"Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) member Roger Tetrault said his panel stopped short of making the elimination of all waivers a requirement for the shuttle's return to flight, but did make an "off-the-record" recommendation to NASA that it begin that process. Columbia's final mission, STS-107, flew with 1,500 to 1,800 waivers."

"A task force Tuesday discussed strategies to ensure the Texas Air National Guard's 147th Fighter Wing stays at Ellington Field despite Department of Defense budget cuts."

Editor's note: Too bad one of those Homeland Security types weren't asked about NASA's 747 flyover today - BEFORE the plane took off from Ellington.

"NASA officials admit that in retrospect they should have warned the public that the flight was no cause for concern. They say no other similar flights are planned."

"NASA spokesman Doug Petersen says it was such a beautiful day, NASA officials decided to take the photos. They apologize for any anxious moments they may have caused Houstonians."

Editor's note: DUH. Make that a double DUH. Not only was this a dumb idea, JSC PAO's response is dumb as well. As I recall 11 September 2001 was "such a beautiful day" as two airliners flew over my house as they departed Dulles airport.

Job opportunities for the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) will be posted on Monday, September 8, 2003 at:

• Internal (NASA): http://www.nasajobs.nasa.gov
• External (open to outside NASA): http://usajobs.opm.gov

"The NESC is looking for NASA's best and brightest engineers, scientists and technicians to perform independent technical assessment of NASA's programs. Selection will begin in approximately two weeks."

"Roy D. Bridges is in his second week as director of NASA's Langley Research Center, where the space agency's new Engineering and Safety Center will be based. He said developing the safety center will be his top priority."

"A report issued in June by NASA's inspector general raised questions about the agency's supervision of its contractors. The report looked at the United Space Alliance's safety procedures at the Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral, Fla. It concluded that while inspection responsibilities were clearly defined in the contract, NASA did not oversee the alliance's procedures as laid out in the agreement."

"... Kennedy's procedures for ensuring that USA properly implemented those safety requirements were not the same procedures defined in the SFOC."

"Amid questions about the independence of the commission investigating the space shuttle disaster, NASA said Tuesday that agency administrator Sean O'Keefe concurred in the appointment of a commission consultant with whom O'Keefe once had business ties as a corporate director."

"Q: If NASA makes a decision, at the end of the current 2-year SFOC contract extension to either recompete SFOC in whole or in part, or break it up in some segmented way, structural way, do you see any risks in pursuing that?

A: Yes. I do. I am a believer that transition of the established programs, particularly safety programs always entails risk; therefore should be avoided unless there is some compelling reason to do so."

"Budget-strapped NASA is so focused on immediate space shuttle needs that long-term safety planning has suffered and the entire system is at future risk, an advisory panel says."

Editor's note: Last week the Pegasus launch vehicle carrying NASA's first X-43A hypersonic test vehicle went out of control moments after it ignited its propulsion system. The range safety officer was quickly forced to destroy the vehicle. Debris landed in the Pacific Ocean. Nothing was recovered. The mission was a total failure.

Alas, NASA's first press release included the word "mishap" to characterize what happened. A slightly inaccurate term to be sure. Then NASA started to discuss the accident internally.

It is one thing to try and put the best spin on a blatant failure as you inform the public. However, the lock step usage of the term mishap internally certainly strikes me as a collective attempt at denial.

"R/Reck: On Saturday, June 2, 2001, a mishap occurred with the X-43A test flight. A mishap investigation board is being formed.

S/Weiler: The High Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager (HESSI) launch is on hold while investigators determine the cause of the mishap that occurred during the X-43A test flight on Saturday.

DFRC/Petersen: Dryden is supporting the X-43A mishap investigation board.

KSC/Bridges: 2) HESSI/Pegasus Countdown Rehearsal is in progress today, and the launch aircraft and integrated stack are at the Skid Strip at Cape Canaveral. The launch is on hold pending the resolution of the mishap with the X-43.

