yet, but it's shaking on the table," says James Jennings, the Kennedy Space Center's deputy director."

"Even agencies that earn a clean bill of health from independent auditors aren't as well-managed as they might be. Despite receiving unqualified audits for six years running, NASA has tremendous problems maintaining outdated finance systems and officials must reconcile accounts manually."

"... the generally slow hiring process puts government at a disadvantage when competing for top talent, he notes, recalling testimony from NASA Inspector General Roberta Gross in May 2000. "It is my experience that it just takes too long to hire staff," she said. "We have lost leading candidates . . . to private sector competitors because companies can hire top-performing candidates faster than we can." It takes an average of four to six months to hire someone in her agency, Gross said."

"With its budget tightened over the past eight years, NASA also ended up cutting funding for upkeep. "We have not had the budgets that we would like to have had for maintenance and repair and revitalization of our facilities," says Jeff Sutton, director of NASA's Office of Management Systems."

"NASA's "faster, better, cheaper" management strategy needs to rise above a mere management philosophy and become a defined part of the agency's mission, according to a new report from the agency's inspector general. "

"Without a common understanding of Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC), NASA cannot effectively communicate its principles to program/project managers or contractor employees. In addition, the Agency has not incorporated sufficient FBC goals, objectives, and metrics into NASA's strategic management process. Therefore, missions completed using FBC are outside the strategic management and planning process, and progress toward achieving FBC cannot be measured or reported. Finally, NASA has not adequately aligned its human resources with its strategic goals. As a result, the Agency cannot determine the appropriate number of staff and competencies needed to effectively carry out strategic goals and objectives for its programs."

"And I particularly commend to the committee to go the Ames NASA laboratory and just spend a half day getting briefed on what they're doing, combining supercomputing nano-scale science and technology and biology, which is, I think, the most interesting single facility in the United States."

"When the government shifts gears and tries to become more businesslike, as it frequently does, it starts contracting out every function in sight. The result is publicly visible failure, from which the government learns nothing. The latest example is NASA's Mars landing debacle."

TITANIUM POWERBOOKS NEEDED TO SUPPORT GEN 2 PROCUREMENT AT MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER

"Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) plans to issue a Request for Quote (RFQ) for Titanium Powerbooks for use at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). This is being issued as a NASA emergency. This procurement is being conducted under the Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP)."

Alas, this is not about saving anyone's money. It would seem that some folks at MSFC want these new Macs simply because they are sleek, fast, shiny, and sexy. Which is why I really want one too! However using the term "emergency" to get these things when other more obvious solutions are readily available is just a flagrant abuse of the procurement system. Hardly 'cheaper' or better or faster.

Editor's note: Looks like someone in procurement reads NASA Watch...

"1) Mr. Goldin called for Center Directors (CD's) and AA's to be personally committed to creating and maintaining an open environment in which safety issues can be easily raised. He will follow-up with his senior managers in several weeks to ensure action is taken.

2) A Management Advisory Group is being established to ensure that NASA is aligned with Presidential policy to "flatten the federal hierarchy by redistributing positions and resources from high-level management positions to front-line service delivery jobs." This group will review the organizational and reporting structure of the Agency and will identify opportunities for improving utilization of our SES, ST, and SL positions across the Agency. Members include Mr. Rothenberg (Chair), Ms. Garman, Mr. Frankle, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Christensen, Ms. Novak, and Dr. Blumberg."

Editor's note: Hmmm ... actions concerning an "open environment" and direction to "flatten the federal hierarchy" ... It's amazing how fast Dan can act to reverse conflicting public statements on his part (see below) when the Transition Team is looking over his shoulder ...

Editor's note: Contrary to what Dan Goldin said last Thursday in his NIAT webcast about encouraging NASA employees to ignore managerial hierarchies, his desire that people not feel "bullied" by management, and his assurance that people "should feel free to raise issues without fear of retribution", Goldin did just the opposite a few days before this webcast.

During a recent HEDS Assurance Board meeting at NASA Headquarters, a representative from the NASA Procurement Office was making a presentation regarding current acquisition policies and how they mesh with risk management and safety requirements. Dan Goldin was in attendance. Goldin said that he saw no reference to the safety hierarchy (the public, astronauts and pilots, NASA employees, and high-value equipment and facilities) in the person's presentation.

The procurement person very respectfully disagreed with Goldin. Goldin replied: "If you are going to disagree with me, I am going to leave." Goldin then got up and left right in the middle of the meeting. It is important to note that this meeting includes Mr. Goldin's participation only once per year and is carefully organized to provide the most benefit to Mr. Goldin as he attends.

It should be quite obvious to anyone who has spent any time with Mr. Goldin that he is just as incapable of applying the managerial directions he expects others to follow now as he was 8 years ago.

