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NASA Watch note: Questions raised by Congress are presented in italic.
United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 DEC 22 1998 Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of October 13, 1998 to Deputy Secretary Talbott in which you posed a number of questions for the record stemming from your committee's hearing on October 7. The answers to those questions are attached. We apologize for the delay in responding. As you know, on October 7, the Secretary was out of the country and the situation in Kosovo was at a critical point. This precluded Deputy Secretary Talbott from appearing personally at the hearing, although the Administration was represented by Dan Goldin. If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Science House of Representatives.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer Most international agreements are entered into because they provide benefits to all parties to the agreement. However, changes in political, economic or technical circumstances frequently can affect the ability of a party to adhere to an agreement. If an agreement continues to benefit U.S. interests, it is not uncommon to take reasonable steps to help keep it in force. Steps taken to adjust to new realities do not undermine the agreement, but rather strengthen it by allowing full implementation despite changed circumstances. Similarly, strengthening an agreement does not undermine the general obligation of all parties to adhere to agreements they have entered into, but rather reinforces that obligation. We believe that the participation of the Russian space industry in the International Space Station gives Russian firms a strong incentive to forego cooperation with problem states in sensitive technology, and thereby supports our non proliferation efforts.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer Parties to international agreements can and do take measures to adjust to changed circumstances. As a rule, we believe it better for parties to discuss and attempt to resolve problems that arise in implementing agreements. This is far better than having problems with one party jeopardize the entire enterprise. This is not to say that we will take any step to preserve agreements or submit to "blackmail". However, we will take reasonable steps if the benefits of a continued agreement justify the measures needed to preserve it. We do not see this as a general problem but a question of how to respond to the specific circumstance in Russia in a manner that best serves the interests of the U.S.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer The United States scrupulously adheres to its international agreements and expects its partners to do the same. However, changed political, economic or technological circumstances can justify amendments or other measures to ensure the continued vitality of agreements. Taking these steps does not undermine the value of the agreement, but rather underscores the long-term benefit we gain from the continued existence of the agreement.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Answer There was no way in 1993 that NASA or the Administration could have anticipated the current economic crisis in Russia. The Russian Government continues to work with NASA to fulfill its obligations to the International Space Station (ISS) program.
When NASA initially decided to include the Russians as partners in the ISS, Russia was - and still is - the world leader in long-duration human space flight. Aside from holding down the overall cost of the program, NASA sought the research data and experience that Russia already had in long-term space flight as a means of enhancing the ISS program. As stated earlier, there was no way in 1993 that the Administration or NASA could have anticipated the current economic crisis in Russia. Nevertheless, once it became apparent that the Russian Government would have difficulty meeting its ISS commitments, NASA developed a comprehensive contingency plan to remove Russia from the critical path of the construction and development of the ISS.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Answer Russia has assured the U.S. Government that it intends to fulfill its obligations to the ISS. In fact, the General Director of RSA, Yuri Koptev, has stated that the ISS s his agency's top human space flight priority. The United States has engaged the Russian government on numerous occasions to stress the importance of Russia meeting its commitments. Some of these discussions have been held at very high levels, including interventions by the President and the Vice President. NASA is currently working with the RSA to ensure full compliance with the IGA on schedule. NASA recently purchased for $60 million additional crew time and research stowage space on the Russian Service Module, as a means to assist RSA in maintaining the current Service Module launch date. Russia's commitment to the ISS program has been discussed at the highest levels of the U.S. and Russian Governments.
The Russians have consistently reaffirmed their commitment to meet their obligations under the ISS IGA. In addition, the RSA is currently working with the Government of Russia to obtain delayed funding for the ISS and secure adequate funding in 1999. We believe there is sufficient flexibility in the IGA to address the current situation with modification to the IGA.