MSFC/Stephenson: Bob Hughes will be leading the X-43A mishap investigation."

"There was no damage to property on the ground, and there were no injuries and no damage to the carrier aircraft. A team of qualified personnel is being formed to investigate the cause of the mishap."

"The term 'mishap' has a fairly well accepted definition within the safety and investigation communities, which makes your criticism of NASA's use of the term in relation to the X-43A flight ill-founded."

Editor's note: The aviation community also regularly uses the somewhat oxymoronic term "near miss" to describe an instance where two airplanes almost collide. I have always wondered why the much more accurate phrase "near collision" is never used. All I can come up with is that some anonymous advisory committee staffer sought to coin a term that would not upset people unduly (or attract unwanted media attention!). Update: I am now told this term had its origin in World War II.

While the term "mishap" has indeed been bestowed with official status regarding its usage to describe event such as the failure of the X-43A flight, this does not mean that NASA has to default to usage of this word every single time the event is referred to! To me, the word "mishap" strikes me as being synonymous with "Oops" and does not come close to describing what happened last week - i.e the deliberate and total destruction of a launch vehicle and its payload due to an apparent major malfunction in the launch vehicle.

Oh well.

"A NASA Lear Jet Model 24 flight research support aircraft was heavily damaged today during a landing at the Southern California Air Logistics Base, formerly George Air Force Base near Victorville, Calif., while on a flight originating from the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, Calif. The incident occurred at about 11:50 a.m."

"We found that the Johnson Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Office (Johnson Safety Office) is not providing the required support to the Manager, Space Shuttle Program Safety and Mission Assurance (Space Shuttle Program Safety Manager), for oversight of USA's safety activities. We also found that NASA's contractor surveillance plans do not address all SFOC requirements for safety; USA did not update its Management Plan to reflect organizational and personnel changes to the SFOC, including changes in key safety personnel from NASA and USA; and USA's reporting to NASA of close calls and mishaps needs improvement. As a result, NASA does not have adequate management controls in place to ensure (1) effective oversight of USA's safety operations under the SFOC, (2) better control over $13 million3 in annual Space Shuttle Program funds provided to the Johnson Safety Office, and (3) that adequate corrective actions are taken on all safety mishaps and close calls. "

Editor's note: In August 2000 a support contractor at NASA MSFC fired Jim Bult, a radiation safety officer when he complained about safety issues at MSFC. NASA management approved of this action. When the news became public, MSFC Center Director Art Stephenson issued a statement (after the fact) saying that they had just become aware of these issues. Since that time, neither NASA or the contractor AJT and Associates has had the common decency to offer Mr. Bult his job or any compensation. OSHA is now involved.

Contrary to Mr. Goldin's regular statements about safety being NASA's number one concern - and that people should feel free to raise these concerns without fear of recrimination - NASA's actions suggest otherwise. If Mr. Goldin actually stands by his own safety propaganda then he should seek to resolve this situation now. Not to do so makes all of his safety and personnel pronouncements ring hollow.

Editor's note: copies of this letter were sent to NASA and AJT & Associates.

"As the site Radiation Safety Officer, I provided Marshall Space Flight Center, it's employees, and it's management, with competent, professional, and courteous service. I personally devised and implemented across the board improvements to the extremely inadequate program which I inherited. Throughout my tenure as RSO, I was confronted with indifference, resistance, pressure, and ultimately overt harassment and attempted intimidation. Ultimately, I was terminated from my employment by AJT and Associates, with full knowledge and concurrence of NASA and Kelsey-Seybold, due to my refusal to compromise Radiation Standards I was employed, and legally and professionally bound, to implement."

Finding #1: The current planning horizon for the Space Shuttle does not afford opportunity for safety improvements that will be needed in the years beyond that horizon.

Finding #5: The KSC facilities, ground support equipment, and test and checkout gear to support Space Shuttle processing and launch operations continue to age. The status of the potential readiness of these essential assets has been projected, but there is no detailed, funded plan to ensure that this aging infrastructure can safely support the Space Shuttle for its likely operational life.