"... Goldin spoke of an inherent tendency for government "to desire a hierarchy. We tried to set up horizontal networks." He then encouraged NASA employees "not to worry about bureaucracy - we need to get away from the established hierarchy".

Goldin said that there needs to be "accountability with management. There should be no fear - manager should not play the blame game by pointing a finger and saying 'you screwed up' ". Goldin continued by saying that "anyone who feels that they are afraid of management should talk to Fred Gregory, Dan Mulville - or me. One thing this agency cannot tolerate is one where people bully other people.

One recurring theme in Goldin's comments was communication and the need for individuals to feel free to surface issues to management. Goldin made repeated references to the fact that employees should feel free to raise issues without fear of retribution. "The strength of this agency is its people - people who are empowered are not afraid of retribution."

Editor's note:I just got a call from NASA PAO's Sarah Keegan informing me that it would be OK for me to sit in on the webcast this afternoon. Thanks Sarah!

Editor's note: In response to an inquiry I made to NASA PAO, NASA's Sarah Keegan called to inform me that this agency-wide webcast is "an internal education activity" and that it is "really not for the press" and that I would not be allowed to enter the auditorium and listen. As such, I (and other press) are being denied access to this event. I can't imagine why PAO is refusing access to a reporter (and one of those taxpayers Dan Goldin keeps reminding people as being 'owners' of the agency) when thousands of people within the NASA community are allowed to participate. More PAO paranoia.

This webcast could well be one of the last times Dan Goldin speaks to the entire agency about topics that span his entire tenure as Adminstrator. As such, what he says should be made available to the public - especially since it concerns (among other things) hundreds of millions of dollars worth of hardware strewn on the Martian surface.

So, since I won't be allowed to cover this, those of you folks at NASA who attend or participate in this event will have to let others know what is going on. Please send your summaries (which will be posted anonymously) to nasawatch@reston.com.

"On Thursday, January 11, 2001, NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin will deliver a unique presentation to the NASA workforce. Using the communication capabilities of the Internet, Mr. Goldin will conduct a live presentation originating from the Headquarters auditorium, and also broadcast via Webcast, to discuss the key messages for the Agency that are associated with the actions of the NIAT report. This event will represent efforts to more broadly use the Internet to communicate and educate our workforce on current issues of significance."

"Thursday, January 11, 3:30-5 p.m., auditorium. Administrator Daniel Goldin will deliver a unique presentation of the NASA Integrated Action Team (NIAT) Report using the capabilities of the Internet. All members of the NASA HQ management team are encouraged to participate. For details, see http://www.hq.nasa.gov/hq/webcast_1-11-01.htm For questions, contact Jim Wilk, HQ Training Officer, jwilk@pop100.gsfc.nasa.gov or call 301-286-2021."

"NIAT- 12.1 Define "Faster, Better, Cheaper " and incorporate FBC- - 20 Define FBC and the application of it into NPG 7120.5" (Full Recommendation)

"NIAT- 12.1 Define "Faster, Better, Cheaper " and incorporate FBC- - 20 Define FBC and the application of it into NPG 7120.5" (Full Recommendation)

Editor's Note: Gee Dan, its certainly about time you got around to standardizing exactly what you've meant when you've said "Faster, Better, Cheaper"! Too bad it took 8 years to come up with a formal description. Wouldn't it have been a little more logical to have basedlined a definition before people embarked upon a wide range of projects costing billions of dollars - all of which were supposed to adhere to your "Faster, Better, Cheaper" mantra? We might have avoided a few mission failures had everyone been singing to the same managerial tune.

• Main Presentation (480K Acrobat file)
  
• Back-up charts (480K Acrobat file)

"As NASA's next spacecraft to the red planet begins a crucial round of testing in preparations for launch next year, the mission has been given a new name: 2001 Mars Odyssey. "The year 2001 has a special significance to many of us who recall the thrill of reading the book and watching the movie '2001: A Space Odyssey.' We looked forward to the exciting future of space exploration that the year 2001 promised," said Scott Hubbard, Mars Program Director at NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC."

Editor's note: I never fail to be awed each and every time I have watched "2001" since I first saw its premiere in 1968.

That notwithstanding ... let's just hope all of the plot details from "2001" don't get revisited: central computer's software is broken causing it to missinterpret sensor signals. The computer then kills the crew in order to be certain it can complete the mission when the crew discovers that the computer had bad software code. Sounds a little bit too much like MCO and MPL to me. Hey: didn't the Apollo 13 crew play the theme from "2001" moments before that oxygen tank blew up?