The U.S. decision to include the Russians as partners in the ISS was largely predicated on Russia's position as the world leader in long duration human space flight. This experience would hold down costs and the already extant research data and experience would enhance the ISS program. Foreign policy reasons also factored into the decision. We wanted mechanisms to keep Russia constructively engaged in the international community as it emerged from its Soviet past. We also saw this as an important tool in our non-proliferation program. Neither of these goals has changed since 1993 and 1994 and in fact they have become even more urgent.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Answer We have seen the press reports concerning the transfer of rocket stages from Russia to India. The transfer of these rocket stages was permitted by the agreement the United States negotiated with Russia in July 1993 to resolve a two-year dispute over Russian plans to assist India in the indigenous production of cryogenic rockets. The results of those negotiations were briefed to Congress and widely reported in the press at that time. Pursuant to the July 1993 agreement, which was implemented beginning in September 1994, Russia agreed to limit the cryogenic engine contract to the transfer of seven complete rocket-stages to India. The stage referred to in recent press reports is one of those seven stages. We do not have any information to indicate that Russia has not been abiding by its agreement with us on this issue. Were we to obtain information to the contrary, we would make our concerns known to senior levels of the Russian government, and would urge the GOR to bring its missile exports in line with its bilateral and multilateral missile nonproliferation commitments.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer While we have developed a comprehensive contingency plan to remove Russia from the critical path of the construction and development of the ISS, such a development would not be in the overall interests of U.S. foreign policy, nor would it be in the best interest of the ISS. The U.S. is seeking to keep Russia constructively engaged in the international arena and perhaps more importantly, Russian participation in the ISS plays a vital role in our non-proliferation program.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer The non-Russian International Partners are committed to doing all they can to help Russia fulfill its obligations to the ISS during this economic crisis. NASA continues to hold Russia accountable for fulfilling its obligations to the ISS, and RSA has stated repeatedly that it intends to meet these obligations. We continue to believe that there are important technical and foreign policy reasons to keep Russia actively engaged in the ISS program.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. In May 1998 the Russian Duma adopted a resolution reorganizing the management of its aerospace industry and placing it under the administrative control of the Russian Space Agency. Since then, the Administration has sanctioned several Russian aerospace enterprises for transferring missile technology overseas.
Answer In July 1998, the United States imposed trade restrictions on seven Russian entities for engaging in proliferation activities related to Iran's missile effort. Specifically. The United States banned all U.S. Government assistance to, as well as imports from and exports to, the following seven entities: Baltic State Technical University, Europlace 2000, Glavkosmos, Grafit Research Institute, INOR Scientific Center, MOSO, and Polyus Research Institute. These penalties were imposed pursuant to Executive Order 12938 (E.O.) on proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), as amended in July 1998, which allows the imposition of penalties against entities that make certain transfers relating to nuclear weapons and WMD-capable missiles, as the USG to impose penalties in the event of an attempt to make such transfers -- not just in the event of actual transfers. The imposition of penalties under the amended E.O. reflects a determination by the USG that the named entities have materially contributed or attempted to contribute materially to the efforts of a foreign country, project or entity of proliferation concern to use, acquire, design, develop, produce, or stockpile weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. It does not reflect any judgement as to whether the activities of concern are inconsistent with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Penalties imposed under the amended Executive Order apply only to the designated entities and their subunits and successors. As with generally applicable U.S. missile sanctions law, penalties imposed under the expanded E.O. are entity-specific, not blanket penalties against the entity's country or government.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer In 1995, Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). As such, Russia agreed to abide by the MTCR Guidelines and Annex, and committed to exercise restraint in the consideration of all transfers of items contained in the MTCR Annex. Government permission is required for the legal transfer of MTCR Annex items by Russian entities. The existence of such requirements, of course, does not in and of itself prevent illegal transfers by individuals or entities. We welcomed these Russian commitments, which represent important contributions to the global fight against missile proliferation, and work vigorously with Russia in pursuit of our missile nonproliferation objectives. In this context, we have raised with Russia our concerns about reports of missile-related cooperation between Russian entities and missile programs of concern, and urged Russia to take steps to cut off the flow of sensitive items, including MTCR Annex-controlled equipment and technology, to such programs. Over the past year, Russia has taken important steps in this area. The Russia government has implemented a catch-all authority and other mechanisms to help it to ban all cooperation with missile programs of concern. It also has stopped some transactions, but has not ended cooperation with missile programs in countries of proliferation concern. We plan to continue to work with the highest levels of the Russian government to resolve this problem.
To Deputy Secretary Talbott
Submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. Answer On July 30, 1998, the United States determined that the following seven Russian entities had engaged in proliferation activities related to Iran's missile program and imposed penalties under Executive Order 12938 on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as amended in July 1998: Baltic State Technical University, Europlace 2000, Glavkosmos, Grafit Research Institute, INOR Scientific Center, MOSO, and Polyus Research Institute. Consistent with the amended Executive Order, the United States therefore banned all U.S. Government assistance to, as well as imports and exports to, the seven entities. We have no information that any of these entities is involved in the provision of flight elements or hardware for the International Space Station. While Executive Order 12398 provides for the possibility of certain limited exceptions to the assistance ban and trade restrictions, no such exceptions have been authorized for these entities.
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