Finding #8: Because of the innovative processes used, there is some possibility that all of the design knowledge related to safety issues that has been acquired by the NASA X-38 team may not be transferred to the contractor selected to build the operational CRV.

Finding #11: The critical skills challenge faced by NASA and its contractors in the Space Shuttle and ISS programs continues despite resumption of active recruiting of experienced and new employees.

Finding #12: NASA's recent hiring of inexperienced personnel, along with continuing shortages of experienced, highly-skilled workers, has produced the chal-lenge of training and integrating employees into organizations that are highly pressured by the expanded Space Shuttle flight rates associated with the ISS. There is no systematic effort to capture the knowledge of experienced personnel before they leave. Stress levels within the workforce are a continuing concern.

Finding #13: Recent downsizing and limitations on hiring have produced a workforce with aberrations in normal career development patterns and a potential future shortage of experienced leadership.

Finding #14: While NASA has made major changes to emphasize the need to utilize IV&V on safety critical projects, the technology is not well understood by program managers and other relevant NASA personnel.

Editor's note: Gee Dan, after almost 9 years, and an avowed focus on safety, it would seem that your record is less than stellar. Isn't it ironic how all of those layoffs you were so eager to make a few years ago now come back to haunt you ... just as you hope to convince the Bush folks to keep you on the job ...

"1) Mr. Goldin called for Center Directors (CD's) and AA's to be personally committed to creating and maintaining an open environment in which safety issues can be easily raised. He will follow-up with his senior managers in several weeks to ensure action is taken.

2) A Management Advisory Group is being established to ensure that NASA is aligned with Presidential policy to "flatten the federal hierarchy by redistributing positions and resources from high-level management positions to front-line service delivery jobs." This group will review the organizational and reporting structure of the Agency and will identify opportunities for improving utilization of our SES, ST, and SL positions across the Agency. Members include Mr. Rothenberg (Chair), Ms. Garman, Mr. Frankle, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Christensen, Ms. Novak, and Dr. Blumberg."

Editor's note: Hmmm ... actions concerning an "open environment" and direction to "flatten the federal hierarchy" ... It's amazing how fast Dan can act to reverse conflicting public statements on his part (see below) when the Transition Team is looking over his shoulder ...

4. Mr. Goldin

"Mr. Goldin referred to the last SMC meeting minutes and stated that with current and projected budget levels, NASA cannot do everything. Safety comes before anything else. We must focus on doing fewer things better. We need to have the proper balance between the work we do in-house and work that is performed by the academic and entrepreneurial, high-technology communities. We must alleviate the stress on our people by prioritizing and only taking on those activities critical to the NASA mission. No matter what funding level is provided to NASA in the President's budget, strategic planning is essential to define the best NASA for the future. The highest value to the American taxpayer can only be gained if we focus on strategic functions and limit what we undertake to the highest priority activities."

Editor's note: Contrary to what Dan Goldin said last Thursday in his NIAT webcast about encouraging NASA employees to ignore managerial hierarchies, his desire that people not feel "bullied" by management, and his assurance that people "should feel free to raise issues without fear of retribution", Goldin did just the opposite a few days before this webcast.

During a recent HEDS Assurance Board meeting at NASA Headquarters, a representative from the NASA Procurement Office was making a presentation regarding current acquisition policies and how they mesh with risk management and safety requirements. Dan Goldin was in attendance. Goldin said that he saw no reference to the safety hierarchy (the public, astronauts and pilots, NASA employees, and high-value equipment and facilities) in the person's presentation.

The procurement person very respectfully disagreed with Goldin. Goldin replied: "If you are going to disagree with me, I am going to leave." Goldin then got up and left right in the middle of the meeting. It is important to note that this meeting includes Mr. Goldin's participation only once per year and is carefully organized to provide the most benefit to Mr. Goldin as he attends.