"If NASA does not make funding available to finish it, the built and tested lander in this picture will go to waste. Some may say they'll cannibalize it for spare parts here and there, but because of the custom nature of interplanetary spacecraft, most of the parts of this spacecraft are not applicable to other spacecraft. While its hard to say what has been spent on the lander to date, the Mars Surveyor Program 2001 Project Budget was over $300 million.. The synergy of having both an orbiter and a lander makes it impossible to differentiate completely between the cost of the two, but an approximation is to simply divide the number in half and say that this lander is $150M of taxpayer money. "

"A string of investigations and a meteorlike shower of reports in March all bombarded NASA with the same conclusion: Administrator Daniel Goldin's eight years of efforts to explore space "faster, better and cheaper" haven't paid off in the way he expected. NASA is doing more things in less time and with less money, but at the expense of quality. "

" [Tony] Spear said he interviewed hundreds of people for his study and had spoken with thousands since, with most of them agreeing that the "faster, better, cheaper" policy of small missions espoused by NASA's administrator, Daniel S. Goldin, was the best approach under current budget restraints. "Most people agree that it's here to stay, even if they can't define what 'faster, better, cheaper' is," he said.

"It is simply an attempt to improve performance."

Editor's note: Gee Tony, this isn't very helpful.

• Main Presentation (480K Acrobat file)
  
• Back-up charts (480K Acrobat file)

"Many now worry that risk will become the single management metric du jour. It's the obvious reaction to a series of failures. However, risk reduction costs money. At what point do you draw the line? In the space business, no mission will ever be risk free, regardless of the amount of money spent. Thus, too much risk aversion and NASA is on another path to oblivion."

A hearing was held on Wednesday before the House Science Committee titled "NASA's Mars Program After the Young Report". At the core of the Committee's concerns was the failure of the Mars Climate Orbiter mission because of simple metric Vs English units conversions and its subsequent crash on Mars; the loss of the Mars Polar Lander apparently due to one bad line of software and its crash on Mars; and the disappearance of the twin DS-2 probes which were simply not ready for launch in the first place. The tone taken by all of the committee members was balanced, but some clear exasperation by members at the sort of mistakes that were made was evident in the remarks of nearly all of the Committee. In closing the hearings, House Science Committee Chair James Sensenbrenner said that NASA Administrator Dan Goldin and other guests would be appearing before the committee next month. Sensenbrenner also clearly stated his committee's intent upon being a "part of the solution" as NASA examines the causes of these failures and seeks to institute remedies.

Full Hearing summary and background information...

"... it was interesting to see a JPL advertisement in the weekly Washington newspaper 'The Hill' seeking a legislative liaison to work in California and make trips to D.C. Specifically, it wanted a "liar." Make that LIAR: a Legislative and International Affairs Representative.

Surely someone at JPL could have thought up a better acronym than that, but NASA folk deal with so many acronyms it probably didn't even notice it. At any rate, the legislative liaison/LIAR will have a tough job this year, particularly during those Washington visits."

"Dan has done so much good, and I hope that there's a couple more successes in the next couple of months so that he leaves on a high note," [Rep. Dana] Rohrabacher said. "

"You can't do these missions with layers of people spread out all over the place,'' said [Lunar Prospector manager Alan] Binder, 60, founder and director of the Lunar Research Institute in Tucson, Ariz. Friday, Binder took his gospel to NASA headquarters here in Washington, D.C., where he met with NASA Administrator Dan Goldin to discuss his concerns. Binder said he requested the meeting and Goldin agreed to meet with him. "

"Dan Goldin took office on April Fool's Day, 1992 and now has the longest continuous tenure of any NASA Administrator. ..."

"Federal workers who help explore space or protect the environment are among the most satisfied with their jobs, while those who enforce immigration and food safety rules are the least happy."

"Returning to the old way of doing business would only erode the space program's public support and deepen its slump. Leanness and efficiency can still be balanced with intelligent launches, though perhaps fewer of them. NASA isn't there yet. "

"Asked whether the company deserved blame for the failure of two Mars missions in rapid succession, [vice president for flight systems at Lockheed Martin Space Systems Noel] Hinners replied, "I do."

That answer indicates that Hinners is taking the heat for hundreds of employees who devoted years to the star-crossed Mars Climate Orbiter and PolarLander missions."

Editor's note: OK Noel, that's a good first step. Now how about getting LockMart's CEO to do what NASA's CEO has done? Perhaps a press release would be in order as well?

Editor's note: NASA Watch has been dumping on Dan Goldin rather strongly these past few days over the release of the Young report. In fairness, I have to say that he has been taking some heat for the failure of the Mars missions, and the growing need to re-examine his Faster-Better-Cheaper approach to exploring space. I'd like to see more, but, to be fair he has been taking some steady punishment. Yet, while Dan is taking the heat, there has been one glaring absence in this post-Young report period: comment from Lockheed Martin.

