4 September 2002

On the table: A decision to Cancel CLCS

by someone@ksc.nasa.gov

This is a story of a major decision about to be made. It concerns countless lives, careers and the extreme dedication of KSC workers. The future of America's Space Program is at stake.

On the surface it appears to be of local interest for Kennedy Space Center only. It is not. America's future in space is at stake. It is very possible that this decision will pass in the night without notice.

Every time the Shuttle leaves Earth, the KSC's Launch Processing System (LPS) and the Launch Team perform the necessary tasks involved in the launch. LPS readies the Shuttle with data and fuel, controls all Ground Support Equipment and performs the launch under the control of a dedicated team at its consoles.

A lot is invested. A lot is a stake. Seven lives hang in the balance along with a $5.5 billion dollar vehicle. The science and hopes of many ride on every flight. Any single disaster would cause the Shuttle to be grounded for at least two years. In the worst case, cancellation of the Shuttle Program would result. Even a launch delay is very costly, driving up costs from any Space Station element waiting in the wings.

The decision before the NASA Administrator today is whether to upgrade the older LPS system or replace it with a modern system being developed at Kennedy Space Center. The new system is called the Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS).

There is a quiet battle occurring at KSC. To each side the path is clear. Each side feels strongly. Each side is intelligent and experienced. The final decision is up to the NASA Administrator and ultimately Congress.

The decision is more complex than the public knows. It can be difficult to understand. None-the-less it must be made correctly.

LPS was built in the early to late 70's. It was and is a superb engineering achievement. Its custom machine code does one job and does it well, launch. By all accounts it is technologically ancient, however, it is fast, even by today's standards. It does the job it was meant to and has never let us down.

LPS is difficult to learn and master, but the Shuttle Engineers have mastered it. They are comfortable with it and trust it when they must meet their responsibility at the console on Launch day. LPS was an extremely difficult system to build. The toughest project of anyone's career. It took eight years and hundreds of people. The workdays often stretched to 2:00 a.m.

As superb as LPS is, it has its drawbacks today. Its age is causing failures. Approximately 25 a day, in a six-day work week. In the Shuttle world, any time spent fixing problems rather than complete attention to a launch introduces risk.

LPS upgrades are tough; some will be impossible in the real world of money or skill constraints. The LPS system is currently at its limits. Memory is full. New additions have to give up something, always. Needed changes can't be added. A current video card in a home PC has more executable memory than the 15 LPS consoles combined that launch the Shuttle.32 times more!

Another problem with LPS is that it isn't attracting new talent to operate it and sustain it. The computer languages that it uses haven't been taught in college for decades.

With no hope for a new launch vehicle in the next decade, the Shuttle may live and require a launch system for 20 more years. New Orbiter upgrades for safety can't be added without major and costly surgery to LPS. It's doubtful that an engineering team can be assembled to modify LPS at all or do it in time if the team did exist. Any future urgency, say, for a needed safety upgrade for the Orbiter, will drive LPS costs through the roof.

The Checkout and Launch Control System (CLCS) was created differently than LPS. It provides more safety and more operator visibility into launch problems before they occur. It is expandable and capable of being upgraded. It is designed to accomplish not only today's Shuttle launches, but also provides a launch capability for any future vehicle. It is written in modern computer languages and attracts new college graduates. CLCS development has forced KSC personnel to delve into old launch programs and re-acquaint themselves with the internal details that may have been lost over years of attrition and layoffs. It is a new start and could be key in the future of KSC. It matches the public image of NASA as a technology leader. Over two hundred million dollars and six years of work have been spent on CLCS to date. CLCS is roughly 70% finished.

CLCS is a state-of-the art system and has been in development since mid 1996. It is the toughest task in anyone's career. The overtime is extreme, the dedication outstanding. Each person on the team has put everything into this replacement system, often at the expense of health and family. The CLCS main development has roughly two more years to go. The exact schedule is not completely predictable, nor is its final cost.

CLCS is actually the second attempt at a wholesale replacement of LPS. The NASA Administrator canceled the first replacement attempt, called CORE, in 1993 after six years of painstaking work and hundreds of millions of dollars spent. All software was thrown away and the hardware transferred or excised. Budget was very tight and CORE was not universally accepted at KSC. Stepping up to a big change was difficult for workers familiar with LPS and the CORE system was predicated to come in over budget. The project was ripe, ready to be picked. After its cancellation, the money was allocated elsewhere to solve other problems.

CLCS is not without it problems. Development costs and predicted sustaining cost estimates have grown over initial commitments. They have grown significantly. CLCS is complex. The Orbiter and launch are complex. Over 64,000 measurements and commands are dealt with on a millisecond basis. Mistakes are not permitted. CLCS software is large and has many interdependencies. Software problems exist but not beyond industry norms. There will be years of testing before a launch, but KSC users of CLCS, by nature, want the software problems reduced and as soon as possible. The new CLCS system must acquire the confidence that LPS has today.

Every line item of budget relating to the Space Shuttle from the Hubble Space Telescope to the Space Station depends on one thing: getting the Shuttle off the ground safely and on time. Can we do this in five years or twenty years? Can we do it without attracting new talent from our nation's brightest?

If CLCS is canceled, it will be eight to ten years from the decision to restart before a new KSC Launch system could be in place. It will cost more than today's CLCS.

The decision is now on the table, LPS or CLCS. Old versus new. The budget pressure to cancel CLCS is intense. Space Station cost overruns are a matter of record. NASA needs the money more than at any time in the past and CLCS is ripe, ready to be picked. The question is: Does NASA need the new system? Will NASA make a decision based on the near-term budget problem or the future?

This decision must be made very carefully.