It should be quite obvious to anyone who has spent any time with Mr. Goldin that he is just as incapable of applying the managerial directions he expects others to follow now as he was 8 years ago.

"... Goldin spoke of an inherent tendency for government "to desire a hierarchy. We tried to set up horizontal networks." He then encouraged NASA employees "not to worry about bureaucracy - we need to get away from the established hierarchy".

Goldin said that there needs to be "accountability with management. There should be no fear - manager should not play the blame game by pointing a finger and saying 'you screwed up' ". Goldin continued by saying that "anyone who feels that they are afraid of management should talk to Fred Gregory, Dan Mulville - or me. One thing this agency cannot tolerate is one where people bully other people.

One recurring theme in Goldin's comments was communication and the need for individuals to feel free to surface issues to management. Goldin made repeated references to the fact that employees should feel free to raise issues without fear of retribution. "The strength of this agency is its people - people who are empowered are not afraid of retribution."

"The [safety] issue arose again last week when a study from the General Accounting Office, a watchdog arm of Congress, repeated what other independent review boards had already found and reported. Namely, that NASA cut far too many workers during a restructuring that began in 1995 - especially among the ranks of veteran engineers and technicians - and put the fleet at risk."

"Conclusions

Over the last several years, NASA's strategic human capital planning was inadequate. While the agency was emphasizing workforce reductions, various NASA studies were showing that the shuttle workforce was being negatively impacted by the reductions. In the wake of analyses of workforce shortages agencywide over the past couple of years, NASA recognized that it had serious problems. The shuttle program was entering a critical phase in which it had to prepare for a doubling of its current flight rate to assemble the International Space Station while at the same time developing and incorporating numerous safety upgrades. NASA is now taking a number of important steps to address the effects of workforce reductions and to ensure that a proper skill mix and staffing level for the shuttle program is achieved and maintained. While the President's June 2000 directive provides further emphasis on the need for integrating human capital requirements with the strategic planning process, continued NASA management emphasis on human capital planning will be critical to continued safe shuttle operations in an environment of increasing flight rates."

"In 1994, NASA stopped approving additional upgrades pending the potential replacement of the shuttle with another reusable launch vehicle. NASA now believes that it will have to maintain the current shuttle fleet until at least 2012 and has established a development office to identify and prioritize upgrades to maintain and improve shuttle operational safety."

The loss of seasoned engineers and technicians in the U.S. space shuttle program threatens the safety of future missions as NASA prepares to double its annual number of launches to build the International Space Station, a government report said.

The General Accounting Office cited internal National Aeronautics and Space Administration documents showing "workforce reductions are jeopardizing NASA's ability to safely support the shuttle's planned flight rate."

The report, requested by Senator John McCain, the Arizona Republican who chairs the Senate Commerce Committee, said NASA's full-time workforce for the shuttle shrank last year to 1,800 from about 3,000 in 1995."

Editor's note: Last Spring, during testing at KSC, the US Lab Module "Destiny" was found to be in violation of ISS program noise requirements. The noise level inside the US Lab exceeds the "NC-50" noise requirement (a weighted-average thing that comes out roughly 50 dB). A requirements change, CR3361, was promptly generated to relax the requirement. The CR appears to be on a fast track to approval since the usual "Technical Coordination Meeting" that is held to discuss a proposed change has been "bypassed" because it has been "sufficiently coordinated with the affected parties."