LockMart has botched two Mars missions in a row by making stupid and inexcusable mistakes. Has anyone from LockMart had the spine to stand up and say they're sorry? No. This is inexcusable. Dan Goldin was jumping back and forth across the country while LockMart CEO Vance Coffman was lying in the sun on vacation in Hawaii.

"Don't believe what you read in the press" Dan Goldin told JPL employees today as he sought to pump up morale.

Editor's note: Dan Goldin has been placing a lot of emphasis upon the need for people at NASA to feel that they can freely and openly communicate with management when problems arise. What Dan still seems to be utterly oblivious to is the culture he has so ruthlessly hammered into place over the past 8 years - one where shooting the messenger has become a high art - and very few people are willing to be the messenger. This reluctance to speak out won't change overnight Dan. Have a look back at the way NASA employees responded 4 years ago ...

Meanwhile. Goldin refused to answer any questions.

"NASA has announced the results of its Mars Polar Lander investigation team's report. The Mars Polar Lander's December 1999 demise apparently occurred when the lander thought the jolt of its landing leg deployment was touchdown - and shut its engines off. Moments later it crashed into Mars at freeway speed, the second probe to do so in less than 4 months. The two Deep Space-2 probes, ironically designed to intentionally crash into Mars at 400 miles per hour, also vanished without a trace. The teams investigating that loss suggested simply that the DS-2 probes should not have been launched - since they were not ready to be launched in the first place."

Editor's rant: The release of these latest mission failure reports serve to call NASA's Faster - Better - Cheaper approach to mission design further into question. Stupid mistakes are being made by smart people because there is not enough time or resources to do things right. Meanwhile NASA's Adminstrator proudly cheered on as NASA's budget went on a 7 year decline. Given his 7.99 years at NASA's helm (his 8th anniversary is on April Fool's day), and his relentless, often maniacal pursuit of his ever-present faster - better- cheaper managerial mantra, Dan Goldin has some explaining to do.

In the past several weeks Dan has been all over the place - answering what he wanted to answer about these failures when he could come to NASA's defense, and ducking behind the fact that the reports were still not final when the questions got tough. Just last week Dan Goldin took "personal responsibility" before Congress for these and other problems at NASA.

Curiously, Dan Goldin was no where to be seen today while others took the heat. Nor did his surrogates hint as to whether he'd have anything to say about these latest reports. Meanwhile, No one at NASA, JPL, or Lockheed Martin seems to be in line for any sort of disciplinary action. In addition, just as was the case when the report was released showing how Lockheed Martin botched Mars Climate Orbiter, no one from NASA would step up today to address the issue of contractor culpability or punitive measures for this latest foul up.

There is a lot of talk of "lessons learned" at NASA these days - while spacecraft crash (or are shaken apart) and the space station circles emptily overhead, looking exactly like it did a year ago. In the private sector, a CEO who's company made high-profile, stupid mistakes like this or failed to get a product line to market within budget after multi-year delays would be pounding the pavement.

Not at NASA. Its Administrator has an 8 year track record wherein saying you're sorry and that you will try harder next time is good enough. Everyone at NASA is now trying this approach. What a splendid example Dan Goldin has set for his agency. Only cost matters. Performance is now secondary and failure is acceptable - the taxpayers - and space exploration be damned.

Once again, Dan Goldin has some explaining to do. Word has it that he'll be at JPL on Wednesday ...

"By Goldin's analysis Wednesday, NASA -- in reducing its workforce from 25,000 to 18,500 over the past seven years -- lost too many senior scientists and overseers, and used personnel so young and untrained that they failed to mention to their superiors glaring problems that later caused catastrophic failures. Goldin told senators he had learned from his failures: ``Did we push the limits? You bet. Did we push too hard? Absolutely.'' Editor's note: Gee Dan, I guess YOU weren't listening 4 years ago when the downsizing began and these exact consequences were being predicted.

"This is world class performance by any reasonable standard," Goldin declared. But he did admit to management shortfalls and noted that NASA had initiated many of the independent reviews to assess the causes. The reports have come to some common findings, he acknowledged, particularly regarding inadequate adherence to good management principles."

"An equipment malfunction or software glitch probably caused the mishap that cracked a satellite's solar panels during preflight testing, the mission's project manager said Friday. "

Editor' s note: NASA Watch has learned from someone@nasa.gov that this is not the first time this sort of damage has occurred at JPL. In 1984, the back-up high gain antenna for Galileo was on a shake table at JPL and was shaken at 3 times expected Shuttle launch loads. The antenna was damaged as a result. When the flight antenna was shaken at just normal Shuttle launch loads it was damaged and declared scrap. Instead of incurring the cost and schedule hits that would have been required to redesign the antenna, the project manager (John Casani) decided to launch "with risk" instead and installed the back-up antenna on Galileo. Galileo's main antenna subsequently failed to unfurl properly on its way to Jupiter. The original flight antenna is now part of a Galileo display at JPL.

" In the latest headache for NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a $75 million satellite was damaged when it was shaken 10 times harder than intended during tests. At least two of the four panels on the High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager will have to be replaced, delaying the launch from July until at least January. Tests were being planned Thursday to look for internal damage."

Editor's note: There was a shaker table mishap at JPL today. According to our sources there was a GSFC satellite (HESSI - High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager) - in the unit at the time. Engineers were performing a test and lost control resulting in damage to the satellite.

HESSI is scheduled to be launched in July 2000 as part of NASA's Small Explorer Program. HESSI's primary mission is to explore the basic physics of particle acceleration and energy release in solar flares. According to NASA its primary observations would involve "simultaneous, high resolution imaging and spectroscopy of solar flares from 3 keV X-rays to 20 MeV gamma rays with high time resolution". The HESSI project is managed by the Laboratory for Astronomy and Solar Physics at GSFC.

° HESSI Home Page, NASA GSFC
° HESSI Fact Sheet

"A $72 million mission to trace solar flares from Earth orbit was set back at least six months this week when the spacecraft was shaken 10 times harder than planned, NASA said Thursday. The accident cracked two solar panels on the High-Energy Solar Spectrograph Imager - and the spacecraft will have to be taken apart to check for further damage."

"The shaking cracked at least two of four solar panels on the High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager, and tests were planned to find internal damage. Launch, which had been scheduled for July, will be pushed back at least to January. It's the latest embarrassment for the space agency and Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which last year lost two high-profile missions to Mars. The cause of the mishap was still under investigation, JPL spokeswoman Mary Beth Murrill said Thursday."

"Stephenson's team, while looking at the Mars Orbiter failure, discovered the problem with the polar lander engines and concluded they should be fired earlier to prepare them for the Martian atmosphere. It took a veteran spacehand on his review team only about 10 minutes to spot the polar lander problem, Stephenson told The Huntsville Times, although it had apparently slipped by Lockheed Martin propulsion system designers. Stephenson said he did not think the UPI story is correct, but his team will now go back and look at the Lockheed Martin test data to make sure the tests weren't rigged. "

"We are working with NASA's public affairs office to determine how best to respond here at JPL. In the meantime, I would suggest alerting your troops to refer any calls from reporters to NASA's response on their home page or to have them contact NASA's public affairs office directly. We should stir clear of this unless events change."

Editor's note: as this gag order was being released Dan Goldin was testifying before the Senate that NASA had not done a good job of facilitating communication such that people were free to raise issues. "People were talking and we were not listening" he said. He added that if "anyone in America has information, they should bring it to our attention and we'll investigate it." It would seem that despite Goldin's testimony that it is still not possible for people to speak openly at NASA.

• Hearing Summary by Keith Cowing, editor, NASA Watch
• Opening statement by Sen. Frist (R-TN) [HTML] [Acrobat]
• Opening statement by Sen. John McCain [HTML] [Acrobat].

• Dan Goldin [Oral statement: Acrobat]

Panel 2

• Allen Li, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs, U.S. General Accounting Office [Statement: Acrobat]
• Harry McDonald, Director, Ames Research Center, NASA
• Tony Spear, (Retired from Jet Propulsion Laboratory) Task Leader, NASA [Statement: Acrobat]
• Art Stevenson, Director, Marshal Space Flight Center, NASA

- 1:00 - 4:00 pm - NASA Management Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space; Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee (recorded 3/22/00) - HQ

- 4:00 - 6:00 pm - Life and Microgravity Sciences and Applications FY 2001 Budget Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics; Committee on Science - HQ"

"UPI never called us and never asked us about this before putting it out. The suggestion that we knew about [problems with the Polar Lander] and didn't tell the public about it is just plain wrong." Brian Welch -- NASA"

Editor's note: I spoke with Jim Oberg. Space.com did not contact Oberg in the process of writing this story. Also, for what it's worth, Oberg claims that he did attempt to contact NASA and Lockheed Martin as he prepared his story. NASA did not respond, and Lockheed Martin would not provide him with the information he requested.

"Brian Welch, director of public affairs at NASA headquarters in Washington, said "we think the story is whacko in every particular.""

"Both the Stephenson and Casani (John Casani, retired JPL flight programs head and also director of mission assurance) teams have conducted intensive reviews relating to Mars Polar Lander, and their teams have surfaced no evidence relating to thruster acceptance testing irregularities as alleged by UPI. In fact, members of the review teams are using words like "bunk," "complete nonsense," and "wacko," to describe their reactions to UPI's charge.