The rationale given for requesting acceptance of this Change Request is " The USL acoustic environment has been reduced during development by addition of mufflers, wrapping noise sources with quieting materials, lining rack interiors with foam, and close-outs of acoustical openings. Additional reduction of acoustical noise would result in unacceptable schedule delays and excessive cost. Program management has indicated that additional quieting and operational constraints, if implemented, will be accomplished on-orbit. Noise levels higher than the specification are accepted based on short operational duration or crew operations. Detailed technical rationale is documented in NCR-ISS-5A-022, Stage 5A Integrated Acoustic Non-Compliance"

Included in the Adobe Acrobat file are:

• CR3361, "Exception to US Lab Acoustics NC50 Requirement"
• The TCM bypass notification for CR3361
• An extract from SSP41162, the specification for the US segment of ISS, with: the noise specification for the US segment and the existing waiver for Node 1
• An extract from SSP50005B (Space Station Flight Crew Integration Standard), section 5 (Natural and Induced Environments) with the NC-50 requirement and associated weighting curve).

Node 1 encountered the same situation. After testing, Node 1 was noisier than the requirement, but it was launched anyway. This is apparently symptomatic of what some people in the ISS program refer to as an "overall ISS bottom-up engineering philosophy", which basically says "Boeing builds what it builds, and if it doesn't meet the requirements (part of its contract with NASA), we'll change the requirements."

This, of course, can also be applied to Russia.

Editor's note: This CR (Change Request) is working its way through the system. It would seem that the Service Module is not the only ISS element with partially addressed noise problems - problems that may only be resolved after the element is in orbit.

Title: Russian Segment Acoustic Noise Violations
Number: 3774
Description: Russian Segment (FGB and Service Module) exceeds noise requirements
Full Text of Risk Summary: [Word] [Acrobat]

"(1) 2A.2 and 3A provides for relatively short noise exposure in the FGB (3A Crew does not go into SM). Shuttle flight rules on Acoustics are applicable for 10 - 14 day missions, and therefore can be applied to the FGB Prior to permanent crew habitation. (2) Quieting provisions were installed in the FGB on 2A.1 lessening the acoustical levels. Following completion of the acoustics data assessments from 2A.1, additional noise abatement measures may be required."

"There was a recent article in the Huntsville Times concerning the safety of some MSFC facilities using X-ray radiation equipment. When this came to my attention, the facilities were immediately shut down until it could be verified that they are safe and the appropriate procedures are in place. We will not compromise the safety of the Marshall team, civil service or contractor.

My greatest concern with this article is the allegation that communications relative to safety is discouraged. Nothing is further from the truth ... I encourage anyone who believes an unsafe condition or act is occurring to immediately bring it to the attention of the Center. In particular - - to our contractor workforce, you should not feel any constraints or intimidation from your employing company or customer organization for raising safety concerns."

Editor's note: Gee Art, isn't it odd that you only take decisive action after something embarassing is printed in the newspaper. Curiously, the action you have taken is exactly what Mr. Bult recommended - yet his employer (your Center's contractor) - saw fit to fire him for making the very same recommendation - and for pursuing these safety issues with the Inspector General's office when his management wanted him to shut up.

This is extremely hypocritical on your part, Art. The honorable thing to do would be to give Mr. Bult his job back - and a commendation for having raised these issues. Not to do so is to condone the actions of NASA and its contractor in firing Mr. Bult and to make your statement professing concern for safety at MSFC to ring hollow.

"Marshall Space Flight Center's radiation safety officer has been fired, and he says it's because he blew the whistle on lax practices that could have led to worker injury or death. ''There have been some severe problems, violations of federal regulations, up to and including falsification of safety-related documentation,'' the fired safety officer, Jim Bult, said Tuesday from his home in Harvest. He elaborated in an in-person interview on Wednesday."

Jim Bult, the Radiation Safety Officer at NASA MSFC has been fired by his employeer AJT & Associates for raising radiation safety issues and voicing concerns over falsification of safety related documentation at MSFC. Bult's name is listed on the NRC license for MSFC. AJT & Associates is a contractor providing service to NASA and aerospace companies.

Dale Ketcham, Public Affairs Officer for AJT & Associates corporate headquarters said that Mr. Bult "was fired for cause. It is a personnel matter and we don't comment on personnel matters." NASA MSFC Public Affairs would not comment on issues between an employee and their employer.

"A recent GAO report along with questions from Congress and several news articles have suggested we are lowering safety standards to accommodate theRussians and implied that safety issues will prevent the planned July launch of the Service Module (Zvezda)... In short, Russian hardware goes through the same safety process as NASA hardware. Let me deal with the noted "Russian safety" areas as follows: ...

"NASA's race to become "faster, better and cheaper'' has left its human spaceflight team too small and too inexperienced to safely cope with the high rate of shuttle flights that will be needed to build the International Space Station, the independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel reported Thursday."

"We did not in any way compromise the shuttle over the years,'' NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin said at the budget unveiling earlier this week. ''Each and every year, we monitored a whole variety of metrics to make sure we operate safely."

Finding #6, Space Shuttle Program:

"Space Shuttle processing workload is sufficiently high that it is unrealistic to depend on the current staff to support higher flight rates and simultaneously develop productivity improvements to compensate for reduced head counts. NASA and USA cannot depend solely on improved productivity to meet increasing launch demands".

"The feeling was that resources have been stretched to the limit and that any further reductions could not be handled as many specialty areas are only one deep in personnel. As a consequence, the general consensus was that it would be risky (or impossible) to accommodate an increase in flight rate."

Editor's note: Dan: Here we are 4 years later. Safety issues delay one Shuttle flight after another while the prospect of a robust and sustained multi-year launch schedule for ISS looms ahead. Yet the problem regarding the number of people and their skill mix remains. Now you want to hire new people to make up for this lack of expertise. Good idea.

You should never have cut so many people in the first place.

"United Space Alliance, the private aerospace consortium maintaining the reusable space planes, will not receive an estimated $2.5 million payment it would have otherwise earned for the on-time delivery of an orbiter for the next scheduled shuttle launch, said Michael McCulley, vice president and deputy program manager for the consortium."

Witnesses:

"U/McCormick:

... Regarding safety, Mr. Goldin expressed concern for employees whose jobs require them to be out in the sun for long periods of time. He stated that exposure to the sun was a safety concern, and he encouraged the Associate Administrators and Center Directors to work closely with Code U to develop an employee skin cancer prevention program."

Editor's note: DUH, Dan - don't you think that everyone at NASA (an organization with major centers in the hot and sunny South and Southwestern U.S. for 4 decades) has the common sense to deal with this issue by now? Aren't there slightly more pressing concerns for you to be dealing with right now?

"Mr. Goldin expressed his deep concerns regarding Shuttle launches being terminated during the last few seconds of the countdown before scheduled liftoff. Mr. Goldin strongly encouraged the Shuttle Team to aggressively work these issues."

Editor's note: The reports continue to come in: Dan is letting everyone inside and outside of NASA know that safety is his number one priority - and that he's not satisfied with the way some people at NASA are working the issue. Last Friday he unloaded on Code Q staff at HQ. Before that it was Code M's turn.

Is this just Dan's concern du jour - or is there something more to this?

"The space station is not the only focus of safety concerns. The designs for a proposed reusable launch vehicle have displeased Goldin because they do not give the crew a way to escape if the craft runs into trouble during launch. "Vladimir Titov sat on top of a Proton rocket that exploded under him. He's still alive, he flew on the shuttle, and he has a family," he told the advisory council. "This is because the Russians said: 'We will not compromise safety.'" Goldin added: "I personally asked our people to assure safety, from engine ignition through main engine cutoff. We do not have it."

Editor's note: Dan: several NASA Watch readers have pointed out that no one has ever sat atop a Proton rocket or flown into space (or anywhere) on one.

"The benefit to NASA and the space program is that all panel members serve in capacities directly related to their own work experience," Sieck said. "Being a member of the panel allows me to stay connected with the people and the programs that I've enjoyed in my career with NASA."

Editor's note: Nothing personal Bob, but my bias sensor just sounded.

"Safety in the short run is well-served,'' said panel chairman Richard Blomberg. "The long-term picture is less certain.''