Editor's note: Peggy and Brian: would you mind telling us who actually used the terms "bunk," "complete nonsense," and "wacko"? This is starting to sound like the sort of (apparently) unsubtantiated material you often complain about on NASA Watch .....

As to the substance of your response, you mention the Mars Climate Orbiter report and its recommendations for the MPL mission (which had yet to land) but make no mention of what the Young Report found about why MPL failed. Moreover, you never address whether the engine test Oberg refers to did or did not happen. Space.com has confirmed what Oberg reported i.e. an engine test was run at room temperature - not at the cold temperatures that would have been expected at Mars - just as Oberg's source said. Did or didn't the test happen?

The question remains: What did NASA know and when did NASA know it?

"As explained privately to UPI, the Mars Polar Lander vehicle's braking thrusters had failed acceptance testing during its construction. But rather than begin an expensive and time-consuming redesign, an unnamed space official simply altered the conditions of the testing until the engine passed. "

Editor's note: If this is true, someone should be indicted.

"When contacted by MSNBC, spokesmen for NASA Headquarters and Lockheed Martin said they couldn't comment in depth about the yet-to-be-released Polar Lander report. But after checking with agency officials, NASA spokesman Don Savage took issue with the claim that test requirements were changed to allow the engines to pass the tests. "Nothing like that turned up in the investigations that were conducted by the independent review teams," he told MSNBC."

"The NASA investigation board, chaired by Art Stephenson, director of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Ala., found that cold temperatures could affect the performance Mars Polar Lander's descent engine, which begins firing at about 2 kilometers (about 10 miles) altitude during the descent to Mars surface. As a result of the finding, a team of engineers at NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif., has developed procedures to warm up the engine system prior to firing. In addition, the team has analyzed descent engine performance at a range of temperatures to assess its predicted performance upon arrival."

Editor's note: just what sort of finding was it that tipped the Investigation board that there might be a problem with the temperature of the catalyst bed? Oh yes - anyone who takes the time to do the english/metric conversion will see that NASA still has problems doing conversions. 2 km does not = 10 miles.

Editor's note: Word has it that the MPL investigation team headed by Tom Young delivered its final report to NASA HQ last week. At a meeting of the NASA Advisory Council last Wednesday, Office of Policy and Plans Associate Administrator Lori Garver said that NASA would be reviewing this report and that it would be sent to the White House for review. No firm date for its release was set but Garver suggested that this might happen towards the end of March.

Meanwhile, hearings before the House Science Committee on NASA's Mars exploration program originally scheduled for 22 March have been postponed and have yet to be rescheduled. Congressional sources suggest early April as the earliest date NASA will be prepared to face the music.

What is to be revealed?

NASA Watch has learned that the report has some rather devastating findings which will cast significant doubt on the ability of NASA and its contractor (Lockheed Martin) to produce and operate viable spacecraft on or around Mars.

Stay tuned.

"Mr. Goldin's safety topic for the day was NASA Lessons Learned. Mr. Goldin shared a quote by Philosoper George Santayana, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."

Editor's note: NASA and its contractor team have botched two Mars missions in a row, Dan. Since you are fond of saying that you "accept responsibility" in these situations, the obvious question is what are YOU going to do to fix the situation? Have YOU learned any lessons? Perhaps you'll enlighten us all at the Senate hearings on "NASA Management".

Update: Dan was long on platitudes and pop management buzz words, but short on specifics when it came to how he was going to address the multiple failures that have arisen after 8 years of his management of NASA.

"The Goldin-ordered reports will urge sweeping revisions in the way the Mars program is planned, managed, and executed. An independent panel chaired by former Lockheed Martin manager Tom Young is expected to criticize the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena for failing to manage the last two Mars missions adequately. It also will take both NASA headquarters and Lockheed Martin to task for their respective roles in the botched orbiter and lander projects. NASA officials are bracing for the worst. Goldin recently told his managers that the Young report will be the Rogers Commission of space science, referring to the devastating critique delivered by a panel that examined the 1986 Challenger disaster."

Editor's note: I wish I could post the entire article here (but can't). It is worth going to your library and reading - for it outlines the (sad) shape of things to come.

"Managers of NASA's Mars exploration program are bracing for a potentially devastating report about the failure of two Mars spacecraft last year and the future direction of the effort. An independent panel led by retired aerospace manager Tom Young is expected to release a study at the end of this month criticizing NASA, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, and the Lockheed Martin Corp. of Denver for their roles in the two disasters. "

"No one individual is considered negligent or lacked competence in the failures of the missions, and those involved are wiser and more capable of getting it right next time, said Larry Dumas, deputy director of JPL. "Certainly no heads will roll at JPL," Dumas said. "We view it as a learning experience."

Editor's note: Chalking this all up to experience isn't enough, Larry. You might want to get a reality check by reading the post-MCO and MPL crash reports a bit more closely. I am certain the taxpayers would like you to find less expensive ways to have these "learning experiences".

"The United States is to abandon its ambitious plans to bring back rocks from the surface of Mars before the end of the decade. It is a decision that could set back hopes of an astronaut landing on the Red Planet by many years. The search for life on the Red Planet will have to slow down until people on Earth have worked out how to land on Mars without crashing," [Carl Pilcher] said. "

Editor's note: This sounds somewhat defeatist to me, Carl. I am sure there are people out there who can land things on Mars. Perhaps they should be given a chance to do so.

Perhaps the fault lies in how NASA has managed its programs - not with its inherent technological expertise. NASA needs to think things out more thoroughly and be open and honest in the deliberations that lead to an overall plan - instead of just lurching ahead as it did in 1996, fueled by post-ALH84001 hoopla.

As for figuring out how to "land on Mars without crashing" - Pathfinder worked just fine. Why is it that NASA has no plans to use this proven landing system again? Sounds like a program out of synch to me i.e. run an engineering test in a fashion where the results can't be applied to subsequent missions. Why do the test if you can't (won't) apply the lessons learned? One of the keys to Pathfinder was its management style. Sadly, this was the first thing about Pathfinder to be un-learned.

Perhaps there has been too much of a preoccupation with "cheaper" than with "better" and "faster". After all, these missions are intended to study Mars, not to save money.

"NASA's desire to have it all might work, experts say, but it hasn't yet and a new report says the concept of "faster, better and cheaper" may never work without a new approach."

"NASA has formed a team to respond to a pair of highly critical independent reports attacking the space agency's basic exploration philosophy, just months after two unmanned Mars missions failed, costing hundreds of millions of dollars. "

"In the wake of last year's double failure in its Mars campaign, NASA signaled Monday that it would refocus its "faster, better, cheaper" approach to space exploration in line with a new mantra: "mission success first." NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin said the flurry of management reviews provided "a roadmap for improving our performance," but outside observers said a lot of the map"s details still had to be filled in."

"The demise of both probes appears to rest on human error. The orbiter was led astray because engineers and spacecraft operators used two different systems of measure to figure out the spacecraft's position. The most likely cause of Polar Lander's failure is a mechanical flaw in its landing legs that inadvertently triggered the probe's braking rocket to shut down prematurely, causing the spacecraft to fall the last 3,000 feet to the planet's surface. "

NASA Administrator Dan Goldin received two reports today on his agency's performance as it explores Mars. A third report is soon to follow. The first report focused on NASA's "Faster/Cheaper/Better" approach to mission design which suggests that NASA needs " to slow down some, not rush too quickly into important Programs and Projects, plan and implement them more carefully, and move away from fixations on cost and near term gain." The second report contains the final findings on the cause of the Mars Climate Orbiter failure. The report found that NASA " failed to introduce sufficient discipline in the processes used to develop, validate and operate the spacecraft; nor did it adequately instill a mission success culture that would shore up the risk introduced by these cuts."

Still to come is a report on the Mars Polar Lander failure which is expected to be very critical of NASA. This report is scheduled for delivery to NASA on 15 March, but NASA will not be making any public comment on its contents for several weeks.

°NASA Press release
°NASA Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) Task Final Report (Full report - 124 K Adobe Acrobat file)
°Report on Project Management in NASA by the Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board (Executive Summary) (Full report - 473 K Adobe Acrobat file)

"The organization that I spent most of my professional career in had these same problems," states Charles Harlan, the now retired head of safety at the NASA Johnson Space Center in Houston. "The current top management at NASA is famous for "kill the messenger''- type management style." Harlan, now an aerospace safety consultant, concludes: "It is somewhat depressing that neither Boeing nor NASA can rise above this kind of behavior."

"The "Mission To Mars'' movie Web site will not only provide the awe-inspiring television ad, but also brings site visitors an exciting online adventure game starting Feb. 7, that puts them in the heart of the Mars mission. Sponsored by Lockheed Martin, the online challenge encompasses a combination of Shockwave game activities and questions/answers, that invite guests to join the adventure by navigating their spaceship to Mars -- including lift-off, deep space travel and Mars landing -- and establishing a base camp. "

Editor's note: The film preview is quite impressive and is worth a look. Curiously, the website has a number of links to NASA Mars mission websites. All of these links point to MPL, MCO, or DS-2 - all Lockheed Martin Mars missions that failed. Oops.

Editor's Note: contains full panel membership.

Sidebar story:

"FACTS: Mr. Cowing, wo steckt der Wurm im Mars-Programm der Nasa?
Keith Cowing: Die Balance zwischen Risiko und Nutzen ist falsch gewählt. Das Motto «schneller, besser, billiger» hat nicht funktioniert, weil das «billiger» immer zu stark betont wurde."