"Cutbacks and a long hiring freeze have left NASA's work force so thin the agency is confronting a "brain drain" that could jeopardize the safety of space shuttle flights, an independent board reported Thursday. "

The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) will present its annual report to NASA Administrator Daniel S. Goldin at 1 p.m. EST on Thursday, Feb. 4, 1999, at NASA Headquarters. The report will be presented to the Administrator in the Program Review Center, room 9H40, NASA Headquarters, 300 E Street S.W., Washington, DC. Each year, the panel reviews and evaluates current and future NASA programs and activities and reports its findings to the Administrator in a public session. Priority is given to programs that involve the safety of human flight. The ASAP report will be available at 1 p.m. via the World Wide Web.

"Recently, we have experienced three close calls that appeared to be minor, but each could have been a contributing factor to a major incident if not for other areas of system robustness."

Note: This report is available in [text] and [Word] formats on the NASA OIG website.

Thursday, February 12, 1998, 1:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m., NASA HQ, 300 E Street, SW., Room 9H40, Washington, DC

"I remain deeply concerned about the manner in which these layoffs were planned and carried out, and I will continue to pursue a Congressional review of that issue. I am confident that the workers and managers at USA and NASA will make it their top priority to operate the Shuttle fleet safely."

"NOTE: Copies of NASA's safety analysis on the USA work force reduction process is available for review in NASA newsrooms at HQ, JSC and KSC. "

NOTE: To their credit, NASA did post this document on their website - 4 days after issuing a press release - and two weeks after the report was delivered to Dan Goldin.

However, they haven't made the electronic version of the report all that user friendly: You can download and then print out the flat text file from NASA's website or view our version now, online (Gee NASA, it took us all of 10 minutes to create the HTML version and get it online.)

1 October 1997: Memorandum for the Record Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee/House Science Committee Hearing on Space Shuttle Safety, prepared by NASA Legislative Affairs

The hearings covered the impact on safety of the recent transfer of funds away from the Shuttle program; the effects on Shuttle launch requirements resulting from the slippage of the Space Station assembly schedule; and the amount of uncosted carryovers and possible plans for its disposition.

Word has it that the Committee did a fair amount of testimony "read-back" to the NASA people testifying i.e. "well, in previous testimony, you made the following [contradictory] statement."

Ouch. Don't you hate it when they do that.

"I believe that it is mandatory that NASA put in the effort to develop a rigorous and disciplined risk assessment for the Mir station that will consider the current and expected changes for the remainder of the planned flight program. Due to the present high perceived safety risk levels, this should be accomplished ASAP! The risk assessment should be characterized in a way that rational and credible decisions can be made regarding the continuation or termination of Shuttle/Mir operations. NASA should be very aware of every instance where it has lowered its standards for human safety for the Mir operations in comparison with the standards required for its own programs and make an informed decision for each case. It is time to correct the deficiencies in the safety and mission assurance processes for the Phase 1 Program."

Note: This letter is included as Appendix B of the 29 August 1997:   Letter from NASA Inspector General Roberta Gross to House Science Committee Chair James Sensenbrenner regarding the safety - and scientific productivity - of the Shuttle/Mir program

"We are aware that the Russians have successfully surmounted serious problems on the Mir. Nevertheless, ongoing problems on the Mir are occurring at a time when the Russian government may not be in a position to provide adequate financial and technical support to enable the aging space station to operate safely. Moreover, these problems are exacerbated by the Russians' failure to timely or fully communicate with NASA. Without knowledge of the problems on Mir or its operating systems, NASA cannot fully prepare our astronauts for their mission. "

"When the Shuttle/Mir program began, the basic safety of the Mir was accepted based upon a known history of apparent safe operations. It appears in recent months that the risk level associated with Mir operations has increased. NASA must conduct credible risk assessments to fully account for the safety standards it now applies to Phase I programs. Those assessments must be based upon understanding the risks involved weighed against the expected benefits of continued operations."