Editor's note: faster, better, cheaper = "schneller, besser, billiger".

"The team will evaluate several recent successful and unsuccessful NASA missions to deep space, including Mars Pathfinder, Mars Global Surveyor, Mars Climate Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, Deep Space 1 and Deep Space 2."

Missions covered by Assessment Team:

Upcoming missions:

Prior Missions:

Editor's note: Is anyone else out there troubled by this?

Editor's update: I have already started to get hate mail from folks at Lockmart.

"Wide-ranging managerial and technical actions are underway at JPL in response to the loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter and the initial findings of NASA's mission failure investigation board, whose first report was released Nov. 10."

Editor's note: no mention whatsoever is made in this sanitized PAO report of the press conference of the statement made by Noel Hinners, Lockheed Martin's representative at the press conference that the metric/english units specification was "overlooked" by Lockheed Martin, nor of the discussion over Lockheed Martin's award fee, nor the non-response Ed Stone gave to repeated questions about a "gag order" in place at JPL, nor the fact that OSS AA Ed Weiler told people that they are free to contact him if they have concerns.

I guess that is why Ed Stone seems to be suggesting that people not pay attention to news reports of the very same press conference (see below).

Staying focused

"....It is also going to be very easy to become distracted by the media. Concentrating on today's headlines is not going to help us land on Dec. 3."

"Rumors

The NASA report has many excellent recommendations for Mars Polar Lander - and we are acting upon all of them. That means we are questioning everything-from top to bottom. But raising questions is not the same as concluding that something is wrong. Rumors have already gone from our hallways to the Internet and then into main-stream print and broadcast media. In this way rumors can take on the appearance of conclusions, and that can be source of further distraction. We just completed an in-depth look at the Polar Lander design by our engineers. Although there is a lot to do in the next three weeks, we know of nothing that stands in our way of landing safely on Dec. 3."

"A question from JSC caused a minor stir. Jim Oberg asked if the "gag order" was going to be lifted on people involved with the project and if they'd be able to talk openly about what happened. Ed Stone replied rather sternly that the team had a landing to prepare for in three weeks and that this was their main focus right now. Stone did not directly address the "gag order" issue. A follow-up question from NASA HQ addressed the issue again. Once again Stone dodged the issue and stated that a "report will be issued in February and that it will probably be released". He did not directly address the issue of employees having the right to speak out.

Editor's note: members of the MCO and MPL teams from JPL, NASA, and Lockheed Martin are hereby invited to pass on their experiences to NASA Watch at nasawatch@reston.com. Let us know if your name can be used or if you'd prefer that it not be used.

Editor's note: Ed Weiler can be reached at eweiler@mail.hq.nasa.gov, +1.202.358.1409 (voice) , or +1.202.358.3096 (fax).

You can also call the NASA Inspector General's hotline at +1.800.424.9183 (information is confidential - caller may remain anonymous), send them a letter at NASA Office of Inspector General, P.O. Box 23089, L'Enfant Plaza Station, Washington, D.C. 20026, or visit their web page and tell them what you know.

"In a scathing report released Wednesday, an investigation board concluded that NASA engineers failed to convert English measures of rocket thrusts to newton, a metric system measuring rocket force. "

"For nine months, the Mars Climate Orbiter was speeding through space and speaking to NASA in metrics. But the engineers on the ground were replying in non-metric English. It was a mathematical mismatch that was not caught until after the $125 million spacecraft, a key part of NASA's Mars exploration program, was sent crashing too low and too fast into the Martian atmosphere. The craft has not been heard from since."

"A series of blunders, inadequate training and overworked personnel allowed a software failure to go undetected for months, causing the loss of NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter, agency investigators said Wednesday. "

"A complete breakdown of all controls -- poor training, mismanagement, lack of communication, cockiness, overwork and inadequate staffing -- caused the fundamental measurement error that destroyed a $125 million Mars space probe, a NASA investigation board announced Wednesday."

• The Board's report is available on-line at NASA at: ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1999/MCO_report.pdf
• Charts used in the briefing today are available on-line at NASA at: ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/1999/MCO_charts.pdf

Root cause: Failure to use metric units in the coding of a ground software file, "Small Forces" used in trajectory models.

Contributing causes:

1. Undetected mismodeling of spacecraft velocity changes.
2. Navigation Team unfamiliar with spacecraft.
3. Trajectory correction maneuver number 5 not performed.
4. System engineering process did not adequately address transition from development to operations.
5. Inadequate communications between project elements.
6. Inadequate operations Navigation Team staffing.
7. Inadequate training.
8. Verification and validation process did not adequately address ground software.